

MILITARY RULE VERSUS CIVILIAN RULE: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY ON THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE OF LEADERSHIP IN PAKISTAN

Lt Colonel Inderjit Singh a/l Tara Singh

I am not at all a politician. I don't think I'm cut out for politics. I am certainly not going to stand for election.

***Gen (Rtd) Pervez Musharraf (2008)
Former President & Chief of
Pakistan Army***

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's history has been characterized by periods of military rule and political instability. It is a developing country that faces problems with high levels of poverty and illiteracy. For most of its existence, Pakistan has been under direct and indirect rule of the military experiencing four series of coup d'état by the Army from Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharraf. The military has ruled Pakistan for most of the country's existence and they have shaped and determined the internal politics, security and economic developments whilst at the same time negotiated its role in the region weakening the civilian leadership to be mere followers. The military has political influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues including mediating confrontations among the feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions which created political instability. It displaced a lawfully elected civilian government which had come into power on the strength of an overwhelming vote by the Pakistani masses.



**Pakistan bordered by India ,
Afghanistan & China**

Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected civilian government (Huntington, 2006)¹. It is a power-sharing arrangement whereby the military has important influence over foreign, security and key domestic issues, and mediates confrontations among feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions if such confrontations are deemed threatening to political order and stability. Although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic management and exercise of state authority, it is expected always to consider the military's sensibilities. The military has repeatedly demonstrated that it can and will influence the nature and direction of political change without necessarily assuming power. The military-led government stated its intention to restructure the political, economic and electoral systems. Civilian governments have come and gone with bewildering rapidity, whether overthrown by military coups or stranded by the constantly shifting loyalty of their political supporters. Yet the same people have gone on running these parties, and leading the same people or kinds of people at local level. The same has been true under military governments in Pakistan.

This paper will look into the military leadership and the civilian rule in Pakistan and make an analysis on the balance of leadership between the military and the civilian rule whilst dictating the people's choice of leadership. This will ride into the consideration of Pakistan's political future and the issues which the political leadership will have to reckon with in order to ensure the future viability of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state. The author will give his views and opinions based on facts and research with appropriate references.

¹ Huntington, Samuel: 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

POLITICAL TRANSITION OF PAKISTAN LEADERSHIP

Pakistan has experimented with half a dozen constitutions within the first 25 years of its existence. Frequent coups and military rules ensured that neither the constitution nor the other institutions of governance were allowed to evolve. The first decade was crucial to shaping Pakistan's destiny and was marked by drift and chaos. Seven different prime ministers and eight different cabinets took oaths of office during this disorderly period, resulting in the superiority of bureaucracy in the decision making, with the tacit support of the Army. Pakistan's political system can best be understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule and broken into 7 stages as mentioned by Syed Abidi's (2004)², as follows (**Figure 1**):

- The first stage was from 1947-1958 and was characterized by the Parliamentary system with the dominant class interest being the feudal land owners.
- The second stage was from 1958-1968. This was martial law with an American presidential system and saw the rise of the capitalist class.
- The third stage from 1968-1977 saw the end of Martial law (with a presidential and parliamentary system) and the beginning of the Bhutto era and the return of feudalism.
- With the coup by General Zia in 1977, military rule returned and the capitalist class was back in power. The fourth stage had begun and ended with his assassination in 1988.
- The fifth stage was characterized by civilian rule (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shariff) until Pervez Musharraf conducted his own coup in 1999 and began the sixth stage. With the events of 9/11, globalization and the rise of the internet, this phase has seen the return of the capitalist class.
- In 2008 the seventh stage of Pakistan's politics appears to have begun. The military era is about to end and the civilians is back in power.




FIGURE 1: STAGES OF MILITARY & CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP POWER IN PAKISTAN

² Syed Abidi, "Social Change and the Politics of Religion in Pakistan." Honolulu, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Hawaii, Department of Political Science, 1988.

