

John Searle and Posthuman Speech Acts Process Perspectives, Frames and Conditions

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Abstract

John Searle is a practice theoretician, and he looks especially at speech acts in their different forms and from a process perspective. I will discuss both practice and speech act as a process. It is useful to connect Searle to realist interpretations of poststructuralism in the posthuman sense.

Introduction

In this article, interpretations and debates started by **Raimo Tuomela** and **Brian Epstein** are in remarkable focus, as you will see. There are also theories that expand on Searlean concepts. Also, it is remarkable that the Searlean idea of collective intentionality as without contents is (neo-) communist in the sense that it emphasizes the larger surrounding structures.

The practice theory is connected to the registrations, according to **Jacques Derrida** and **Maurizio Ferraris**. The connection is through the idea that there is an idea of text more holistic (Marxist as Derrida called himself) than analytical social ontology and text also emphasizes one term, namely, text, to explain the whole causation as also practice, and then analytical social ontology has three terms in Searle's background, and performative and collective intentionality explain causation in social ontology. In practice theory there also are performatives, but they are not as important as in Searle's theory because they only somewhat vary some Marxist postmodern themes and do not work as basic structure as theory as in Searle performatives' function. This is important in the larger context of this article, because the idea of trace and remembering are also behind the practice.

Process ontology is present nowadays in many theoretical areas of philosophical cultural theory, like in the theory of Slavoj Žižek and Rosi Braidotti, which sees process and being as more important in a process sense, more important than other forms of ontology with differentiated entities. The process ontology in philosophy and cultural theory is a way to understand how things become and have different intensities and therefore identities in the way that there are force fields metaphorically that effect the entities if written in analytical non-process terms (as I do). The idea of speech act is connected to the process or posthuman reading of social ontology (there are, like posthuman theories of speech acts, a very strong connection between the analytical theory of speech acts and posthumanism) in general, and speech acts; **Gilles Deleuze**, and, for example, **Emmanuel Renault** (2016) have theorized speech acts from the point of view of posthumanist theory. According to Renault, critical social ontology is process ontology. I will look into the ideas of some of the leading critical posthumanist-oriented thinkers. From this process perspective (that is also posthuman), I attempt to see to posthuman speech acts and therefore social ontology. The posthumanism that explains Searle's concept of speech act is the ultimate goal of this article. I will develop these posthuman speech act ideas in both practice- and process-theoretician theoretical frameworks. The most important of these posthuman theoreticians who has theorized speech acts is **Manuel De Landa** because De Landa has done the most work to turn Deleuze's work to non-Marxist institutional economist terms that correspond with Searle, who publishes in an institutional economics journal, and Searle is, maybe, the most famous analytical social ontologist and certainly is remembered for his speech act theories. And there is one more philosopher who writes about Searle's concept of collective intentionality, namely **Anthony Meijers**, in whose theory there is a need to see more posthuman theory in the sense that he describes, need towards the contents approach to collective intentionality. A contents approach to collective intentionality sees collective intentionality as code that is self-sufficient, as in a sense it has its own code, its own rules; the collective intentionality on the contents approach kind of happens on its own with nothing like an environment surrounding it. In Searle's approach, there are no contents of collective intentionality; the collective intentionality is only part of a much larger process that is the Marxist intuition also as a centrally planned state.

The idea in posthumanism in general is that also non-humans like objects have the acting capacity to create the contents of collective intentionality. There are also Wittgensteinian theories able to see through this question of the interplay of the material and social. Posthuman speech acts are sketched from the general notion that "bundles of resources" and people making something like coffee in the cafeteria in this assemblage, or in a Wittgensteinian sense, the general

notion of a language game as working together giving tools to each other while working. I will take a critical stance towards this.

