

Examining Intolerance of Atheist Speech over Time and Across Generations

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Abstract

Since the mid-1950's, the study of political intolerance has been an important element in public opinion research. Much of the debate has focused on whether, why, how, and with what consequences tolerance has changed in the United States. Little is known about the dynamics of intolerance over long periods of time by the same individuals and across generations. This research addresses the issue of stability and the interrelationship of social, political, and psychological characteristics with intolerance of anti-religious speech. The analysis represents substantial progress in the effort to understand political intolerance arising from generational, life-cycle, and period effects. The longitudinal results show that individuals became less intolerant, but that cleavages exist between the generation coming of age in the 1960's as compared with the previous and successive generations.

Keywords: Intolerance, lifecycle, period, generational, trends

Introduction

Given the theoretical importance of political tolerance it has been the subject of numerous empirical studies in democratization, participation, and system effectiveness. It is hardly surprising that many of these studies have tried to determine the extent to which support for tolerance exists among the general public and to provide important connections between tolerance and the way democracy in America actually works. The earliest studies made substantial progress in the effort to understand the levels and sources of political tolerance and support for democratic values (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1979, 1982; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Gibson, 1992; Golebiowska, 1995; Marcus et al., 1995; Mondak and Sanders, 2003). Much of this progress focused on the conceptualization, measurement, and sources of political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; Finkel, et al., 1999: 203-205; Gibson, 1992; 2005; Mondak and Sanders, 2003, 2005;).

Still, not much is known about the stability of political intolerance attitudes over an individual's lifetime. Since Karl Mannheim's essay on political generations in 1929, it has often been argued (though hard evidence has been in short supply) that the processes of birth, aging, and death have important consequences for public opinion (Mayer, 1992: 141). Given the historic and rapid nature of political change, investigating the interrelationship of social, political, and psychological characteristics with intolerance over the life course could have important implications for our understanding of the sources and consequences of political tolerance. There is presently no consensus on the dynamics of political intolerance over long periods of time.

The study of change over time in political beliefs is a complex matter, and methodological and conceptual problems abound. The topic is of particular interest because of the subsequent speculation about the detrimental effects of intolerance on society. Of special concern is the question of why changes in opinions occur, and the present study examines this question. This paper reports intolerance for antireligious speech among the same individuals and across three lineage generations stretching from 1965 to 1997 (see Appendix A for wave panel summary). Our evidence enlightens the debate about the dynamics that are associated with intergenerational maintenance, acquisition, and reduction of intolerant beliefs.

A second objective is to see how well Sullivan et al.'s model of generic tolerance would perform when applied to the narrower question of the sources of intolerance toward a specific civil liberties dispute. While a number of studies examine "focused intolerance" towards specific target groups, none employs longitudinal data and so are limited in their ability to examine the relative impact of the key predictors to intolerance over time for the *same* individuals and across three lineage generations. Since a strategy employed here is to determine if the generations are more alike or unlike, and why, we examine the influence of the social, psychological, and political predictors and the presence of intolerance for each generation. Of importance here is the extent to which changes in an individual's environment may create instability in attitudes, and which environmental factors significantly contribute to the change.

The earliest empirical study of tolerance (Stouffer, 1955) utilized a similar measure designed to examine the extent to which Americans were prepared to extend procedural rights to atheists and two other groups on the left, communists and socialists. Gibson's research (2008), comparing intolerance and political repression from 1954 to 2005, finds that among a list of preselected groups, one in five Americans find atheists objectionable - rivaling dislike of communists, and those who would do away with elections and let the military run the country. Similarly, Peffley and Sigelman (1990) argue the utility from a theory-building perspective of testing the Sullivan et al. general model of tolerance to the study of specific groups. In this way, investigating "focused intolerance" toward a specific group provides a stringent "test" of the generalizability of the sources of intolerance to a very different history era and political context (Peffley and Sigelman, 1990: 95).

Thus, the intuitive appeal of the approach used in this study is to advance theoretical accounts for variations in political intolerance irrespective of generational placement, life-cycle, and differences in the political context. Unlike other studies of political tolerance, we have the added advantage of "before" and "after" measures and lengthy panel data. Specifically, the research design encourages an effort to examine the relative impact of the predictors of intolerance of anti-religious speech and to assess the consequences of how changes in these determinants affect some of our most fundamental hypotheses about the origins of intolerance.

Key Concept

The scholarly consensus suggests that political tolerance constitutes a willingness to grant the full rights of citizenship uniformly and without exception. Tolerance implies the willingness of citizens to extend civil liberties even to those with whom they disagree. In this sense, tolerance implies a commitment to the "rules of the game" and a willingness to apply them equally (Sullivan et al., 1982). Tolerance ensures individuals or groups the ability to express unpopular opinion without fear of persecution. From this perspective it is the exception to extend full legal rights that signals intolerance: *"people are intolerant provided that they advocate any restriction of political acts that are otherwise permissible under law"* (Mondak and Sanders, 2005, p. 326).

Consequently, any deviation from the commitment to the rights and liberties of others reflects some degree of intolerance (Lawrence, 1976; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Bobo and Licari, 1989). The general literature on democracy and the literature on political tolerance, suggests one requirement is a dedication to the inalienable right of free speech including the protections for anything that insults or defames religions. Thus, in keeping the focus on political intolerance, respondents are being asked to extend the *constitutional* right of free speech to criticize churches and religion.

From this vantage point, it is possible to compare the political intolerance attitudes of today with those of the past, and to speak confidently about trends in intolerance that result from lifecycle, generational, or period effects. There have been many suggestions in the literature that younger people typically are more tolerant than are older people. This was originally attributed to a lifecycle effect i.e. the tendency for people to become less tolerant as they age (Stouffer, 1955; Sears, 1983). But more recent studies have found no evidence of this aging effect and indicate instead a generational effect so that recent cohorts are not only more tolerant than earlier cohorts but tend to remain so as they grow older (e.g. Davis, 1975; Cutler and Kaufman, 1975; Wilson, 1994). Overall, the picture emerging is one where tolerance attitudes are invariably the result of generational rather than life-cycle effects. Because of their particular research design, however, these studies cannot answer questions such as to why individuals may be more intolerant as compared to similarly situated individuals in previous or later generations, or how those intolerant attitudes develop and change over the lifecycle. As such, we know very little about how stable intolerance beliefs are, and the extent to which the predictors are relevant over an individual's life-course.

In the following section we will begin with a discussion of several hypotheses regarding explanations of individual change, and a review of evidence pertaining to several central issues that arise from these hypotheses. The main question is to what extent age, cohort, period, and individual characteristics contribute to the longitudinal explanation of intolerance for the right to criticize churches and religion? This discussion provides the theoretical basis for our presentation of findings. Next, we will describe the data and measures used to test these hypotheses. In the final section, we will present and discuss the results of our analyses.