But why has Pakistan been dominated by the poles of military and civilian power and why the pendulum between these two poles? Noted political scientist and human rights advocate, Dr. C. Inayatullah (1998) in his classic book *State and Democracy in Pakistan* argues that one creates the conditions for the other. Military became more independent and powerful controlling national politics, its top brass developed an ideology and a set of perceptions to justify their political role. As guardians of the nation, they believe they have the right to rule the nation. Once the civilians come into power, feeling threatened by the military, they attempt to control them. As well, with their feudal roots, a pattern of patronage and corruption sets in.³

POLITICAL POWERS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RULE IN PAKISTAN

The military has seldom had to face opposition in coming into power. In fact, it has been invited in by political parties and sections of the public at large. Coups have been walk-over's. With compromise rather than confrontation defining Pakistan's political culture and tradition, and with willing partners to be found by different dispensations of ideology packaged by military generals, it is not surprising that the military has ruled Pakistan for 32 of its 60 years. Perhaps it is not the military which is to blame for Pakistan's repeated military governments, but those of us who have invited it in and let it come and stay in power. The takeover by General Zia ul Haq in 1977 had crystallised the hegemony of the civil and military bureaucracy, not just on the political map of Pakistan. With political and administrative roles and interests, the civil and military bureaucracy emerged as a key and well-established entity in the economy.

But it really take-off when the military returned to power and government, under General Musharraf in October 1999 where he declared the state of emergency which claimed to be equivalent to the state of Martial Law as the constitution of Pakistan of 1973, was suspended, and the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court were fired. He also issued some amendments in the Military Act, which gave the Armed Forces some additional powers.

Pakistan succession of military and civilian rule has emphasized on Pitirim Sorokin's (1957)⁴ theory which states that events and stages of society and history are generally repeating themselves in cycles. Such a theory does not necessarily imply there cannot be any social progress. Following this theory of social change each system overreaches, becomes more corrupt, focuses on its own survival or makes long term decisions that may prove unpopular in domestic politics (peace in Kashmir, dismantling of extremist Islam), and then the other group comes in. Both have created a pendulum that only benefits their own strategies and worldview. Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other. Most commonly, the leader of the party or coalition with the most votes becomes the Prime Minister.

**Gen Zia ul Haq
1977-1998**



The position of president in Pakistan which is the head of state has traditionally been one of a figurehead, with actual powers lying with the Prime Minister. However, at various times in history, often related with military coups and the subsequent return of civilian governments, changes in the Constitution have altered the powers and privileges associated with the office of the president. In 1986 the power-hungry Zia ul Haq brought in the eighth amendment to the constitution. It allows the president to hire or fire prime ministers, governors of provinces, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, judges of the Supreme Court. The current constitution gives the President reserved powers subject to Supreme Court approval or veto to dissolve the National Assembly, triggering new elections, and thereby to dismiss the Prime Minister. The President also chairs the National Security Council and appoints the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Martial law has been declared three times in Pakistan. The issue of military compliance is also central to Michael Desch's book "*Civilian Control of the Military*" (1999)⁵. Desch Theory centres on civilian control of the military. For him, "the best indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there is not". He says that civilian control is easiest when threats are high and mostly international, hardest when they are primarily domestic.

³ The Future Of Democracy In Pakistan : A Liberal Perspective: Inayatullah, Sarah Inayatulla and Sohail Inayatullah

⁴ Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin Russian-American sociologist born in Komi (Finno-Ugric region of Russia). Academic and political activist in Russia, he emigrated from Russia to the United States in 1923. He founded the Department of Sociology at Harvard University.


⁵ MICHAEL C. DESCH is the Associate Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce and a member of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky

When neither kind predominates, the story is mixed and other factors such as military doctrine may strongly influence civilian control of the military.

IMPACT OF MILITARY RULE

The Pakistani military has played an influential role in mainstream politics throughout Pakistan's history, with military presidents ruling from 1958 to, 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2008. Muhammad Ayub Khan was the first military ruler of Pakistan, serving as the President of Pakistan. As a result of his having control of the Pakistan Army, Ayub deposed his mentor President Iskander Mirza in a bloodless military coup triggering a succession of military takeover in Pakistan history.

This was actually welcomed in Pakistan, since the nation had experienced a very unstable political climate since independence. This would be the first of many instances in the history of Pakistan of the military becoming directly involved in politics. Ayub also faced criticisms during that time on questions of family corruption and cronyism through his business links. Because the Army is Pakistan's only effective modern institution, because of the repeated failures of Pakistan's civilian governments, because of the security threats that Pakistan faces, and because of the ambitions of the generals, the Army is repeatedly drawn into the business of running other parts of the state.



