

## **The Role of Iraq in the Middle Eastern Problems 1970-1972**

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### **Abstract**

*Iraq is very different state nowadays from what it was when military coup d'états upheaval overturned the pro-Western kingdom and arrangements a radical Arab nationalist governments. Notwithstanding, the strong-Arab cast to the ideology of the inexperienced nationalist officers who dominated Iraq, domestic issue proved so dangerous and so persistent that successive governments were forced to turn inward. This article outlines the history and genesis of Iraq's role in the Middle Eastern problems. This study is presented a noteworthy amount of positively not promulgated details about these parties. Particular attention is given to relation between Iraq also other Middle Eastern countries, and their relations with each other. Iraq's oil and the Kurdish issue.*

**Keywords:** Kurdish issue, Iraq's regional and international relations, and oil

### **Introduction**

Iraq is absolutely different country nowadays from what it was when a coup d'états upheaval upturned the pro-Western monarchy and arrangement a fundamental Arab nationalist regimes. Notwithstanding the strong-Arab cast to the ideology of the inexperienced nationalist officers who dominated Iraq, domestic issue proved so tough and so persistent that successive governments were forced to turn inward.

It was not only the degree of issues at home, conversely that created Iraq's position so isolated in the 1960s. The old-fashioned was one concentrated on the competitions between Arab countries which Jamal Abdul Nasser<sup>1</sup> vanishing leadership failed to mollify. The young Iraqi new republic, though its leader numerous, was through much of this time the most dogmatic and most ideologically encouraged of the Arab states. The outcome was often frustration and hostility, even between Iraq likewise other radical countries. Since Nasser's death, conversely foreign relations between Arab countries have altered in character; certainly there was something of spirit of laissez-faire<sup>2</sup>.

Iraq has never been an easy state to govern, with its enormous Kurdish minority living in the hills of the north and the Arab majority separated between the Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam<sup>3</sup>. Sunni Arabs, who number only about a quarter of the complete population, have consistently dominated the administration. By breaking down authority the coup compounded the issue of administrating the diverse groups. The former ruling clique well-off, often foreign educated, and accustomed to look to the west for support has either emigrated or lost its positions of power. Republican administrations have had to reconstruct the governing apparatus almost from scratch, a method disadvantaged by recurrent changes of governments<sup>4</sup>.

Challenged with these complications and lacking wide acceptance of their legality, administrations since 1958 have by and large supported punitive oppressive tactics against, all challengers. Competitors have been captive, exiled, or even assassinated. Iraqi administrations have reinvigorated and manipulated crowd ferocity against their opponents. Supplementary, the increasing heaviness of these ferocity strategies have created a wide-ranging fear of informers that pervades Iraqi life. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of government took over is moderated by organizational inefficiency, and the administration has allowed some emerges to pay short-lived visits to their mother country.

Successive ground-breaking administrations have had only uncertain success in developing living circumstances of the general public. Whereas the economy has developed at a regular annual rate of about five percent in current year, the rewards have not been consistently distributed. Preliminary efforts to progress the lot of peasant by removing large private landholdings triggered widespread disturbance. Several of the ill effects have been overcome, but much land remains in government hands and agricultural output has been unsuccessful to keep pace with population development. Industrial and commercial activity, frequently in government hands, had wrapped, but then again over the past 15 years, a considerable quantity of economic groundwork in the form of communications, public utilities, and public housing has been constructed. In addition to the governments have had an enormous inflow of foreign cash from oil to boost the economy and avoid most important calamities<sup>5</sup>.

Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in June 1972, however, shortened oil amount produced, triggering Iraq a loss of some \$30 million in incomes in the following six months. Henceforth far, Iraq has received someplace between \$50 and \$90 million in loans essentially from Libya and Kuwait to aid make up the loss. To conserve foreign exchange, the administration cut imports suddenly, as well as those for development ventures. Even though by late 1972, Iraq was again receiving oil revenues roughly equal to the regular receipts of the previous year, the governments have rejected to decrease the austerity measures that are instigating adversities in the national economy. The Government workers were subjected to compulsory saving; cuts in imports have caused in shortages of consumer and investment properties. Most important for the long run, the progress program, which was just opening to demonstrate some real development in such fields as irrigation projects and industrial development, have been abruptly reduced<sup>6</sup>.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the role of Iraq in the Middle East issue, including its leaders, foreign relations, major domestic preoccupation, moreover Iraq's oil crucial role. It provides a brief history about the Iraq's major domestic preoccupation, additionally its diplomatic relations with Arab states and Iraq's ambitions in the Gulf region, as well as regional and international relations.

### ***Major Domestic Preoccupation***

The Baathist Party of Iraq which was in power since July 1968 was part of a pan-Arab ideological movement originated over a quarter century ago in Syria. The leaders of the Iraqi Baathist party were more committed to pan-Arabism and since 1966 have had apparently incompatible personal differences with those at the head of the Syrian Baathist party. Positively, personality has often been more significant than philosophy in setting specific strategies of the Baghdad administration. Military support was indispensable to the Baathist's success in seizing power in Baghdad and remains a fundamental element. Conversely, the Iraqi armed forces, dissimilar those in Syria, have been reduced in significance in the question of power. The Iraqi civilian leaders have eliminated the officer corps, whereas raising its pay. They have also transported a number of dedicated parties in the armed. However, the military group in the Baathist party and a probably a non-Baathist or anti-Baath faction in the armed forces<sup>7</sup>.

Committed to controlling authority, the current Baathist leadership, during its four years or rule, has managed to control or destroy political dissidents except for the Kurdish nationalists in the northern country stronghold. In this circumstances, strife among the Baathist leaders looks to be the most important threat to continued stable rule. Surrounded by the Baathist party, the civilian faction under Saddam Hussein Al-Takriti<sup>8</sup>, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Iraqi Baathist Party, has been in the controlling, nevertheless there were ongoing signs of resistance between this group and that of President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr<sup>9</sup> who has had closer ties with the military wing of the party. Saddam was being criticized for complications halting from growing resistance with the Kurds, the monopolization of the IPC, disappointments to secure late-model arms from the USSR, and conspiracy over plans to form a National Front. President Bakr appears to be infiltrating personnel faithful to him into sensitive positions in the government. It was tough to evaluate how this factional infighting will turn out. Conversely sooner or later this engagement seems likely to arise to a head, manufacturing a foremost reshuffle in the administration<sup>10</sup>.

Should this internal arguments lead to the removal of Saddam Takriti and his supporters by Bakr's group, the armed forces would unquestionably again play a greater role in the political development. However, the policies of the government might not change seriously. Such a break in the revolutionary positions, however, would weaken central government and might encourage additional military conspiracy. This may even increase the

chances of a revolution by a non-Baathist group in the military, even though the regime's principal intelligence arm the so-called public Relations Bureau was supposed to have "Watchdogs" in military elements.

Notwithstanding these and other efforts over the past few years to turn the military formation into a Baathist reservation, it likely gave the idea that specifically among lower and central ranking officers a number of non-party members continue. Lacking information on the reliability and viewpoint if these officers as U.S did, it was not imaginable to recommend with self-assurance what changes a non-Baathist regime would create. Nonetheless it was practically assured that in this circumstance military officers would be leading and that they would administrate in the authoritarian manner of former administrations<sup>11</sup>.

### ***The Kurdish Deadlock***

Similar to their predecessors, the Baathist leaders have recognized the Kurdish problem challenging. Most of the Kurdish districts of northern Iraq have been outside of effective controller by the central authorities for years. Comprehensively supported by Iran and Israel the charismatic Mullah Mustafa Barzani<sup>12</sup> has positively overcome traditional tribal competitions to weld dissimilar Kurdish groups into a more or less homogeneous movement capable of standing up of Baghdad's shoves. Subsequently recurrent failure to re-impose its authority by militaries of arms, the Baathist administration in March 1970 with Saddam Takriti supposed to be the chief architect unwillingly transported itself to offer Barzani and his party's the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)<sup>13</sup> a generous settlement, providing for an extensive measure of autonomy for the Kurds in their areas. This ended up open fighting, equally has not provided honest cease-fire<sup>14</sup>.