I will argue that there is a great need for some coherence with posthumanism and therefore different ways to understand speech acts. Some new interpretations of collective intentionality as such must be represented, and I have introduced some names and ideas. My conclusion is to criticize poststructuralism – assemblage is not enough. There is a real possibility of posthuman speech acts, poststructuralism in some senses, in my research. I use pragmatist and realist notions also from critical theory to sketch out some posthuman implications and possibilities of posthumanism in John Searle's theory of social ontology and speech acts, namely, performatives, which are the same thing as a speech act. There is a contents approach to collective intentionality that defines the outside of the there-and-now-happening place of collective intentionality. Then there is the mode account of collective intentionality that gives more space to performatives in Searlean theory, but performatives are coming from spaces coded from outside or not coded but intensified. Posthumanism seems to support the contents account of collective intentionality since posthumanism is creative and nice, and that is only possible in small places not coded from outside. The Searlean view emphasizes performatives but opposes the postmodern theories and therefore also posthumanism and claims things are ordered from outside of the thing where collective intentionality actually happens.

John Searle and speech acts

I will research John Searle and posthuman speech acts. There is a strong tendency to see Searle mainly as a speech act theoretician; Eerik Lagerspetz claimed when advising my thesis that if Searle is remembered for something it will be (at least) for his theory of speech acts he was a pioneer in. I will look at Searle's speech acts in more general social ontological contexts in the sense that speech acts can only be a theory of speech acts and in Searle's social ontology was developed much later than his theory of speech acts.

Speech acts have often been theorized in a posthuman way (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, Zizek 2014, Barad 2007, De Landa 2016) that actually also opens possibilities to read Searle's entire social ontology also in a posthuman way. Searle has also developed social ontology since it came into fashion. To do analytical social ontology, Searle combined his ideas of speech acts and philosophy of mind and opposition to postmodernism and created social ontology, which was also a bestselling Penguin book. In it, 1) speech acts are one of the three terms that explain causation. The other two terms are 2) background and 3) collective intentionality. Collective intentionality is important to the speech act because the speech act is based on collective intentionality (collective intentionality explains causation in Searle's social ontology but is also based on larger processes) in Searle's theory.

Searle believes "objects and people cannot perform function solely in terms of their physical nature" (Searle, 2010, 7) In this respect, Searle believes that there is "performance of the function that there is collectively recognized status of the person or object" (Searle, 2010, 7) Searle explains status function to end "in virtue of that status the person or object in question can perform the function in question" (Searle, 2010, 7) Searle specifies the theory of speech acts to declarations only by writing about speech acts (also called performatives), concluding that "performatives are members of class of speech acts I call 'declarations'. In declarations the state of affairs represented by the propositional content of the speech act is brought into existence by the successful performance of that very speech act" (Searle, 1995, 34) So the speech act is a process, maybe also including nature, as I will argue can be theorized according to this.

The debates on the contents of collective intentionality and the possibility of continental thought like process thought speech acts are two important and interesting debates to briefly look at in order to also create readings of speech acts and social ontology including posthuman elements.

Searle and Tuomela as a Debate on Collective Intentionality's Contents

I will also add to this discussion Finnish philosopher Raimo Tuomela and his more rule-oriented social ontology. The point is to refer to the debate on the contents of collective intentionality that is briefly also looked at in order to theorize speech acts as posthuman. The difference between posthuman speech acts and Searlean speech acts is basically the particular, even communitarian, logic of posthuman speech act meaning code in only the present situation of collective intentionality and then the Searlean kind of (neo-) communist collective intentionality that just happens in its background force. In Searle, the environment, the background dispositives, and other elements make collective intentionality happen in a certain way. The debate on contents of collective intentionality is not straightforward and is vague, but I use it to understand the different aspects of speech acts. There can be a like-self-sufficient code of collective intentionality, and then the speech act caused by this form of collective intentionality (roughly speaking) is like posthuman referring to code and there is the possibility to take it into another context with the same attributes.

Basically, in Searle, then, collective intentionality is stable or as coming from the environment, and then it is not possible to take into a different context.