Explanations of Change

In comparing generations with each other, and with themselves over time, one must be aware of four types of phenomena: (1) continuity and discontinuity as a function of (2) life-cycle effects, (3) generational effects, and (4) period effects. The importance of age, period, and cohort in explaining variations in trust stems from the understanding that the specific source of change can have important – albeit different and possibly, negative – consequences on society.

Hypotheses

Exactly how might age, year of birth, and experience affect baseline intolerance judgments as well as the stability of these judgments? The relationship between age and intolerance should be considered in accordance with the two leading explanations of the “age” predictor. A *life-cycle* explanation argues that the distinctive patterns exhibited by a cohort are due not to the years in which its members were born and raised, but to their position in the life-cycle (Mayer, 1992: 146). The life-cycle explanation assumes a process of development in which experiences are a function of age and when we observe all birth cohorts change in tandem as they grow older, these changes are presumed to be manifestations of life-cycle effects. This claim implies:

H1A (Lifecycle Intracohort Change): If intolerance represents a life-cycle effect, age-related patterns and changes will be marked by the younger cohort (the 1965 high school senior class or Gen 2) showing similar intolerance of anti-religious speech as their parent’s cohort (Gen 1) at the same point in the life-cycle.¹

From a life-course perspective, a critical question is whether opposition to atheist speech in the younger cohort changes with age or whether in their adult years they adhere to the political orientations developed during their youth. Life-cycle effects may also be an important explanation for increasing attitudinal stability. That is, a life-stage pattern may help explain why opinions do not change, or why some changes occur at a very slow pace. The “aging-stability hypothesis” claims that people change their minds little as they age (Lorence and Mortimer, 1985; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). The stability grows out of a learning process marked by habituation and hardening through exposure and usage (Jennings and Markus, 1984:1007). This hypothesis has been supported with respect to many social attitudes (see, for example, Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Davis 1992; Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Wilson 1994). This claim implies:

H1B (Lifecycle Opinion Stability): If intolerant opinions are associated with stages of experiences in the life-course, the younger cohort (Gen 2), as they pass through time, will demonstrate similar levels of attitudinal stability to their parent generation (or at least to the point at which the older generation was when it was in that age bracket).

A *generational effect* exists when a specific age cohort is uniquely socialized by a set of historical events. The generational explanation holds that, as new cohorts enter the electorate with different life experiences, they may develop different political attitudes. Even though the older and younger generation experience the same historical processes, they do not have the same “generational location” (Alwin et al., 1991: 15), and it is the young adult who is most vulnerable to the impact of social change (p. 17). Thus, the historical period and the nature of the political times shape youths’ first political experiences that influence them for a lifetime. For a distinct political generation to exist, something of historical consequence must have happened during the “impressionable years” (Erikson and Tedin, 2007: 150).

¹ This research utilizes national samples of three lineage generations stretching from 1965 to 1997. The 1965, 1973, and 1982 panels include data for the 1965 high school senior class (Gen 2) and their parents (Gen 1). The 1997 survey includes data for a third generation (or Gen 3), children born to members of the class of 1965. Comparisons between Gen 2 and their offspring will be limited due to the youthful age of this third generation (mean age 23), the trimmed down version of the survey instrument, and the absence of longitudinal data (see Appendix A for wave panel summary).

It is easy to conceive that age differences in the suppression of antireligious speech will illustrate the profound influence of the collective experiences around the onset of Gen 2's adulthood. The presumption is that the second generation, whose formative political experiences consisted of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, will be more tolerant than either their parent or children's generation, but the generational-divide will be largest when compared with the parent generation whose early experiences were forged by the Great Depression of the 1930's and WWII. This claim implies:

H2A (Generational Change): If intolerance is related to generational placement, then intolerance will be lowest among the second generation.

An argument could be made that the third generation (children born to members of the 1965 high school senior class), having grown up during a period of increasing liberalization of American values and changing conditions, will be more tolerant than the two older generations. The decade was characterized by alternative subcultures gaining unprecedented exposure in mainstream society, and ethnic minorities, youth culture, and homosexual society all achieving larger roles in shaping the American identity (Oxoby, 2003). The presumption is that these societal changes may be reflected in greater tolerance among the third generation, as compared to their parents and grandparents. This claim implies:

H2B (Generational Change): If intolerance is related to generational placement, then intolerance is greatest among the oldest generation (Gen 1) and decreases with each successive generation.

It is also possible; however, that political climate affects the public at large so that attitudinal changes reflect *period effects* (Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos, 2002). In their purest form period effects, which reflect the impact of events and movements in the external world, are said to fall more or less equally on the public regardless of age or other socio-political characteristics (Jennings, 2006). For example, Nunn et al. (1978: 90) argued that the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War increased the commitment of the American public in general to political tolerance. This claim implies:

H3 (Period Effects): If intolerance is influenced by external events and conditions, then intolerant attitudes will be similar regardless of age or birth year.

Of course life-cycle, generational, and period effects are difficult to disentangle in the real world as the three factors of age, date of birth, and historical period overlap and operate in varying combinations. There exists no all-purpose method of "cohort analysis" that can be routinely applied to produce reliable and valid estimates of the different kinds of effects (Page and Shapiro, 1992: 302). The study reported here can, because of its longitudinal design, contend with certain aspects of these methodological problems. Using panel data on multiple generations avoids the problems – unavailability of confounding age with cohort and period - encountered in decomposing trends in repeated cross-sectional attitudinal data (Davis, 1992; Wilson, 1994). A convincing analysis of the long-term dynamics of intolerance attitudes is possible in this study through the use of panel data.

Data

This research draws on the national multiple-generation, four-wave panel study stretching from 1965 to 1997 collected by Jennings and Niemi. The long-term political socialization project was compiled from interviews with a national probability sample of 1,669 high school seniors from the graduating class of 1965 and when possible at least one parent. Of the high school sample, a total of 935 individuals were resurveyed in 1973, 1982, and 1997, resulting in an unadjusted retention rate of 56% across the 32 years. The three-wave parent panel consists of 898 respondents from an original sample of 1,562, for an adjusted retention rate of 57%. For ease of understanding and to avoid awkward labeling, the high school senior class is identified as Gen 2 or G2 and their parents as Gen 1 or G1.

Additional data consists of interviews in 1997 with Gen 2 and their offspring (Gen 3 or G3), aged fifteen and above. Self-administered questionnaires were received from 778 of the 1,435 offspring aged 15 and older, for a response rate of 54%. The availability of data for G2 and their offspring (G3) in 1997 provides the additional opportunity to explore the extent to which intolerant beliefs in the previous generation are reflected in the next.²

² Less attention will be paid to contrasting the second generation with their children. The absence of additional observations prevents us from knowing if these patterns continue as the generations continue to age and process historical experiences and

A more detailed discussion of the research design including survey methodology, response rates, and generalizability can be found in chapter 4 of *A Telescope on Society – Survey Research & Social Science at the University of Michigan & Beyond* (Jennings in House, et al., 2004: 104).