Tension is again rising in relations between Baghdad and the Kurds. The Baathist government has never fully lived up to the terms agreed in 1970. There was little prospect that it will. In fact, the Baathist administration still would like to bring the Kurdish areas under its direct control. To this end, it continues to intrigue against Barzani in hopes of splitting the Kurds. Recently there have been renewed clashes between Baghdad's forces and the Kurds. Conversely although the central government was losing patience with Barzani, it has not succumbed to the temptation to reopen full-scale hostilities. The Baghdad government officials apparently recognize their present inability to carry military action to a successful conclusion against Barzani. They may also hope that time will increase the strains within the Kurdish movement, providing better opportunities to end the autonomy of the north at some later date. Moreover, the Soviets are no doubt therapy forbearance<sup>15</sup>.

For his part, Barzani severely mistrusts the Baathist administration which made numerous endeavours on his life. He continues to search for outdoor maintenance and would similar direct backing up from the U.S to counterpart the weapons, money, also military instructors received from Iran and Israel. Barzani was disappointed with the contemporary deadlock, nonetheless on the whole discoveries it less difficult than open conflict. His Kurdish defense forces, equipped only continued warfare outdoor of their mountain nature preserve. They can adventure rocky terrain of the north to thrust back outbreaks, but cannot carry the war to Baghdad. Furthermore, renewed conflicts would not be general with the Kurds who suffered particularly from air attack in prior operations<sup>16</sup>.

Whereas the present stalemate may well hold for some time, it is characteristically fragile. Assumed present tensions, small-scale clashes of the sort that have taken place in past months seem investable, particularly after the end of the compulsory immobility of the winter season. This would posture an ongoing challenge to the Baathist administration and form a ready pretext for comprehensive hostilities. Baghdad feels other complaints against the Kurds as well. Barzani has showed insensitive to soviet urging to join the communist party of Iraq as a second junior member of a national Front dominated by the Baathist leaders (There is little chance that the Kurds will agree to take part as long as Baghdad did not meet the terms of the 1970 agreement). This unquestionably annoys the Baathist leadership and may likewise be weakening the wellbeing of the Moscow in providing diplomatic of Soviet apprehension about the destiny of the Kurds would correspondingly encourage the Baathist government to revive the war. In any occasion, there was only miniscule viewpoint that relations between Barzani and the Baathist would change. Similarly the Kurdish question would in all probability continue a constraint on the freedom of action at home and abroad of any Iraqi government<sup>17</sup>.

The chances for a resumption of full-scale struggling would upsurge sharply with the departure of Barzani. At the present approximately 70 percent, Barzani appears in reasonably good health. Mistrustful as he was of Baghdad's good faith with purpose he was not likely to put himself within reach of the Baathist party government.

Conversely, when he leaves the scene, there was no one in the Kurdish campground who could have played his uniting role. Deprived of Barzani, the effectiveness of the Kurds would be uncertain. It would certainly be challenged by Jalal Talabani<sup>18</sup>, once the second ranking figure in the KDP.

Expelled from the party in 1964, he heads a younger, more radical group whose progressive social opinions were antipathetic to the out-of-date Kurdish tribal order<sup>19</sup>. Additionally, without Barzani's authoritative presence tribal oppositions would be likely to arise to the forefront again. Such disunity among the Kurds would strongly tempt almost any administration in Baghdad to endeavor to re-impose its authority. In addition to under these circumstances, an early resumption of warfare would turn out to be most likely<sup>20</sup>.