Muhammed Ayub Khan
President of Pakistan 1958-1969

Samuel Huntington (2006)⁶ states that a weak economy has a major positive impact on the probability of a coup d'état with low income and poor economic performances increases the risk of further coup d'état, which keep income and growth at low rates and therefore increase the chances of future. Pakistan is the typical example of this situation in which the military leadership hopes to change the situation as they felt the current civilian government is not pushing the economic growth and the rampant disturbances by external and internal threats. In other words, the risk of the military launching a coup in Pakistan is high if the military perceives a threat to its institutional interests, a threat to the nation's external security or domestic integrity or perceives the civilian government to be illegitimate, encroaching on military prerogatives or governing poorly (Amina Ibrahim, 2009).⁷

In the late 1990s, the government of Nawaz Sharif improved the provision of key services to the population by bringing in the Army to help run everything from education to the distribution of water and power. So even before the coup of 1999 in which General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the Army had taken over large parts of the state by invitation. The provocation for the Pakistan Army's military coup was that the dismissal of General Musharraf as Pakistan Army Chief, the second in a row by the Nawaz Sharif Government.



Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
2 Terms from 1990 to 1993
& 1997 to 1999

Since Musharraf stepped down in August 2008, the high command of the Army under General Ashfaq Kayani (Chief of the Army Staff) has repeatedly stated its desire to keep out of politics and government. For the moment at least, this desire is entirely sincere. After both previous periods of military rule the generals wanted to stay out of government for a long time so as to rebuild the public image of the Army as defenders of the country against outside (ie Indian) threats. The generals have also been well aware how a long period in government makes any ruler in Pakistan unpopular, because for the reasons set out above, no government, civilian or military, can ever give the population most of what it wants or needs.

⁶ Huntington, Samuel: 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁷ Amina Ibrahim. 2009. Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? The Economic Factors of Pakistan's Military Coups, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

Pakistan gives a picture of a nation far more internally divided than it was under civilian rule. Vast sections of the Pakistani society view General Musharraf as an American stooge who has bartered away Pakistan's self respect for his own continuance in power in Pakistan after the 9/11 incident in which he supported the US against the Al Qaeda (Zaidi, 2008)⁸. This view is widely shared in the Islamic world all over, whose leadership Pakistan has always tried to claim.

CIVILIAN RULE IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan's first president was Iskander Mirza Habib, who was also the last Governor General. In 1958, he ended the constitution and declared martial law. A few weeks later, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état by General Ayub Khan, who then declared himself President. After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the new President and presided over the formation of a new constitution who served as the President of Pakistan. This constitution was completed in 1973, and reduced the presidency to a figurehead position, giving power to the Prime Minister. Bhutto stepped down as President and became Prime Minister, symbolizing the transition. The president was elected by legislative assembly members, not by popular vote. Popular vote would be used to directly elect the members of the National Assembly, including the Prime Minister.




Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
President of Pakistan from 1971 to
1973 & Prime Minister from 1973 to
1977

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto remains a controversial figure in Pakistan.

While he was hailed for being a nationalist, Bhutto was roundly criticized for opportunism and intimidating his political opponents. He gave Pakistan its third constitution, oversaw

Pakistan's nuclear programme, held peace talks with neighbour India and was more of an Internationalist with a secular image. He was sentenced to death on the charge of having ordered the assassination of a political opponent after an appeal to a higher court, Bhutto was hanged, despite appeals for clemency from several world leaders.



The electoral victory of Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) in the November 1988 Pakistani elections represents a noticeable shift from the previous pattern of male dominance in Pakistan politics. She was Pakistan's first and only female Prime Minister to date and served as Prime Minister twice, the first time Bhutto became Prime Minister in 1988 and after a successful 1993 re-election but on both occasions removed from office after only short stints on alleged corruption charges. Nawaz Sharif was twice elected as Prime Minister of Pakistan, serving two non-consecutive terms, the first in 1990 and the second in 1997. He is best known internationally for ordering Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests in response to India's nuclear tests, and the abrupt end of his final term in a dramatic coup d'état by the Pakistan military.

ANALYSIS ON MILITARY & CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN PAKISTAN

At the defense leadership level, Pakistani civil-military relations are shaped by several institutional and constitutional features, which have been highlighted by political practice through the years. The Chief of Army Staff, rather than the Defense Minister or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), is the most powerful position in the defense arena. This is in large part a reflection of the disproportionate size, seniority and prestige of the Army among the three services (Cheema, 2002,⁹). The role of the military also changed in the Zia era compared to when it was first in power under General Ayub in the 1960s. Earlier, the military had played primarily an administrative role, but under Zia it became more and more visible in the economic sector as well.