Speech acts are based on the idea that we act together and there is debate on collective intentionality about (somehow exact) knowledge of what we do together or as a thing coming from the environment like the example of playing football that is some kind of trend that imitates the business-oriented football industry. Collective intentionality is the collective we intend (Searle 1996, 2010). There has been a debate about the contents of collective intentionality, whether the contents of collective intentionality are theoretically necessary (Searle 1996, 2010, Tuomela 2007, Bratman, 2014, Kirk, 2016). Bratman and Kirk propose contents (meaning code of only collective intentionality working theoretically on its own) of collective intentionality, and Searle and Tuomela reject the contents of like-individual collective intentionality. The content means here the way to understand the contents as empty or not. Tuomela and Searle share a mode account of collective intentionality. Basically, Searle and Tuomela also refer more to (scientific) realism, and therefore the mode of collective intentionality comes and rises likewise from a scientific-style environment and realism. The point is that there is some mode that has no contents because in roughly, maybe like a system-theoretical way, the surrounding of collective intentionality places the mode of collective intentionality.

Background does not work on the basis of the information in the registrations or code because Searle explains that if people are sensitive to the rules, they follow the rules according to rule sensitivity, namely a non-linguistic sensing of rules (based on the environment as explained as roughly the mode account of collective intentionality). Raimo Tuomela has written in his article about the practice as defined as something through collective acceptance that gives a kind of legitimacy to the practice. There is a certain kind of definition of some practice collectively. It also involves obligations and other commitments (Tuomela, 2003 (eds. Koepsell Moss) 123-165). This conferring or speech act gives new meaning to practice, according to Tuomela. He directly refers to practice, and this is why he is referred to here. Then, also, the point is to make clear that the borders of analytical social ontology are vague and the possibilities for its use for posthuman theory as frame are limited. There is a discussion of rules and obligations and suchlike acceptance (those tied to individuals intentionality) in both theoreticians of seemingly Marxist and posthuman mode account of collective intentionality.

Tuomela does think that Searle's theory is too narrow and it leaves out expectation-based social norms that are more regarding Wittgensteinian norms described by Bloor (1997) (Tuomela, 2003 (eds. Koepsell Moss) 149). Tuomela claims that Searle has too simplistic an idea of social institutions and criticizes the idea of a physical X term. I will analyse Tuomela in order to see the mode account of collective action according to a YouTube video of a symposium on Ludwig Kirk's account of collective action (2017)¹. Kirk's book and around it the (so-called) happenings are about the debate between more generally different views, the mode account and contents account of collective intentionality defined above. The point to looking at Kirk's ideas of collective intentionality differences in social ontology is that the distinction lines go in different directions in the debates and where performative (speech act) is used and then also posthumanism goes in a different direction. Posthumanism is near realism and explains all of history and human doings also in a big history way in general (different posthuman famous big histories), and Searle is a realist and explains many things in a very large scope (general information), so he also uses a lot of term speech acts, so the more narrow analytical social ontology of Bratman, for example, should therefore intuitively not be the posthuman way to understand speech acts. This is only one view in many relevant senses that can be used in an academic article.

One possible solution to these debates of collective intentionality is a more continental and Marxist view of environment (Fernand Braudel), for example through power. The Marxist kind of Braudelian views go through the small theoretical details of these debates to the bottom of theories of posthuman speech acts (as part of social ontology, a minor issue in this paper). Searle describes using power as two cases: 1) a first agent can make a subject want to do something he would have not otherwise wanted to do, and 2) a second agent can show the options as such, that there are no other options available. (Searle, 2010, 147) The problems that Ferraris addresses are understood here in terms of practices, which are given meaning as Tuomela (2003) argues in his theory of collective acceptance or intentionality. These theories always point towards possibilities of Marxist continental readings of the debates in a more general and even common-sense way.

This brings us to look at a posthuman reading of social ontology that backs up the argument of speech acts that are posthuman (at least in some sense). Let us now look into a totally new argument in social ontology that is nonetheless

¹ The debate on different types of social ontologies in analytical social ontology and its kind of resolution triggered the happenings around Ludwig Kirk's book

tied to previous ones. Brian Epstein introduces a posthuman interpretation of the collective intentionality debate in the same kind of networked center of some debates as Kirk.