### ***Iraqi Regional Relations***

More than preceding Iraqi regimes, the Baathist government in Baghdad has ideological as well as national ambitions in the Arab world. Considering deeply in their version of pan-Arab socialism, some Baathist leaders would like to transfer their "Progressive" approach to their colleague Arabs. However, the Baathist in Iraq has encountered both resistance and unconcern in its endeavours out of the country. The Arab world seemed to be going through a series of fragmentation each country highlighting national concerns and giving diminished attention to problems of enormous Arab wellbeing. Even the Iraqi Baathist regimes appeared to be losing some of its resolution to promote pan-Arab strategies.

In part, the Baghdad administration was self-conscious by the weakness of its armed forces concentrated political involvements and extensive purgatives have lowered the superiority and working out of Iraqi military personnel. This, more than the amount and characteristics of equipment relentlessly limits military efficiency. The Iraqi armed forces have little offensive proficiency. They were overshadowed through the Iranian military establishment on the ground, at sea, and specifically in the air. Iraq could defeat Kuwait military on the assumption that the latter did not receive outdoor help, from saying the Iranians. Logistical contemplations would make it awkward for Iraq to carry out military action against the relatively defenseless states of the Gulf coastline. The Baghdad government possibly recognizes something of its weakness and appears questionable to endeavour major military action accomplish its regional proposals<sup>21</sup>.

### ***Relations with Iran***

Iran and Iraq realize one another as most important competitors. Relationships between the two states were poisoned following the overthrow of the Iraqi kingdom in 1958. Each side was now convinced of the ill will and dishonesty of the other. This mistrust has been fanned through rumbling argument over the authority in the Shatt Al-Arab waterway<sup>22</sup>. The Shah has criticized the 1937 Saadabad agreement which accorded comprehensive control of this significant boundary river, and Iran has taken military processes to enforce its claims to direction-finding rights. Another source of misfortune has been Iranian backing up to Barzani, of which the Baathist leaders were well aware. Both Baghdad and Tehran have assumed to guarantee subversion against the other for instance, Tehran's abortive coup tried January 1970 and Baghdad's assistance to Iranian terrorists. Similarly the two countries were correspondingly challengers for influence in the smaller countries on the Gulf region.

There was little prospect for early development in relations between Iran and Iraq. The Shah's determinations for a dominant role in the area and his tactics to update and increase his armed forces will ground concern in the Baathist leadership. These plans, which he justifies somewhat as a response to what he recognizes as the threat from Iraq, will supplementary arouse Baghdad to seek equipment in the USSR. Likewise, ongoing Soviet assistance to the Iraqi armed forces will only enhance the Shah's determination to continue regional military supremacy. The Iraqi leaders have a healthy admiration for the Shah's military upper hand and have backed down from military confrontation whenever large-scale action appeared likely. This caution is likely to keep it up even in the face of provocations by the Shah. They did not consider Iran was likely to initiate foremost military action against Iraq<sup>23</sup>.

### ***Iraq's Ambitions in the Gulf Region***

Iraqi administrations have long sustained proposals to play a bigger role in the Gulf region. Abdul Karim Qassim<sup>24</sup>, leader of the 1958 coup d'état, advanced claims to Kuwait, precipitation doubts that he was formulating for military action to impose his demands<sup>25</sup>.

After his overthrow, however, the short-lived 1963 the first Baathist government<sup>26</sup> in Baghdad rejected these privileges and succeeding governments have not re-energized them whereas the present Baathist administration has been demanding to form a commercial as well as a political influence in the region, it seemingly was not willing to commit a huge share of its capitals to that end. The Iraqis seemed to be making Bahrain their midpoint of processes.

The Baathist administration was furthermore in contact with dissident political groups, like the Popular Front for the liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, which was looking for to overthrow the fundamentalist administrations of the smaller Gulf States.

Hence far, Iraqi subversive activity has not encountered great victory. The Baghdad regime's desire to form relations with the emerging Gulf States has kept it from willingly pursuing advertising attacks on these old-fashioned governments Iraq was far outshined by the prosperity and proximity of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Notwithstanding these teething troubles, Baghdad was wedded to its spitting image as a ground breaking authority. Hence, it appeared practically certain to keep on backing up rebellion in low significant with money and advance arms. However under the circumstances Baghdad was not likely to score considerable success<sup>27</sup>.