⁸ The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime Professor Akbar Zaidi is an Independent Social Scientist in Pakistan.

⁹ Dr Cheema is President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He has held senior positions in international relations, defence and security in government and universities in Pakistan and Germany.



Current Pakistan President Asif Zardari & his late wife Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan

Many lucrative positions in the huge public sector were made available to retired and serving military personnel and it became far easier for private companies to curry favour and make economic progress if they had close ties with members of the military establishment. From the Zia period right up to today, the personal wealth of a very large number of military personnel has grown in a way that could not have originated from their official salaries. For instance the National Logistics Cell is the country's biggest public sector transport organization based on a hybrid civil-military management but its main four divisions are headed by active-duty Brigadier Generals and its operations are Army managed (Siddiq, 2007). Hundreds of army personnel have posts in civilian institutions whereby civilian officials have long complained about military officers taking up senior posts in the civil service, universities and ministries. Many critics have questioned about the commitment of the Pakistan Army which should be focus into their core business of national security rather than involving in business opportunities whereby the rate of corruption seems inevitable.

Pakistan has always inherited the feudal family clan hierarchy whereby business networks are shared amongst family members besides key appointment and ministers are kept in the family loop. The rise of a woman like Benazir Bhutto to the top of the political system in an extremely conservative male-dominated society is unheard of but thanks to the inheritance from her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ms Bhutto's widower, the present President Asif Zardari, in turn became leader of the Pakistan People's Party and later President by inheritance from his murdered wife without previously ever having won a single election to as much as a municipal council seat.

In summarizing the main elements of the 1988-99 period, we can say that a middle class had begun to emerge in Pakistan and gradually also acted as a political entity taking part in the many elections that were held throughout this decade. While politics was at the forefront of this period, the economy, due to numerous factors, suffered throughout. Due to the wasteful Zia years, domestic and international debt had increased well beyond sustainable limits, and during 1988-99, Pakistan had become a highly indebted country paying large amounts of interest to bilateral and multilateral donors, all under severe structural adjustment programmes enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

On numerous occasions, Pakistan's economy was nearing bankruptcy, and following the nuclear tests of May 1998, an economic crisis of major proportions had emerged and much of the economic growth under Zia, had begun to come undone¹⁰. While these political and economic changes were the main differences that marked the 1980s with the 1990s, the cultural and social agenda inherited from the Islamist Zia period, remained largely unchanged. As shown in **Table 1** during the military rule there has been a downward trend in GDP growth, export value, income per capita growth rate and increased defence spending which paves the way for low quality of life for the people of Pakistan during the military rule. The period of military rule has not pushed the economy but reliance on high defence expenditure has traded this situation.

¹⁰ American analyst Stephen Cohen, like so many others and including General Musharraf himself, called this ten year period the 'ten years of flawed democracy'; Stephen P Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2004, p 279, emphasis in original.

	GDP Growth Rate (%)	Export Value Growth Rate (%)	Income / Capita Growth Rate (%)	Defence Spending Growth Rate (%)
Average Of Sample ((1951 -1998)	5.208	14.953	2.236	-0.750
Average of Sample Less (t-1) Coup Years	5.497	15.778	2.248	-0.250
Average of (t-1) Coup Years	3.915	5.881	2.098	-6.189

Table 1: Economic Trends in Coup Years

Sources : 1. Central Statistical Office 1959-1972
 2. Federal Bureau of Statistics 2000, 2008a, 2008b
 3. Statistics Division (1998a 13-36) and (1998c 1-7,8-14.504)
 4. IMF International Financial Statistics 1948 (Assessed from Economic & Social Data Service 2008)

Coming into power and being welcomed by a large section of Pakistan’s westernizing middle and upper classes, and by a large number of political parties which suffered under the previous Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, General Musharraf announced his arrival as Pakistan’s Chief Executive. Bringing with him a new and fresh personal style of doing business compared to General Zia, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif when Musharraf took on to solving Pakistan’s ‘problems’ in the commando style he was trained in. Given the fact that both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the two democratically elected Prime Ministers, were constantly working under the heavy shadow of the military and its numerous secret and covert agencies, and were always watching over their shoulders both were dismissed twice each when in power well before their terms ended for the military to formally take over power and also formally manage government overtly rather than as it had, covertly, must have given its leader supreme confidence.¹¹



People of Pakistan wants strong economy but hampered by Corruption Amongst Leaders Both Military & Civilian Rulers

¹¹ For an analysis and comparison of the earliest speeches made by General Ayub Khan, General Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf, see the Herald, November 1999.