Measures

Dependent Variable

To keep the focus on intolerance, it is essential to determine the number of respondents willing to deny the constitutionally protected act of free speech. To this end, intolerance is measured utilizing a common question employed in the tolerance research that asks respondents whether they approve of public speechmaking against churches and religion. Although this question does not explicitly ask about "atheists," it does indicate intolerance for people who represent anti-religion (Schafer and Shaw, 2009). Furthermore, Gibson (2008) found that 79.6% of the American public expresses some antipathy toward atheists suggesting that the issue of extending freedoms, such as allowing speeches against churches and religion, would be considered offensive by many and thus, a reasonable gauge of intolerance. Indifferent respondents or those refusing to allow the inalienable right of free speech are coded as intolerant.³

Social, Psychological and Political Predictors

The causal model of generic tolerance patterned by Sullivan et al. (1982) identified a number of independent variables that previous studies have shown to have significant relationships with political tolerance. The major independent variables fall into three broad categories: *social* (or demographic) characteristics; *psychological* (or personality) characteristics; and *political* characteristics (Sullivan et. al., 1982, p. 93). Since the bases of intolerance appear to vary with a number of possible influences, the present design provides the opportunity to examine the direct effect of each of the predictors, and if the relationship is consistent across generations and time.

A related expectation is that the influence of the key predictors on attitude formation may depend partially on the occurrence of the predictor and the position in the individual's life-cycle in which it is experienced, reflected in intragenerational (within cohort) and intergenerational (across cohort) discontinuities. Of importance here is the extent to which changes in an individual's environment may create instability in political intolerance attitudes and which environmental factors significantly contribute to the change. So, for example, does the impact of education as a predictor of tolerance continue as one ages or does the impact recede and become overshadowed by some other factor? A related query is whether the impact of education on tolerance opinions is dependent on absolute (sum of education achieved) or relative (age, or historical and political period attended) levels, or both. There are reasons to expect a college education, particularly for the older generation, to have different effects on intolerance than increments of education at lower levels (e.g., see Nie et al., 1996).

As the dependent variable is dichotomous, we employ probit⁴ models to estimate the effects of the predictors of intolerance for each panel wave. The tolerance items are each coded so that 1 indicates an intolerant response. The social, psychological, and political determinants were coded using dummy variables with "1" representing the presence of a particular characteristic, and "0" representing the absence of the characteristic. To avoid perfect collinearity in the model, cases where the values of the independent variable consisted of 3 or more categories, such as party identification, one value was used as the baseline measure in the model. The political knowledge and interpersonal trust predictors are indexes created by combining several questions, with larger numbers representing greater knowledge or trust respectively.⁵

social change. The offspring generation is particularly problematic since discontinuity is more likely to occur within G3 as they confront frequent disruptions – such as getting married, having children, deciding on a profession - that are associated with the aging process.

³ The lack of recognition of these undeniable rights as demonstrated by a "don't know" or "refuse to state" also constitutes an intolerant response. As discussed previously, there is support in the tolerance literature for the position that a refusal to extend civil liberties to any group - regardless of affect or indifference - represents an intolerant attitude.

⁴ The probit technique produces maximum likelihood estimations (MLEs) which are estimates of change on the cumulative standard normal distribution that results from a one unit change in the independent variable with the remaining variables held constant (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).

⁵ See Appendix B for a complete list and wording of the items used to compile the trust and political knowledge indices.

Findings

Our first task consists of painting broad strokes that map aggregate trends for each generation. Table 1 displays the variability in support among the generations for allowing anti-religious speech in the period from 1965 to 1997. As can be seen in the table, intolerance is low among the generations, but particularly so for the generation coming of age in the 1960s. In fact, the number of individuals within the second generation expressing intolerance decreases, nearly to the point of unanimous support (95%) and becomes stable at the 1973 figure. A second point is the remarkable degree of aggregate continuity in the parental generation, and the moderate, but nevertheless pronounced, longer-term shift among their offspring.

The question remains whether the value difference between the parents and offspring could be attributed to their different life stage, or historical experience and socialization. The life-cycle explanation holds that two conditions must be satisfied: intolerant attitudes must be correlated with age, and that the opinions of the younger generation consistently move in the direction of the older generation (Mayer, 1992). The patterns suggest that the first prerequisite is satisfied - the young are generally less intolerant than the old. However, the second generation failed to abandon their youthful acceptance as they grew older and change in the direction closer to that of their elders. Rather, the young became even less intolerant, increasing the gap between the two generations from 12% to 20% suggesting a more permanent division (Table 1). Finally, as Stouffer (1955) speculated, the aggregate results reveal a trend toward greater acceptance so that the third generation, while more intolerant than G2 in 1997, outperform their grandparents' generation. As it happens, compared with G1 in 1982, the third generation (in 1997) holds rather different opinions and is much less intolerant of anti-religious speech (Davis, 1992; Wilson, 1994).

These aggregate findings may be useful in deriving testable hypotheses about longitudinal developments in intolerance attitudes. In particular, the approach provides meaningful insight into overall cohort levels of continuity and change. Since the panel design involves re-measurement of the same samples, any fluctuation in beliefs indicates intra-individual change. For example, intolerance in the second generation decreased by half from 1965 to 1973 suggesting that several respondents had changed their minds.

It makes a difference if intolerance is a stable property as individuals mature. Higher levels of continuity suggest a fairly consistent commitment to legal and constitutionally guaranteed rights, while lower levels would suggest considerable slack, with the loss of rights and liberties subject to come and go. The results in Table 2 indicate a medium-range level of continuity by the standards of survey research. Consistent with the "impressionable years model" the second generation, given its position in the life-cycle, exhibited less aggregate attitudinal stability than their parents. The continuity correlations for G2 lag far behind those of their parents until the third panel period when G2 approaches continuity levels similar to those in the first panel period for G1 at a similar age.

Taken together, the aggregate trend data combined with the life-stage pattern of increasing attitudinal stability support the presence of permanent age-group differences in allowing atheist speech. Stouffer's prediction, as is the case with most assumptions based on the aging-conservatism hypothesis, would have led us to expect increasing levels of intolerance, especially among the younger cohorts. Rather, a generational explanation is consistent with the trend in attitudes of decreasing intolerance toward antireligious speech. The second and third generations are less intolerant than the first generation, which matches the trend of decreasing intolerance in the entire population (Cutler and Kaufman, 1975; Davis, 1992; Wilson, 1994). A further test of the generational model consists of making use of a time-lag design. By dividing the generations into roughly same-aged individuals from different generations at different points in time, and at least partially controlling for any life-cycle effects, enables us to be more confident that the source of the differences in opinions is the work of generational influences.