### ***Iraqi Relations with Syria***

There was slight love missing between the ruling Baathist parties in Syria and Iraq. Baghdad has harbored Syrian dissidents and has pushed the more hardheaded Syrian to acknowledge Iraqi superiority. At the same time, under the Soviet Union poking, the Iraqi administration has made hesitant proposals to Damascus to constitute their general alterations. Conversely, Baghdad's terms were not satisfactory to the Syrian Baathist leaders, who have little to advance by closer relations with Iraq. Relations were moreover ruffled by an argument over transport for oil shipped through the Syrian section of the now nationalized ICP pipeline. Iraq was counterattacking Syrian demands for sharply advanced fees, which could meaningfully decrease its revenue on oil from the northern grounds. Meeting on this question between Damascus and Baghdad have been unsuccessful. In the meantime, Syria was authorizing the oil flow in wishes ultimately of getting a better settlement. Whereas Damascus was not being paid awaiting an agreement, it most likely has the whip hands as there was no other passage for oil from the northern fields. In addition to eventually economic gravities will almost certainly lead the parties to a resolution of this disagreement in which Syria would obtain sophisticated fees than IPC paid.

There seemed little probability, on the other hand, of general reconciliation between Syria and Iraq as long as the current leaders keep on in power in either country. The Syrians were leaning toward Cairo these days. Not only did this decrease their wellbeing in humanizing relations with Baghdad; it postures complications for the Iraqis who were usually doubtful of Cairo. The likelihoods for reconciliation were moreover lowered by other disagreements issues, such as the use of Euphrates river water and way. This issue would turn out to be especially serious when the outsized Syrian dam now under manufacture was finished. The USSR, which gave considerable economic support to dam and renovation schemes in both countries, has urged healthier collaboration on river ways development. Even though in the end the both parties will no uncertainty reach some satisfactory agreement, the process was not right to horizontal and there will possibly be mutual retaliations for some time to come<sup>28</sup>.

### ***Iraqi Relations with Other Arab Governments***

Iraqi foreign relations with other Arab states were not as freezing as they have been at times past; however neither were they principally friendly. Baghdad and King Hussein (1978-1999) of Jordan have no special bone to pick since the Iraqi forces removed from their forward headquarters in Jordan near the armistice line with Israel. These forces had complicated the King's efforts to bring the Fedayeen under his control, and Hussein was still distrustful of Iraq. Notwithstanding general opposition to kingdoms, the Baathist administration leaders appeared to have originated to something of a modus vivendi with the Saudi Arabian administration. But then again this could be vitiated if the Iraqis turned out to be more active in the Gulf, for Riyadh was tremendously doubtful of Iraqi purposes in this area. The Baathist leaders were joyful that Nasser was absent from Egypt, and they were especially satisfied at Anwar Sadat's<sup>29</sup> still looms for them as a challenging, and no warmth was possible to advance in their relations<sup>30</sup>.

### ***Iraq's Role in the Arab-Israel Dispute***

Iraq has always communicated threatening on the question of Israel, conversely was far from the battle positions and has managed to be moderately little involved in actual aggressive. From the end of the 1967 war until 1971, Baghdad did position a force of about 20,000 men one-fifth of its armed forces in Jordan and a few thousand in Syria to show solidarity with the Arab cause<sup>31</sup>. These gestures, however, characterized small sacrifice for the Baathist government, which distinguished exile for officers of suspected trustworthiness. Likewise once King Hussein had broken the power of the Fedayeen in Jordan in Black September 1970, the Iraqis, after initial indecisions, inaugurated to pull out their forces.

Certainly, even though paying lip service to the Fedayeen grounds, Baghdad has avoided being drawn into a foremost role in this question. Even though the Baathist regime has overtly supported the Fedayeen movement, it has not legalized it to involve in noteworthy activities in Iraq.