The point is to look first in the Kirk debate (which is tied to general distinction lines between different kinds of collective intentionalities in different social ontologies, which is the main kind of debate I look into in context of this article, and then there are the other things like Epstein and Kirk's debates) and then to proceed to the more posthuman-oriented Epstein debate regarding the topics of the Kirk debate but with a more posthuman-oriented thinking that might help to also create a united picture of posthuman speech acts. I will also briefly address these debates to try to explain the general picture of the field of debates.

There is then (maybe) a possibility for a posthuman reading of these debates referred to above also in this way. I have noted in the margins of a page of Epstein saying social facts depend on parts of the world we interact with in microeconomics. For instance, we typically model economy not just as interacting individuals but also including "bundles of resources" they own. Here the individual-territories include not just people but bundles they govern" (Epstein, 2015, 48). This argument is brought to the fore because it shows different ways to approach and consider again the individualism-holism debate that the property and environment of some smaller group is in a certain way de facto put as a priority. This is also important to briefly sketch out for purposes of this speech act theory or, in other words, performative article. This is contingent but helps to show a posthuman understanding of collective intentionality with material "bundles of elements" included.

To bring forth some theoretical substance to use in the end of article to theoretize posthuman speech, Epstein's use of famous American neo-pragmatist Hilary Putnam is brought to the fore; this American neopragmatist philosopher's ideas are also influential for Searle. I will look at Putnam more from the perspective of Epstein because of the reason of substance. Epstein does social ontology and comments also on Searle, and my point is to comment here on Searle's scientific realism in many ways.

Epstein comments that high level properties are multiply realizable at a lower level. This means that the particles are not important for the function of the object composed of these particles. Epstein uses the example of a screwdriver (Epstein, 2015, 31). Epstein means a screwdriver is used to turn screws, but it might be composed of different particles even though it functions like a screwdriver. He provides his readers with example of a screwdriver: "it (screwdriver) can be made of steel wood or hard plastic and still function to turn screws" (Epstein, 2015, 31) This idea of (at least some kind of) emergence, meaning the non-reducibility of more complex entities to smaller parts, partly explains collective intentionality as some kind of posthuman collective intentionality. The emergence is the multiple realizability, meaning that the particles composing the function can break down if there are many risks like in posthumanism, and then there are no more emergent properties but many kinds of properties are like waste, for example. Then screwdrivers in the waste bin might be something different after a thousand years.

In individualism the screwdriver would only be a product to use now and then, and a human can always get a new screwdriver, so the (magnificent and ironic) point of this is only the screwdriver (not waste, for example). He describes how individualism fails in a cellular level explanation that an anatomical explanation doesn't fail at if it is only at the cellular level. In the same way, an individualist explanation doesn't explain the whole society, according to Epstein. (Epstein, 2015, 46-47) So the multiple realizability from the previous chapter means that a screwdriver has a different meaning when thought of in a whole society, like waste is waste, and it is good to reproduce it no matter how creative some guy is with the screwdrivers, for example.

Epstein gives the example that "It is absurd to think that social facts – like action performed by Starbucks Corporation – are nothing more than the psychological states of individual people" (Epstein, 2015, 48) There, citing Epstein, it is, as described, the material particles that the collective intentionality of working in a café are explained with more than with pure intentionality. Epstein joins the code thinking of collective intentionality as self sufficient with posthumanism in some sense. By this, I mean that there is a connection with the contents approach to collective intentionality and posthumanism.

As argued in last paragraph, there are posthuman ideas of codes included in the contents approach to collective intentionality. This idea is that posthuman theory from Deleuze's of assemblages is the theory explaining some part of speech act theory. The other part is of Searle's side of collective intentionality-style theory, as explained earlier. Assemblage is the general theory of different meanings, the speech acts and bundles of resources and collective intentionality. For instance, Starbucks is an assemblage with the collective intentionality to make a café together and a name given by a performative and the "bundles of resources" that are used to make a café in Starbucks. This is one example of this issue of posthuman and non-posthuman ways to understand meanings, economics, and social ontology.