Beginning with the aggregate generational comparisons of G2 at age 50 in 1997, with the younger half of the parents in 1973 at a similar age (49), the patterns illustrate that the second generation continues to maintain the distinct advantage in demonstrating less intolerance as compared to the preceding generation (Table 3). Marked differences are evident among the two generations at similar ages, favoring G2 with a whopping 16 percent disparity existing for allowing anti-religious speech. In a similar vein, generational comparisons of G2 (mean age 26 in 1973) with the older members of G3 (1997) at a comparable age (mean age about 27) again highlight Gen 2's commitment to atheist speech.

A noticeable gap exists, but it is worth mentioning that the rejection of anti-religious speech is relatively low among both generations with 6% of G2 and 14% of G3 expressing an unwillingness to allow speeches against churches and religion.

The substantial age differences do not seem compatible with either a life-cycle model or period-effects explanation. Rather, the cross-generation comparisons confirm that intolerance attitudes were influenced, in part, by generational effects. The gap in intolerance attitudes for anti-religious speech may have emerged as a result of the prior experience with this issue during their formative years and thus, readiness to repress speech. It is often argued that Americans who reached adolescence during "the 1960s" carry with them a permanent "liberal" tilt. Cohort theory maintains that young adults acquire attitudes that reflect those prevailing in the immediate milieu and local subculture, as well as temporary shocks experienced during adolescence (Davis, 2004). Consistent with the theory, the second generation, having experienced the Civil Rights Movement during their formative years, is significantly less intolerant than the previous generation, and the differences hold up over time. Moreover, the findings support a liberal rebound so that the offspring generation (Gen 3), reaching maturity during the 1990s, is more intolerant than their parents ("the 1960s" generation) but much less intolerant than their grandparents.

Observing opinion trends is one matter, explaining them is another. We turn now to discovering how the predictors interact with intolerance to account for these findings. The following analysis is directed at investigating two distinct but related sets of questions. The first concerns how intolerance opinions unfold across time, generations, and the life-cycle. The objective here is to uncover the *sources* of continuity or discontinuity across age cohorts. The second set of questions is concerned with whether the generational discontinuity occurs simply because of compositional factors. Rather than the way in which new generations come to reflect, reject, or redefine the tolerance patterns of their elders, the deviance of a generation may simply be due to a change in its composition. Given the emphasis placed on the implication of long-term trends, the impact of social and demographic changes hold a variety of potentially significant implications for political tolerance attitudes. Since opinions people hold are strongly influenced by individual characteristics - the kinds of jobs they hold, their life histories, their day-to-day experiences, their place in the status hierarchy, the sorts of people they live and work with - changes in their social and demographic characteristics will produce changes in attitudes (Mayer, 1992: 191).

The probit estimates for allowing anti-religious speech are summarized in Table 4. Coefficients in the first column are estimated using data from 1965, coefficients in the second column are for 1973, and those in the third column are for 1982. A positive coefficient indicates that a person is likely to be more intolerant of speeches against religion. The most striking observation is that generation is a powerful predictor of political intolerance. Controlling for generational placement as a dummy variable with 1 representing Gen 2, we find that *generation* has a strong and constant relationship with the suppression of anti-religious speech. The negative estimates for the *generation* variable demonstrate that the second generation is consistently less likely to express intolerance than their parents, and the influence of generational placement significantly increased from the 1960s to the 1980s.⁶

We reasoned that *intragenerational* differences in the suppression of anti-religious speech would be connected to a number of the social, political, and psychological determinants. As expected, the occurrence of a predictor, and the position in the life-cycle that it was experienced, work to differentiate members within the cohort, and across cohorts. In this sense, we find that the predictors differentially impact intolerance attitudes across the panel waves. The estimates demonstrate that, among the key variables, the predictors with the greatest influence are *respondent's race*, *personal trust*, and *political knowledge*. Starting at the top of the table, race has a substantial, significant influence on attitudes towards speech critical of churches and religion. Whites were far more intolerant than nonwhites, the excluded baseline. However, the difference between the 1960's and 1970's is not statistically significant and the impact of race recedes by 1982 ($p < 0.10$). High levels of interpersonal trust, sometimes referred to as "social trust" (Davis and Silver, 2004), are also an important indicator for allowing anti-religious speech.

⁶ The test for significance between the 1965, 1973, and 1982 equations is calculated using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. Since the error terms in panel data are likely to be correlated over time the first stage is used to estimate an "instrument" for the lagged intolerance variable from the prior panel period. The second stage employs the predicted value in the previous panel to determine whether the difference in coefficients in the later panel represents a significant change over time.

That greater interpersonal trust is correlated with a willingness to concede acceptance is expected given that individuals with a stronger sense of interpersonal trust may be less anxious about the possible threat posed by atheist speech. However, the trust-intolerance relationship is modified over time suggesting historical events provided a more fertile seed bed for the influence of social trust in the earlier and later panels. Political knowledge mattered in all the time periods. Individuals possessing higher levels were significantly less intolerant than those with low political knowledge, and this relationship grew significantly over time.

The pattern of the generation coefficient suggests that age and period effects are relatively unimportant in shaping the intolerant preferences for anti-religious speech than is birth cohort. If age were an efficient predictor of intolerance we would expect the magnitude of the generational marker to decrease, not increase, over time as the younger generation moved closer in line with the previous generation. Similarly, if period effects were operating we should also find the impact of generation to decrease as the young and old respond to political shocks alike. These findings do not rule out the possibility that the occurrence of the predictor - as associated with the aging process or historical happenings - affects opinions. Notably, the estimates for 1973 point to the importance of external events and conditions, with a number of predictors exhibiting highly significant effects on intolerance. The nine years between wave 1 and wave 2 were clearly one of the most turbulent periods in modern American history. According to Mayer (1992: 15), a conservative realignment was in progress in the early 1970s and the statistically significant party difference among Republican identifiers, southerners, and frequent church attendees reflects the sharp turn to the Right in American public opinion.

The effect of education on levels of support for civil liberties has both supporters and detractors in the tolerance literature (on this point see Bobo and Licari, 1989). Still, not much is known about the influence of education over the life-course. We find that *completing* a college education (the excluded baseline category) affects the likelihood of intolerance among individuals with a 'high school or less' education in 1973. Respondents who never attended college were significantly more likely to favor the suppression of antireligious speech, but the education relationship changed over time so that by the 1980's the better educated were indistinguishable from their less educated counterparts.

This leads us to question the theoretical mechanism underlying the relationship between education and tolerance. If increased educational attainment exposes individuals to diverse attitudes and opinions we would expect intolerance to decline with increasing education. These findings indicate that the particular effects are associated with having a college degree in a particular time period, and not the sporadic exposure to institutions of higher learning. Moreover, the finding that college graduates in the 1970s alone are less intolerant confirms that education imparts a superficial degree of commitment to democratic values (Jackman, 1978), so that during a period of free speech protests erupting on college campuses, the very educated were better suited to give the "correct" (tolerant) response.