Baghdad's had tough line against Israel was is certain to keep on. The Iraqi refusal UN resolution 242 and obstinately compete with concessions to Israel as part of a settlement. Baghdad would unmistakably speak out as it has in the past against any moves toward Egyptian and Jordanian with Israel. Then again it undoubtedly would endeavor very little, if any concrete action against these states of they decided to attempt to reach a settlement with Israel, additionally, in any case, certainly has few properties to employ against them<sup>32</sup>.

### ***Iraqi Relations with Turkey***

Except for a short interval under the Qassim administration, successive Iraqi governments have conventionally continued good relations with Turkey. Both states have a common interest in keeping further sharing interests in keeping the lid upon Kurdish resistance in the region. They correspondingly share interests in arriving at reasonable arrangements for the use of the Euphrates river water and way. Bilateral talks have been held on this matter over the past few years, all the same final resolution of this problem was not possible for some time. A recent argument of high-level visits has established the good relationship between the two states, and there was no purpose to imagine significant change in the near upcoming diplomatic relations<sup>33</sup>.

### ***Iraqi Oil***

Iraq's stature and international role were very much bound up with the development of its outsized oil resources. Organization of these critical resources, which makes more than a third of Iraq's uncivilized national manufactured goods and more than three-fourths of all government incomes, has been a foremost challenge to the Baathist Party administration. In its tactic to this problem, the regime was generally ruled more by its gratitude of market factors and the laws of supply and request than by imperatives of its communalist ideology. The Baathist top officials recognized the need to game reserve, in fact, to expend, the flow of oil income which was an all-important prop of the administration. No successive Iraqi governments of any stripe has hitherto shut down oil manufacture, even though Iraq temporarily boycotted sales to some Western states immediately after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. The Baathist administrations did not appear to concern oil as practical artilleries for obtaining advance from the West<sup>34</sup>.

Iraq's nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company, which function the enormous producing fields in the north, originated only after more than a decade of running disagreement over concession rights, beginning with Iraqi capture of 99 per cent of concession area in 1961. These differences had shortened investment in new accommodations, reducing the rate of increase in oil production to half that for the Middle East as a whole over the past decades. Without a doubt, most of the advancement in oil production in Iraq in recent years has originated from exploiting the use of facilities that occurred before 1961. Furthermore, given source of pride tanker costs, shipment through the pipeline to the Mediterranean seas had turned out to be more expensive than through the Persian Gulf. These reasons had persuaded the Iraqi Petroleum Company to cut back manufacture, an action which in June 1972 motivated nationalization of the IPC Kirkuk fields in Kurdistan. The government did not touch the Basra Petroleum Company's substantial field in the South, nor the small Mosul field in the North though both were function by associates of the Iraqi Petroleum Company<sup>35</sup>.

Oil production was suddenly shortened immediately following nationalization; conversely Iraqi struggles to organize alternative quantity contacts have been comparatively positive.

The Iraqi Petroleum Company itself contributed to the easing of the crisis by approving to overhang legal action purchasers of oil produced from its Kirkuk concession until there had been time to negotiate a compromise resolution. The unique time limit for these discussions has been drawn-out until the end of 1972. In the meantime, Baghdad has concluded short-term arrangements to sell oil to the Compagnie Francaise de Petroles (CFP), a most important shareholder of IPC, Iraq has furthermore decided deals to supply Greece, Italy, the USSR, and East European countries with oil from the nationalized fields. Iraq was now shipping about 800,000 barrels a day to the Mediterranean Sea through a pipeline system which has a capability of about 1.2 million<sup>36</sup>.