There is the posthuman (contents in collective intentionality) way to understand the cafeteria as an actual cafeteria important in itself. Then there is the (neo-) communist way to understand the cafeteria just being kept somehow by different surrounding factors as explained in the example that amateur football players don't consider the game important but just play imitating commercial professional games and others.

Posthuman speech acts are created from posthuman collective intentionality with the "bundles of resources" (briefly sketched), and it is interesting to think what speech acts would be if there were no background that is the central idea in general in ordinary language philosophy. Background is so central to Ludwig Wittgenstein, so when discussing his conception of background, Searle discusses Wittgenstein. The idea of collective intentionality with contents in a different form than the background is interesting since, then, performative is missing the central term in ordinary language philosophy. In the contents approach, the process of forming speech acts as a complete whole is more easily seen.

Maurizio Ferraris has claimed that documentality and/or registers is the basic notion in the understanding of causality and the structure of social ontology in general. The main difference between the theories of Ferraris and Searle is that Ferraris wants to replace the activities falling under collective intentionality with documentality. Searle's theory was a pioneering work in the analytical branch of social ontology. Ferraris also separates written and spoken acts. He writes about speech acts and distinguishes between them, asserting that "institutional acts may have various levels of deliberateness and of rituality" (Ferraris, 2013, 169). Searle admits the importance of background assumptions, interpretation principles for the formation of causality in the social, like Ferraris. Ferraris (2013) stretches the contents of collective intentionality in the same way as Kirk and Bratman.

Derrida's book *Archive Fever* (1994) addresses this phenomenon. Ferraris' idea about documentality is the already-explained new realist thesis that text is at the origin of social being. (Ferraris 2013.) Nevertheless, this is contrary to Searle's ideas because, according to him, postmodern thought that gives interpretation endless options to work without restrictions is not a working explanatory model. In other words, Searle will attempt to show how the starting point of each event can be traced in the context of speech acts, and if that is not possible, the speech act in question can be included in the category of perlocutionary acts². What does this mean in a posthuman sense? The context of a speech act is also the entirety of pressures by which the society also often at least perlocutionally acts.

The question is partly about a controversy concerning the classification of speech acts. According to Jacques Derrida, performatives have been considered as one category that cannot be broken. On the other hand, Searle has maintained Austin's separation between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Judith Butler illustrates Searle and Austin's contentious distinction as follows: "Whereas illocutionary acts proceed by way of conventions perlocutionary acts proceed by way consequences" (Butler, 1997, 17). None of these theoreticians have been seen as posthuman, and in a posthuman sense, the story is simpler. The idea is also that in a posthuman sense the accidents (consequences as a joke) are more general, and different objects can affect them if it is assumed that nature and society are intertwined (and that in societal intentional processes there is a factor from natural brute objects consisting of different causal tendencies in a critical realist sense that shape the situation in a perlocutionary sense). Contents of collective intentionality are the way to try to fix these effects (with the concept of performative not much used in that branch of theory) with contents of intentions included in collective intentionality there and now.

According to Due, Deleuze applies this genetic principle of causality to all features of social organization, including the human "subject" (Due, 2007, 130.) The formal starting point of their method is multiplicity. A multiplicity is an indeterminate "group" defined formally as *a capacity to be affected* prior to the elements that it will consist of" (Due, 2007, 130.). The performatives are speech acts and therefore are at the heart of the opportunities and possibilities of speech acts. The speech acts are affected before the elements of speech, such as syllables. The multiple realizability thesis partly explains this as there being an effect coming from a higher level that can be realized in many ways. This is the formal way to model this.

In Deleuze's social ontology, objects as tendencies are connected to each other with unstable flows. This means that there are tendencies that some object might be realized, but the flow as an unstable way of acting makes most of the objects unreal. In speech acts, the same logic of perlocutionary acts (with unstable context) is often functioning, meaning that a speech-act-creating object, for example, the name of the boat, is not always realized in the sense that there can already be a name for the boat, so the social facts might not be suitable to realize the performative, such as if

² A perlocutionary act is a speech act that has no fixed meaning

the name of the boat is masculine, and there is other flow from history such as the convention that a boat always has a feminine name. This gives some hint of posthuman adaptations of the speech act theoretically in social ontology.