While the probit model provides statistical support for the influence of the predictors on intolerance, the coefficients do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation. A common approach with probit analyses is to calculate the predicted probability by allowing a predictor to vary while holding constant all other variables in the model. After converting the coefficients in the tables into probabilities, we can generate predictions about the types of individuals who would be more (or less) likely to be intolerant. These predictions are very useful in interpreting the effects of the individual determinants on opinions. The most revealing way to do this is to begin by focusing on a hypothetical individual. By using either the minimum or maximum values for the binary predictors and entering the mean values of the continuous variables – *political knowledge* and *interpersonal trust* – we can calculate the change in probability brought about by change in those specific variables. Table 5 shows the results of the calculations of a hypothetical individual – one who is white, male, Republican, attends church frequently, believes the Bible is the literal word of God, has a high school education or less, and is from the South - for intolerance of anti-religious speech.⁷ The predicted probabilities say a good deal about the direction and magnitude of these factors to intolerance, and how these relationships reflect age, period, or cohort effects. A higher score indicates a more intolerant view, while a positive number in the *change* column means the predictor is associated with intolerance as compared to the hypothetical individual.

⁷ In 1973 and 1982, the *social class* measure was added to the model and for the purpose of calculating the predicted probability of a hypothetical individual has been set to represent a member of the middle class.

Controlling for the effects of *generation*, we note that the baseline for the hypothetical individual representing the second generation is lower than that for the hypothetical parent. For otherwise identical individuals who differ only in cohort placement – Gen 1 or Gen 2 – there is a substantial degree of difference, favoring the youth cohort, for allowing anti-religious speech. Moreover, this pattern holds across all three time points, and the *generational* gap intensifies over the 17-year panel period (15 percent gap in 1965, 23% in 1973, and 24% in 1982). On a related note, the estimated level of influence these predictors generate is different across the generations. The *change* columns in Table 5 show that the influence of the predictors is much stronger in the first generation that serves not only to differentiate members within this cohort from each other, but also members from the subsequent generation. For example, among Gen 1, the probability of intolerance is 12 to 16 percentage points higher among whites than nonwhites, depending on the survey year. In contrast, intolerance among whites of Gen 2 is approximately 8 percentage points higher than nonwhites. Political knowledge follows the expected route so that for both generations, but particularly so for Gen 1, political knowledge has a strong effect on the probability of intolerance in all three survey years. For the first generation, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean on the knowledge index decreases the chance of intolerance by about 7 to 10 percentage points. We see a similar pattern among the younger generation, although the effects are somewhat smaller (a range of 4 to 5 percentage points).

The figures reveal a consistent trend – noticeable *intragenerational* differences occur as a consequence of the presence of a predictor reflected in *intergenerational* discontinuity. That the influence of the predictors is larger in the parent generation - in some cases, more than twice that in Gen 2 - suggests that tolerance for anti-religious speech is the result of generational effects. Moreover, when controlling for the effects of *generation*, the estimated baseline for the hypothetical individual is 15% higher among the youth - a gap that intensifies to 24% over the panel period, suggesting a more permanent trend. It is of considerable importance that none of the intolerant patterns in Table 5 were due to the aging process. The evidence demonstrates that substantial age differences do exist but the patterns persisted, or the older and younger cohorts moved in a similar direction. Thus, the reasons for rejecting life-cycle effects are grounded in the fact that the younger cohort maintained attitudes that were different from the earlier cohort, and where *intercohort* differences were small the source of change appears to have little to do with growing older.

The subsequent section will build on these findings by contrasting G2 to their children. The availability of data for G2 and their offspring in 1997 provides the additional opportunity to explore the extent to which politically intolerant opinions in the previous generation are reflected in the next. Unfortunately, the discussion is limited somewhat by the lack of over-time observations for the third generation. If the third generation adopts the same tendencies toward political intolerance displayed by the previous generation, then *intergenerational* continuity is assured (Jennings and Stoker, 2004). However, the absence of additional observations prevents us from knowing if these patterns continue as the generations continue to age and process historical experiences and social change. The offspring are particularly problematic, since discontinuity is more likely to occur, as the younger cohort is still very much in the process of developing a generational character.

The probit estimates for allowing anti-religious speech are summarized in Table 6. Again, a positive coefficient indicates a person is likely to be more intolerant, and a negative estimate indicates less intolerance. The figures demonstrate that *generation* is a major contributor to the explanatory power of the models. To this end, we find that the second generation maintains the advantage (10 percent gap – see Table 7) and that the measures of biblical literalism and personal trust are all also relevant factors in determining intolerance for atheist speech. It is generally believed that higher levels of education would expose individuals to differing viewpoints and encourage tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al., 1982; Gibson, 1992). Following this logic, we expected that individuals with at least some college experience to be more supportive of allowing individuals to speak out against religious institutions than those with a high school education or less. But in this context, the expected effects are not present. The lack of an educational impact when comparing the youngest cohort to their immediate predecessor (their parents) lends further support to the education-tolerance relationship uncovered previously. For intolerance of antireligious speech, school and the educational process appears to be ineffective at passing on democratic values - even the specific liberty of free speech (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Merelman, 1980). However, it is also possible that the small and insignificant impact of education can be explained by the most recent cohorts' relatively unfinished educations. While younger generations of Americans are generally better educated than their elders, cohorts' education levels tend to increase until about age 30 (Davis 1992).

So when the 1997 data was collected, children born of the 1960's generation, the mean age of whom was 23, may have been less educated as compared to their parents, accounting for the lack of an educational effect on intolerance for anti-religious speech. In fact, the data confirm that the youngest cohort were less educated than the parent cohort, with 30% in 1997 reporting having completed a college degree. In comparison, 41% percent of the parent generation reported having finished college. As they finish their educational experience, it remains unclear if the youngest generation will come to match their parents' low levels of intolerance as they grow older. More importantly, from a trend perspective the magnitudes of the predictors on political intolerance vary considerably, reflected in within- and across-cohort discontinuities. Specifically, the findings indicate that the impact of many of the predictors is somewhat larger in the third generation, and this works to differentiate the generations (Table 7). That the influence of the predictors is larger in the offspring - in some cases, almost twice that of the second generation - suggests that intolerance for anti-religious speech is the result of generational effects. However, the absence of additional data points limits the discussion since the aging process, particularly for Gen 3, is still very much in play.

These limitations aside, the evidence suggests that the documented differences are due to events occurring during the second generation's early years that left its mark. For this generation, the unique events occurring in the 1960s and 1970s worked to form a less intolerant outlook, a trend that is not reflected in the older or younger generations. However, the generational coefficient in 1997 makes clear that the differences between G2 and G3 are modest in comparison to the G1-G2 contrasts, indicating the decreasing importance of generational placement. In brief, we find that the two younger cohorts are less intolerant than the older cohort, that cohorts shifted in the direction of lower levels of intolerance, and that these shifts were of greater magnitude for the second generation than for the parent generation over the 17-year period. The findings confirm the importance of generational replacement and opinion change noted elsewhere (Cutler and Kaufman, 1975; Wilson, 1994).