Iraqi's success in positioning of these quantities of oil has been contingent in part on the collaboration of IPC. Its prospects for sharp upsurges in sales with concomitant increases in income appear to hang on reaching some agreement with IPC. Whereas the USSR and East Europe were currently supplementary Iraq to advance its north Rumaila oil field, they were neither prepared nor able to position of great amounts of oil. In the short time, USSR harbors and distribution accommodations were not oriented toward getting or trans-shipping oil from overseas. Correspondingly, both Moscow and East Europe suffer from foreign exchange obligations that would complicate such contracts. Essentially, however, it would be the difficulty for the communist countries to organize for the advertising of Iraqi oil that would discourage them from a foremost endeavor to supplant IPC. They were undoubtedly similarly concerned about the feasible decrease of their own oil incomes and damage to their standing as reliable members of the international commercial market community<sup>37</sup>.

Iraq's dependence on the Western oil companies was all the bigger due to it has not obtained passionate back up from its Persian Gulf neighbours in the association of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These countries are making arrangements with the international oil companies that promise a continuous supply of oil to world customers at terms acceptable to both creators and sellers. Supposed over the long run, international request for oil will create increased creation from Iraqi oil reserves of continuing significance, these arrangements remove for some years much of the urgency for the Western Companies to purchase bigger amounts of Iraqi oil<sup>38</sup>.

The Baathist leaders ostensibly recognized that their position has weaknesses, likewise did not feel great assurance in their capability to distribute completely with the international marketing oil companies. The Baghdad administration appeared inclined to settle for contribution in the processes of the Basra and Mosul oil companies on something alike the formula generally recognized by other Persian Gulf creators. For reasons of prestige, the Baathist administration will not reject nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company. Conversely there was secret code that the party would be agreeable to some settlement in effect providing similar benefits to the Iraqi Petroleum Company. This would be a complicated business and the terms would have to be appropriately confused to permit. Baghdad to claim triumph, It would moreover require substantial collaboration by the companies<sup>39</sup>.

An official settlement which in the circumstance of the Iraqi Petroleum Company permitted the companies a level of productivity similar to that from offering Persian Gulf crude would characterize the optimum resolution for all parties and would be a tribute to their devotion to economic interests over principle, If this effort unsuccessful, a freezing of the disagreement at its contemporary stage would be prospective. Both Baghdad and the companies would possibly prefer an approach arrangement on something like current terms, for instance with CFP certainly acting for its IPC associates to an official settlement that looked to be an undesirable precedent for the upcoming. For a few years at least neither Iraqi necessity for basic will be so extreme as to force either side into what it considers a depraved bargain-basement<sup>40</sup>.

### ***Iraq's Relation with the Soviet Union***

The Soviets have had a long-time wellbeing in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region. However, the initiative for the 1972 friendship and cooperation agreement appeared to have been taken by the Iraqi Baathist administration. The Baghdad government obviously calculated that it would be heightened the regime's domestic prestige and its standing in the Arabs world. Moreover, the Baathist administration must have wished that an arrangement might lead to an increase in Soviet Union military and economic aid as well as assistance in increasing Iraqi construction and marketing of oil in the World marketing. Similarly, the Iraqis in all probability calculated that the conclusion of an agreement might transform the USSR's compassionate neutrality in the simmering Iraq-Iran disagreement into a much more benevolent and less normal stand. The agreement was concluded in April and ratifications were exchanged in Moscow on 20 July 1972 in the midst of Sadat's dismissal of Soviet military

advisors from his country Egypt. Baghdad has consequently applied to the Soviet trading coalition, CEMA, for eye witness status<sup>41</sup>.

The USSR has a substantial investment in Iraq. Economic assistance has amounted to over a half million dollars and military assistance more than a billion since 1956. This makes Iraq the receiver of more assistance than any other country in the Middle East region excluding Egypt regime. Most Iraqi military equipment was of Soviet origin, and Iraq was profoundly reliant on the USSR for parts, replacements, and military proficiency. Hitherto the Soviet finds relations with Iraqi regime in Baghdad a thorny issue. Having signed companionship treaties with Egypt and India, Moscow could scarcely turn down Iraq without risk of damage to its relationship. Above and beyond, the Soviets were concerned by chance to formalize their dealing with some one more Arab radical regime in the Middle East. Currently that Soviet forces have been overthrown from Egypt, the psychological advantage from official connections with Iraqi regime has turned out to be developed. However, an Iraqi agreement irritates Iraq with whom Moscow has been determined on developing relations over the past decades. In fact, the USSR looks to value extremely the developing network of economic deals progressing out of the agreement to purchase substantial amounts of Iranian natural gas. No doubt also the Moscow be familiar with that Iran was likely to play a far more significant role in the Middle East and the Gulf coast than was Iraqi regime<sup>42</sup>.