From the past military and civilian autonomy in Pakistan there is a strong possibility that military rule will prevail in the future as mentioned in Pitirim Sorokin's (1957) theory about cycles of leadership in Pakistan. The masses of Pakistan needs the military as the internal threats of terrorism particularly al Qaeda and Taliban fighters alongside the border conflict with India at Kashmir. The Pakistan Army has always been associated with the thrust force in keeping the mainstream security in close governance. The masses will look into the military if the current civilian rule moves into the shadows of their former leaders in corruption, tightening the feudal family clan and other related activities which will hamper future foreign investors to enhance the current economic situation. The military's primary and official role is to serve as the protector of Pakistan's national and sovereignty. At present Pakistan Armed Forces are the final political authority and the guardian of its own economic interests. A governing civilian regime must work to establish an unquestioned dominance over the Armed Forces and therefore reduce the political and economic power.

WAY FORWARD

A year into its tenure, the civilian government is struggling to cope with the multiple challenges it faces, above all in the spheres of the economy and security. The security challenge is, of course, nothing new. In recent months the 'peace process' with India has been frozen following the terrorists attacks in Mumbai in 2009, for which India partly blames the Pakistan government. In the tribal areas, the security forces continue to struggle to contain, let alone defeat, militants with links to the Afghan Taliban and, in some cases, al-Qaeda. However, the security challenges have been compounded by spiralling economic decline of as Pakistan is hit hard by the global financial crisis. Since civilian leaders assumed power, capital flight has been in the billions of dollars. Inflation on the Sensitive Price Index¹² has gone up 33 per cent, according to Pakistan's Federal Bureau of Statistics, and demand for energy grows, even as the country is being hit by blackouts each day. With many poverty-stricken Pakistanis unable to stretch their money, daily crime is on the rise. The civilian political elite in Pakistan has been characterised by some analysts as being as much part of Pakistan's problem as the military, not least when it comes to corruption and misuse of power.

The economy experienced high growth from 1999 to 2007 under Musharraf with an average real rate of 7 % for the past five years. But economic issues were almost totally neglected during 2007's political turmoil. As global prices raised steeply, Pakistan's mechanism for the automatic adjustment of prices of oil products was dropped. The heavy cost of food and fuel subsidies caused reserves to drop from about \$14 billion in November 2008, enough to cover only two months of imports. The fiscal deficit rose to 7.5% of GDP, inflation to 25%, and the currency has depreciated by more than 20% since the start of the year. Foreign investment has dried up and investors have sought to withdraw their assets. International financial institutions estimate that some \$5bn of extra financing is needed immediately if a financial crisis is to be averted, and twice that amount over two years¹³.

Unlike Musharraf, current civilian leaders have shown themselves to be poor managers, and have not inspired confidence in the market. What the people of Pakistan want is a stable country and basic supportive requirements for them such as medical facilities, schools etc. It does matter who rules the state whether military or civilian rule although at one time military rule was more acceptable due to the weak civilian rule. But the military regime has failed in lifting the state's economy and the mainstream of corruption has increased tremendously to portray a different outlook for the people¹⁴.



**Gen Pervez Musharraf
1999-2008**

Military rule in Pakistan is increasingly relying on the carrot rather than the stick. Also, in all three cases, the United States' government and Washington's financial institutions have played a key role in supporting the Generals rule in Pakistan. Without this financial, military and diplomatic support, none of the military governments would have survived as long as they did. This factor also explains why the decades of military rule show higher growth rates for the economy than do the democratic interregnums.

¹² Sensitive Price Index is the tendency of the demand for a product or service to vary according to variations in price

¹³ "Pakistan on the brink", IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 14, Issue 9, November 2008.

¹⁴ UNDP, Human Development Report, various issues, New York.