Further confirmation of the generational interpretation comes from a comparison of the different generations at similar ages but different time periods (not shown, available upon request). The probit estimates for the time-lagged comparisons for tolerating anti-religious speech confirm that members of Gen 2 depart dramatically from their parents and their offspring in young adulthood and middle age. Here, we find the effects of *generation* are highly significant ($p < 0.01$); and the sizeable and positive coefficient indicates that the second generation is a great deal less likely to take an intolerant position on the question of atheist speech than either the first or third generation at comparable ages. Controlling for the effects of *generation*, we note that the baseline for the hypothetical individual representing the second generation is noticeably higher than that for the hypothetical parent in middle age (15 percent difference) and offspring in their mid-twenties (19 percent difference).

The patterns – substantial gap and the larger influence of the key predictors – support a generational effects model. Among the second generation, the effect of each predictor is rather minimal so that members within the cohort are rather alike in their intolerance attitudes, regardless of any differences in the predictors. For Gen 1 and Gen 3, however, the within-cohort differences are rather large – twice that found among G2. At the same time, the time-lagged results show that the likelihood of intolerance varies little among the second generation – ranging from a high of 20% to a low of 3% in middle age, as compared to their parents at a similar age of 40% and 11%. Likewise, Gen 2 in early adulthood shows a variation of 25% to a low of 6%, whereas the maximum and minimum likelihood for intolerance among the third generation is 47% and 17% respectively.

Conclusion

The analyses presented here has taken the tolerance discussion a step forward by focusing on a specific civil liberty and investigating the importance of three models – life-cycle, generational, and period effects - that could account for intolerance patterns and trends. Moreover, the study provides a stringent check of the generalizability of our current understanding of the sources of intolerance over an individual's lifespan. At the outset, we outlined several questions we wished to address. The first question asked how political intolerance changed over time and across generations, and contingent upon the answer to this first question, what was the source of the change? In terms of both these questions the results make two obvious, but nonetheless important, theoretical points. First, the 'Stoufferian' prediction - a decrease in intolerance through cohort replacement - fits the facts very well. The longitudinal and contemporaneous gaps in tolerance opinions imply that the persistent age differences in political intolerance appear attributable to a *generational* argument. In some cases the gap between the first and second generations are too large to explain away by the effects of aging alone.

The older cohort was more intolerant than the two younger generations, and the second generation became less intolerant with age, rather than more, as expected by the life-cycle hypothesis. The over-time generational comparisons show that the difference is relatively constant, which undermines any sense of gradual and consistent change as one ages. Rather, the findings reveal that these age-based patterns can be explained for the most part, by the political, economic, and social environments in which the generations were raised. After controlling for race, gender, education, religiosity, party identification, social class, region, personal trust and knowledge, the cohort differences are such that the more recent generations are less intolerant than the earliest cohort. The evidence points to a decrease in intolerance since the initiation of the panel study in 1965. The differences in attitudes towards antireligious speech hold up even when controls for demographic changes are incorporated. The results show that when all else is equal intolerance declines considerably across birth cohorts. Thus, change in attitudes is independent of other changes in the population as measured here. Moreover, since the study examines *intolerance*, when we observe that more recent cohorts are less willing to deny the rights and liberties of others than the oldest generation (Gen 1) in all survey years, this reflects true generational differences, and not generational differences in opposition. These are the major finding of this study.

Second, the evidence suggests the uniqueness of the second generation. The age-based patterns summarized earlier indicate that the most important influence on intolerant orientations was the unique circumstances in which the second generation first acquired their viewpoints. The younger cohort was at the most politically impressionable age (under thirty years) during the turbulent decade of change, the 1960's. Their preferences are definitely less intolerant than the cohorts who preceded or followed them. The general pattern, regardless of the changes taking place in their personal lives and society, was a fundamental commitment to allowing free speech against churches and religion.

While there is not much evidence here to support aging hypotheses, life-cycle effects cannot be dismissed so easily when we think about the mechanics of opinion stability. That is to say, life-cycle effects may help to explain why opinions did not change, or changed very little. The findings here point to extraordinary continuity among the parental generation over time. The results offer a strong endorsement of the "impressionable years model." There was some modest variation, but in general the elder generation remained stable over time. By contrast, the younger generation, although hardly erratic, displayed considerably more movement before beginning to resemble the moderately high continuity displayed by their parents. In fact, the former stabilized at an overall level of commitment that is nearly identical to that of their parents, suggesting a more permanent division, and also demonstrating that support for speech against churches and religion has become more common, and that this cohort, and subsequent cohorts, may display comparatively greater acceptance.

Third, one of the most striking observations is that aside from the influence of a number of predictors in 1973, the estimated effects show little evidence of a period explanation. In general terms, period effects are causes of public opinion that affect all cohorts at the same time and produce a general shift in public opinion in some direction. Growing acceptance of free speech for atheists was exclusive to the second generation, and the moderate change that occurred in the parent generation was in the opposite (i.e. intolerant) direction. If the changes were the result of historical happenings then we should witness similar movement in support over the panel period regardless of cohort placement. The contributions of the three APC dimensions suggest that period and age effects are relatively unimportant compared to those of birth cohort. In its methodological form, the hypothesis that these are age or period effects, and not generational effects, would require a lot more congruence than we see in the data.

Finally, the focus on one specific manifestation of intolerance as a test of the applicability of the Sullivan et al. model has proven to be beneficial. Not only have the results confirmed the relevance of key predictors across birth cohorts and time periods, but also how social and cultural changes may influence the impact of these predictors of intolerance. For instance, we find that when level of education and other relevant factors are held constant the more politically knowledgeable citizens are less intolerant than others. However, the somewhat surprising result was the lack of a connection between religious beliefs and practice for allowing anti-religious speech. Given changing religious trends in America (e.g. changes in denominational membership, the increasing role of religious discourse in the public realm beginning in the 1970s, and differences in church attendance rates), we expected cohort and period variations in religious commitment to be borne out in attitudes toward antireligious speech. Rather, the results show that religion is relatively unimportant to explaining intolerance. These comparisons offer illustrations and evidence that can be used to further our understanding of the formation and continuity of politically intolerant opinions.

We realize, of course, that these conclusions are based on an examination of a single manifestation of intolerance using a four-wave national panel study, but these findings are largely consistent with the conclusions of other scholars regarding intolerance of atheist communication. For example, using a collection of public opinion trend data, Schafer and Shaw (2009) show that Americans remain deeply divided in their views of atheists, and yet increasingly support their civil rights. We reach the same conclusion, but with the certainty that is only possible with panel data. The existence of tolerant procedural norms is an important condition on which a modern democracy rests. The longitudinal patterns indicate the source of support for allowing someone to make a speech against churches and religion has more to do with the formative experiences of the younger generations than social and demographic differences. That recent cohorts are not only more supportive than earlier cohorts, but tend to remain so as they grow older, suggests that the most likely scenario for the future is a decrease in intolerance.