The posthuman story is that there is only one level and different surprising effects causally (also in speech acts) as seen in Deleuze's causal principle³. This is called an assemblage. This is how poststructuralism is against power (also as in the Derrida paragraph above). Material elements have meanings that have surprising effects.

Searle is against the contents of collective intentionality and therefore against a process posthuman understanding of collective intentionality with actual contents in an actual situation where collective intentionality is practised. Emmanuel Renault has made the distinction between two types of social ontology: "The first of these two ontological interrogations deal with the types of entities that compose or constitute the social world. The second approach deals with the type of being that is proper to social reality" (Renault, 2016, 23). Searle deals with (even if he talks of processes a bit) entities that are proper to social being and a kind of the only states there are in nature and larger society together in the background (in many senses this is proper here theoretically and metaphorically since background is a term connected to the natural capacities of humans) and collective intentionality is an entity connected to certain entities, not a way of being. This means that process ontology addresses the way of being in the collective intentionality in the code; this is kind of a conservative way of being that is not controlled from the outside but from the inside with tight cosmetic rules.

Renault (2016) has represented how critical social ontology is always that of process ontology. Deleuze, as discussed earlier in this paper, also has process ontology as a basis, and he does it in a clearer manner. There is always a complex process of material and textual or discursive elements. Relational social ontology is often pragmatist, as is Renault. The idea that critical theory is about process comes from the fact that critical theory of the Frankfurt School wanted to preserve culture and because of these cosmetically-controlled code-type collective intentionalities with contents.

The definition of process ontology for Renault (2016) is that of multiple levels and parts interacting. Social ontology as process ontology is as a negotiation between different elements, natural and social, in a process of being. Those elements negotiated might be, for example, flowers, which are natural, as Searle puts it, but socially they have (in a rough sense) different meanings communicated in a semantic process with all the meanings of the social. Epstein sees the gap between Renault and Searle because there are relations and possibilities to realize natural and/or social and functional properties like the social cultural meaning of a screwdriver and its use function to turn screws and it being some material as a natural element like wood to burn or plastic to make napalm, for example.

Furthermore, according to Derrida, power is a skill to make a subject see binary couples such as natural and social, whether the subject wants it or not. This general notion of Derrida explains how different-level entities can also be realized in speech acts. There is the posthuman idea of speech acts that the meanings of objects can be understood as speech acts from the natural to the social level (with the functional level in between, as described in the screwdriver example).

What the authors (Deleuze and Guattari) refer to as an "assemblage" is a stratum that has become decoded, that is, one in which the value of the coding parameter is low, as when animal behaviour stops being determined by genes, or when human behaviour ceases to be fully specified by written norms" (De Landa, 2016, 23) This is how poststructuralism is against power in decoding as deconstructing a code in general. Then human institutions have a role when the decoding happens backed by a violence monopoly, as Searle and Derrida both seem to claim. This is when the performatives, or in other words the speech acts, start to have an effect. Nature is not nature, but socially categorized behaviour is also natural in some sense. There is an interpretation that no coding comes from one source, nature or society, and this is posthuman.

According to Manuel De Landa, it is hard to approach the study of languages from assemblage theory because language simultaneously works at many levels.

- 1 Words and languages are parts of many assemblages. Language interacts not only with material components but also with non-linguistic expressive components. So language is a variable of social assemblage.
- 2) Some linguistic entities have the ability to code all components of some assemblage that is marked as the object of those linguistic components (religious discourse, written constitutions), so language is a parameter of social assemblage.
- 3) Language is an assemblage in itself.

³ Deleuze's causal principle is the idea that there is an everything that effects everything very possibly and no clear linear causal chain can be seen.