In each of the three cases when generals ruled Pakistan, they received large amounts of financial backing from the United States and other Western governments, which allowed the military rulers to provide patronage and buy-off political opposition, but to also invest in economic resources. They could not have done this on their own. The generals have also been well aware how a long period in government makes any ruler in Pakistan unpopular, because for the reasons set out above, no government, civilian or military, can ever give the population most of what it wants or needs. The overall involvement of Pakistan's military in the ruling of this state is due to the masses requirement as the civilian rule has been infected with corruption, autocracy and mismanagement. Unfortunately the military rule has also been plagued with the same disease and the end of Musharraf's era will hopefully see the civilian power under President Asif Zardari bring peace and harmony between both parties for the future of Pakistan's people. The Army has repeatedly shown that it will not bow to civilians on national security, refusing a government order last year, for instance, to play the top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, under government control¹⁵.

CONCLUSION

Ironically it has been the history of Pakistan that Pakistani Army Chiefs have never relinquished power voluntarily. They have been pushed out of power by another Pakistani General or assassination engineered from within the ranks of Pakistan's Armed Forces. The military-led government stated its intention to restructure the political, economic and electoral systems. It is time to take stock of what military rule has accomplished in Pakistan. General Musharraf is the fourth in a line of army chiefs who seized power on essentially the same pretext, getting rid of dishonest politicians, saving the economy from bankruptcy, and preserving the security and integrity of the country. None of the past three military rulers successfully achieved these goals, and all of them left their office involuntarily. The military governments which took power promising to sweep away the political elites and their corruption also found themselves governing through them, partly because no military regime has been strong enough to govern for long without parliament.

Pakistan's only effective modern institution, because of the repeated failures of Pakistan's civilian governments, because of the security threats that Pakistan faces, and because of the ambitions of the generals, the Army is repeatedly drawn into the business of running other parts of the state. Even when the Army is not actually running the state as a whole, it is often involved in matters far beyond its constitutional mandate of defending the country. The current civilian leaders have shown themselves to be poor managers, and have not inspired confidence in the market. But the military regime has failed in lifting the state's economy and the mainstream of corruption has increased tremendously to portray a different outlook for the people. What the people of Pakistan want is a stable country and basic supportive requirements for them such as medical facilities, schools etc. For the people of Pakistan it does matter who rules the state whether military or civilian rule although at one time military rule was more acceptable due to the weak civilian rule. Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other.

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¹⁵ "Pakistan identified as biggest foreign policy test", *Guardian*, 9 February 2009

Lt Colonel Inderjit Singh was commissioned to the Royal Signals Regiment and attended all Signal career courses including Staff College in 1998. He served as an UN Military Observer and later became the first Malaysian to be selected as the MA to the Force Commander in UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2004 besides been awarded the UN Commendation Certificate for his excellent service contribution. He holds a Bachelors Degree in Science (Australia), Masters Degree in Information Technology (UM), Masters Degree in Management (UM), Diploma in Strategic and Defense Studies (UM) and Diploma Psychology (Counseling) from UKM. Since 2008 he has been a regular guest lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Command Defense & Staff College (Oslo) lecturing in organizational leadership to international students. He also lectures regularly at the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), Institute of Diplomacy & Foreign Relations (IDFR), Wisma Putra, Armed Forces Leadership Centre, other military and government organizations on leadership, organizational leadership, managing change, international negotiations, motivational & counseling and soft management skills besides being a prolific article contributor to New Straits Times on general management.



SYNOPSIS

Pakistan has been under direct and indirect rule of the military experiencing four series of coup d'état by the Army from Ayub Khan to General Pervez Musharaff. The people of Pakistan welcome military coup d'état as they felt the civilian government was not performing due to corruption, the feudal family clan system and cronyism. The military rule also has been involved in the economics of the country taking high appointments in many civilian based organizations besides providing security for the sovereignty of Pakistan but they too have been involved in corruption. The current civilian leaders have shown themselves to be poor managers, and have not inspired confidence in the market. But the military regime has failed in lifting the state's economy and the mainstream of corruption has increased tremendously to portray a different outlook for the people. What the people of Pakistan want is a stable country and basic supportive requirements for them such as medical facilities, schools etc. For the people of Pakistan it does matter who rules the state whether military or civilian rule although at one time military rule was more acceptable due to the weak civilian rule. Pakistan thus swings back and forth between military and civilian rule one side and feudal and capitalist economies on the other.