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Table 1. – Cross-sectional Differences

	Generation (n)	1965	1973	1982	1997
% willing to deny speeches against churches and religion	First (898)	24	24	26	n/a
	Second (935)	12	6	6	5
	Third (751)	n/a	n/a	n/a	13
	Difference*	+12	+18	+20	+8

Note: *Based on a comparison with the second generation. The values reported here are in percentages unless otherwise indicated. The standard errors for each time reference is (0.05) and a simple T-test reveals the difference is statistically different ($p < 0.01$ for all years).

Table 2. - Overtime stability, by generation (first and second generations)

	<u>1965-1973</u>	<u>1973-1982</u>	<u>1982-1997</u>
<i>Intolerance of Antireligious Speech</i>			
G1	.30	.35	-
G2	.14	.21	.29

Note: Entries are Pearson continuity correlations. Unstandardized regression coefficients obtained by regressing the T2 score on the T1 score are almost identical. Cases were held constant across time, within each generation.

Table 3. - Cross-Generation (Time-Lag) Comparison: Intolerance at Similar Ages

	Gen 2 in 1997	Gen 1 in 1973	Age 50 Differ.*	Gen 2 in 1973	Gen 3 in 1997	Age 27 Differ.*
<i>Intolerance of Antireligious Speech</i>	5	21	16	6	14	8

NOTE: *Based on a comparison with the second generation. The values reported here are in percentages unless otherwise indicated. The standard errors for each time reference is (0.05) and a simple T-test reveals the difference is statistically different ($p < 0.01$ for all comparisons). To permit matching up of approximately same-aged individuals, the parent generation is limited to the younger half when both G2 and G1 were about 50 years old; and the older half of Gen 3 in 1997 (mean age 27) is compared to Gen 2 in 1973 (mean age 26).

Table 4. – Determinants of Attitudes Regarding Anti-Religious Speech: Gen 1 and Gen 2

Intolerance of Anti-Religious Speech	1965 (N=1686)	1973 (N=1416)	1982 (N=1176)	Significant Difference Over Time 65-73 / 73-82
Intercept	-1.17 (0.37)	-1.44 (0.39)	-0.65 (0.42)	
Race – White	0.34** (0.14)	0.32* (0.16)	0.43 (0.24)	no / --
Gender – Male	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	
Party Id - Republican (Independent reference)	0.20 (0.14)	0.31** (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	
Party Id – Democrat	0.26* (0.14)	0.13 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.19)	
Church Attend - Frequently (Never reference)	0.27 (0.22)	0.40* (0.18)	0.36 (0.19)	
Church Attendance – Sometimes	0.37 (0.23)	0.22 (0.19)	0.04 (0.21)	
Bible Beliefs - God's Word (Written by men ref.)	0.36 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)	0.41 (0.27)	
Bible Interpretation – Inspired by God	0.14 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.27)	
Social Class – Middle	n/a	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.16 (0.12)	
Education – No College (College grad. ref.)	0.28 (0.20)	0.82** (0.23)	0.14 (0.17)	
Education – Some College	-0.22 (0.25)	0.45 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.18)	
Region – South	-0.04 (0.08)	0.25** (0.10)	0.09 (0.12)	
Personal Trust	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	
Political Knowledge	-0.15** (0.03)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.19** (0.05)	## / #
Generation – Second	-0.56** (0.08)	-0.72** (0.11)	-0.75** (0.13)	## / ##
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.21	0.20	

NOTE: The tolerance determinants were coded using dummy variables with “1” representing the presence of a particular characteristic, and “0” representing the absence of the characteristic. To avoid perfect collinearity in the model, cases where the values of the independent variable consisted of three or more categories, such as party identification, one value was used as the baseline measure in the model. The political knowledge and interpersonal trust predictors are indexes created by combining several questions with larger numbers representing greater knowledge or trust, respectively. The model excludes the social class measure in 1965 as it does not exist for the younger sample. Additional analyses excluding the social class variable revealed no substantive differences among the predictors. Standard errors in parentheses. $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.01$ **; # $p < .05$, ## $p < .01$ for coefficient difference across panel years.

Table 5. – Probit Estimates Converted to Probabilities

Intolerance of Antireligious Speech	1965	Change	1973	Change	1982	Change
Gen 1 – Base for hypothetical individual	0.28		0.39		0.39	
Race – Nonwhite	0.18 (.05)	-0.16	0.27 (.07)	-0.12	0.24 (.06)	-0.15
Gender – Female	0.29 (.05)	0.01	0.43 (.09)	0.04	0.39 (.08)	0.00
Party Id – Democrat	0.37 (.06)	0.09	0.44 (.07)	0.05	0.33 (.07)	-0.06
Independent	0.22 (.09)	-0.06	0.28 (.08)	-0.11	0.36 (.09)	-0.03
Attends Church Sometimes	0.42 (.07)	0.12	0.48 (.09)	0.09	0.40 (.09)	0.01
Attends Church Never	0.20 (.15)	-0.08	0.25 (.13)	-0.14	0.26 (.12)	-0.13
Bible Inspired by God	0.33 (.07)	0.05	0.32 (.08)	-0.07	0.35 (.07)	-0.05
Bible Written by Men	0.17 (.13)	-0.11	0.33 (.14)	-0.06	0.24 (.12)	-0.15
Not Middle Class	n/a	---	0.50 (.09)	0.11	0.45 (.08)	0.06
Education – Some College	0.21 (.05)	-0.07	0.57 (.08)	0.18	0.37 (.08)	-0.02
Education – College Grad	0.19 (.08)	-0.09	0.14 (.11)	-0.25	0.33 (.09)	-0.06
Region – Non-South	0.29 (.05)	0.01	0.30 (.07)	-0.09	0.36 (.06)	-0.03
Personal Trust - +1 S.D.	5.32 (.04)	-0.03	4.94 (.06)	-0.03	4.99 (.07)	-0.05
Political Knowledge – +1 S.D.	3.75 (.03)	-0.07	3.78 (.05)	-0.07	3.71 (.05)	-0.10
Gen 2 – Base for hypothetical individual⁸	0.13		0.16		0.15	
Race – Nonwhite	0.07 (.07)	-0.08	0.09 (.08)	-0.07	0.07 (.09)	-0.08
Gender – Female	0.13 (.04)	0.01	0.19 (.07)	0.03	0.15 (.08)	0.00
Party Id – Democrat	0.19 (.05)	0.08	0.19 (.07)	0.03	0.12 (.08)	-0.03
Independent	0.09 (.10)	-0.05	0.10 (.09)	-0.06	0.13 (.09)	-0.02
Attends Church Sometimes	0.22 (.07)	0.10	0.22 (.08)	0.06	0.16 (.07)	0.01
Attends Church Never	0.08 (.14)	-0.09	0.08 (.11)	-0.08	0.08 (.11)	-0.07
Bible Inspired by God	0.16 (.08)	0.03	0.12 (.10)	-0.04	0.13 (.10)	-0.02
Bible Written by Men	0.07 (.14)	-0.07	0.13 (.14)	-0.03	0.07 (.13)	-0.08
Not Middle Class	n/a	---	0.24 (.07)	0.08	0.19 (.07)	0.04
Education – Some College	0.09 (.05)	0.07	0.29 (.08)	0.13	0.14 (.07)	-0.01
Education – College Grad	0.08 (.08)	-0.12	0.04 (.10)	-0.12	0.12 (.09)	-0.03
Region – Non-South	0.13 (.04)	0.01	0.11 (.08)	-0.05	0.13 (.08)	-0.02
Personal Trust - +1 S.D.	5.32 (.04)	-0.02	4.94 (.06)	-0.02	4.99 (.07)	-0.02
Political Knowledge – +1 S.D.	3.75 (.04)	-0.04	3.78 (.05)	-0.04	3.71 (.05)	-0.05
Intergenerational Difference*		0.15		0.23		0.24