In the first case, linguistic entities are variables of a social assemblage, but in the second case, they become the parameter of it. De Landa states that a given language can also be studied as an assemblage in itself. (De Landa, 2016, 51-52) This is also familiar in the Wittgensteinian idea of a language game. There are expressions and material elements connected to language.

De Landa states that speech acts do not create effects if they are not enforced. (De Landa, 2016, 53) This is the same idea as Derrida's idea that violence is always beneath some performative or institution in general.

De Landa concludes that for a "brief account of languages as variables (or components) of social assemblages it will be useful to clarify some of the terminology used by the authors." (De Landa, 2016, 55) American pragmatism is an important point in some variants of posthumanism that De Landa is also part of in some senses. I have argued in this article that language is a social assemblage in a De Landian sense.

The article's point is that a speech act can be caused from a relatively separate actual particular place where there is collective intentionality, where the people included know what it is about from the contents of collective intentionality and then the mode account of collective intentionality that is about some general setting around collective intentionality fixing the collective intentionality. There is a kind of middle way in Ferraris' text positing that there are external movements to show what is collective intentionality (in analytical social ontological terms) but the information-meaning text in Ferraris theory is more general, coming also from the outside, and also possible to replace Searle's mode account of collective intentionality.

For example, within the framework of Ferraris' theory, it is possible to say that in order to lock the ritual meaning into position, it is necessary to have external gestures. Ferraris defines ritual as external gestures that have internal impact. (Ferraris, 2013, 215) Therefore, Searle defines the performative as more crucial than Ferraris because Searle has accounts only of strict institutions and speech acts; they are more relevant to Searle than to Ferraris, who is more focused on loose human conventions like art and rituals. Ferraris functions theoretically as a bridge between posthumanism and the realism of John Searle.

In the general framework of the theoretical frame of reference, Ferraris sets the written acts first. According to Ferraris, a speech act can be only a manifestation, and the necessary conditions for the performative are in the registers (Ferraris, 2013, 171-172). As far as I can see, speech acts are a very essential feature. They lead to significant new services of the textual factors. Smith theorizes that documentary acts rely on communication, which increases the pressure to rely on Ferraris when interpreting the Searlean idea of the deontic forces.

Searle seems to think that the effects go to the material as entity, and material is just a passive receptor of effects. There is no process being in Searle. The Searlean example of a piece of paper as status function is not important in itself, and therefore it only adapts to the different natural processes around that also are. Anthonie Meijers writes about Searle's concept of collective intentionality – that the concept's content is underdeveloped. He also briefly explains the basics of different sides in the contents of the collective intentionality debate. According to Meijers, in Searle's framework, the only possible way to illustrate the collective intentionality is that different individuals can have different modes of the same types of we-states that are collective intentionality. He asserts that Searle's view that collective intentionality is just mode seen from outside as some mode of some collective intentionality has been heavily criticized because it is not enough for a condition of shared intention that it is the same by coincidence. (Meijers, 2003, 174-175) Meijers does the explaining of different theories of collective intentionality through a mild critique of Searle. There is the possibility of a posthuman speech act between these theories of collective intentionality. The speech act is the more marginal theoretical part of social ontology though of collective intentionality with no contents, since then the performative only takes effects from the general background and general causality.

Conclusions

In this article I concentrate on speech acts and their causal effects. Introducing alternative accounts of Searle's performative ideas of causality in social ontology is one central theme of this article. The alternative accounts come from many levels of theory like from that of the speech act and then different types of collective intentionality distinguished in levels of contents or no contents of collective intentionality. The idea of the realist theme of natural brute fact intrasive level and the phenomenological of how we see as transitive is the middle of social structure where the speech act is situated abstractly also causally in this paper. I have introduced some relevant names and ideas. Intentional states also contain objects. Objects are actors in a network or flow in a posthuman sense. This is also realist thinking. In posthumanism the story of collective intentionality (creating a social ontological basis for a speech act) is very different. This also leads to different results in ideas of posthuman speech acts.

I have argued that that there are controversial positions in speech acts and posthumanism, and different demarcation lines must be drawn theoretically to posthumanly cartographically map the possible theories, as has been done in the paper.

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