⁸ The standard errors for the probabilities have been calculated using the Clarify program designed to simulate quantities of interest for the most commonly used statistical models, including a binary probit. On this point, see Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King (2001). CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.0 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, June 1. <http://gking.harvard.edu>

NOTE: Change column indicates the associated change in probability for the binary variables representing a switch from 0→1 and the associated change in the continuous variables (personal trust and political knowledge) as an increase of one standard deviation from the mean (with standard errors in parentheses). *Intergenerational* difference represents the associated difference in probability of a switch in the hypothetical individual (one who is white, male, Republican, attends church frequently, believes the Bible is the literal word of God, has a high school education or less, and is from the South) from a member of the second generation to being a member of the first generation. In 1973 and 1982, the *social class* measure was added to the model and for the purpose of calculating the predicted probability of a hypothetical individual has been set to represent a member of the middle class.

Table 6. – Determinants of Attitudes Regarding Anti-Religious Speech: Gen 2 and Gen 3

	Intolerance of Anti-Religious Speech (N=1524)
Intercept	-1.72 (0.35)
Race – White	-0.14 (0.19)
Gender – Male	-0.11 (0.10)
Party Id - Republican (Independent reference)	-0.10 (0.12)
Party Id - Democrat	0.01 (0.13)
Church Attend - Frequently (Never reference)	0.30 (0.19)
Church Attend - Sometimes	0.23 (0.19)
Bible Beliefs - God's Word (Written by men ref.)	0.94** (0.27)
Bible Beliefs - Inspired by God	0.43 (0.26)
Education - No College (College grad. ref.)	0.12 (0.14)
Education – Some College	0.01 (0.12)
Region - South	0.18 (0.10)
Personal Trust	-0.05* (0.02)
Generation - Second	-0.41** (0.11)
Adjusted R ²	0.11

NOTE: The *political knowledge* and *social class* variables are not included in the probit analyses as these questions were not asked of the third generation. Standard errors in parentheses. p< 0.05,* p< 0.01**

Table 7. – Probit Estimates Converted to Probabilities

Intolerance of Anti-Religious Speech	Gen 2 1997	Change	Gen 3 1997	Change
Base for hypothetical individual	0.12		0.22	
Race – Nonwhite	0.15 (.07)	0.03	0.26 (.09)	0.04
Gender – Female	0.14 (.06)	0.02	0.25 (.06)	0.03
Party Id – Democrat	0.12 (.06)	0.00	0.22 (.06)	0.00
Independent	0.14 (.09)	0.02	0.25 (.09)	0.03
Attends Church Sometimes	0.17 (.08)	0.05	0.29 (.08)	0.07
Attends Church Never	0.07 (.12)	-0.05	0.14 (.13)	-0.08
Bible Inspired by God	0.23 (.11)	0.11	0.37 (.11)	0.15
Bible Written by Men	0.02 (.15)	-0.10	0.04 (.16)	-0.18
Education – Some College	0.12 (.07)	0.00	0.22 (.06)	0.00
Education – College Grad	0.10 (.10)	-0.02	0.18 (.09)	-0.04
Region – Non-South	0.09 (.06)	-0.03	0.17 (.06)	-0.05
Personal Trust – +1 S.D.	4.60 (.05)	-0.02	4.60 (.05)	-0.04
Intergenerational Difference*				0.10

NOTE: Change column indicates the associated change in probability for the binary variables representing a switch from 0→1 and the associated change in the continuous variables (*personal trust*) as an increase of one standard deviation from the mean (with standard errors in parentheses). Intergenerational difference represents the associated difference in probability of a switch in the hypothetical individual from a member of the second generation to being a member of the third generation.

Appendix A - Research Design for Longitudinal Analysis of Political Tolerance

Survey Year	<u>1965</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1997</u>	
Primary Sample of High School Seniors (Gen 2)					N
Average Age	18	26	35	50	(935)
Their Parents (Gen 1)					
Average age:					
All parents	46	54	63	---	(898)
Younger parents	41	49	58	---	(448)
Their Children (Gen 3)					
Average Age:					
All children	---	---	---	23	(779)
Older children	---	---	---	27	(379)

Analytic Approach to the Data Sets

Generational Analysis (Aggregate and Individual Level)

A. Single generation over time—Gen 2: 65, 73, 82, 97; Gen 1: 65, 73, 82.

B. Contemporaneous cross-generation comparisons—G1:65-G2:65; G1:73-G2:73; G1:82-G2:82; G2:97-G3:97.

C. Cross-generation (time-lag) comparisons—e.g. G1:73-G2:97; G2:73-G3:97.

Appendix B – Measures and Index Construction

Questions (Agree/Disagree):

(4 waves - 1965, 1973, 1982: G1 and G2; 1997: G2 and G3)

1. If someone wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, that person should be allowed to speak

Interpersonal Trust Index - 0 Missing Data Allowed

Responses to TRUST, HELPFUL, and FAIR were summed to form an index ranging from 7 (high personal trust) to 1 (low personal trust). Missing data on any of the three component variables resulted in the case being dropped.

(TRUST) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

(HELPFUL) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?

(FAIR) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try to be fair?

Political Knowledge Index - 6 Components

An index based on the number of correct answers to six factual questions. Don't know and incorrect answers were treated as incorrect responses. Cases with any missing data (NA) were dropped.

Who is the governor of (name of this state) now?

About how many years does a U.S. Senator serve? [YEARS]

Marshall Tito was a leader in what country?

Do you happen to know about how many members there are on the United States Supreme Court? [IF NECESSARY: How Many?]

During World War II, which nation had a great many concentration camps for Jews?

Do you happen to remember whether President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Republican or a Democrat?