The Iraqi agreement had slight effect on the Soviets-Arab international relations as a whole. Not only did Sadat soon broke the spirit if not the letter of Egypt's treaty expelling Soviet forces, but then again other radical Arab regimes in the region articulated displeasure with the Iraqi agreement itself. For instance, the Libyan regime even withdrew its Ambassador from Baghdad for a time in protest. The Assad administration in Syria apparently feels no obligation to compete with Iraq in making an official arrangement with the Moscow government. Within Iraq, Soviet military arrangements were not noteworthy sources of frustration. The USSR has about 400 military personnel in Iraq, serving generally as were those in Egypt. Soviet naval containers operating in the Indian Ocean frequently call at the port of Umm Qasr for requirements, provisions, further to present the flag. There have even been some movements with the small Iraqi Navy; nonetheless activities have been recurrent and small scale. Principally in view of the jeopardy of damaging their relations with Iran, the Soviet did not appear to be demanding for the development of most important facilities in Iraq. Even though Moscow in time may seek more widespread use of Iraqi harbors, over flight rights, and conceivably use of Iraqi air fields for staging, it will most likely move very progressively in this course and will be prepared to draw back if either the Iraqi price was too high or the Iranian protests were too flashy<sup>43</sup>.

The Iraqi-Soviet international relations would have probably continued close for some more years to come. The Baathist regime was not searching for remarkable gestures to enhance its prestige and appear unlikely to rotation the Moscow's tail by sending home-based Soviet advisors as Sadat has done. Even if the Baghdad government was to decide to develop relations with the West in general and with the U.S in particular, it would not do so at the expense of its contacts with Moscow which make available much economic and political advantage. For their part, the USSR has no purpose to wish disturb the relationship. They would no doubt have upheld their current support to the Baghdad government. The Soviet military aid program would carry on, through Moscow would have be very conscious of its effect on the Shah's regime<sup>44</sup>.

### ***Iraq's Relations with the United States.***

The Baathist government realizes no particular advantage in suggestively developing relations with the U.S American "Imperialism", especially in terms of U.S support for Israel, Iran and the activities of the U.S oil companies, remains the regime's favorite insolvent diplomatic relations with the U.S after the Arab-Israel war in 1967, it approved to permit wellbeing sections in Baghdad and Washington. Iraq kept back personnel assigned to the Indian embassy in Washington, conversely, but the U.S did not send American personnel to Baghdad until September 1972. This move did relieve some practical teething troubles and could be carried out without elaboration. It did not, however. Presage further progress toward restoring diplomatic relations. Certainly, the Baathist regime would be possible to remain far behind other "progressive" Arab governments in dealing with the diplomatic relations with the U.S, Baghdad might certainly feel slight obligation to follow<sup>45</sup>.

There was not much chance of primary change in this prognosis. Factional and personal competitions within the Baathist party regime, however, they come out, did not revolve around relations with the U.S. any Baathist administration would be likely to continue the policy of standby toward restoring diplomatic relations.



Even a non-Baathist government would not be likely to move speedily to patch-up relations with the U.S. mistrust of Washington runs profound in Iraq, and there was no internal faction which appeared willing to risk running against this stream<sup>46</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

Iraq was an element in various Middle East issues. Geography, economic, and ideological propensities toward involvement in foreign policy, conversely these have been flooded in recent years through internal concerns remarkably squabbles within the Baathist Party hierarchy and the rumbling disagreements with the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In general Iraq's foreign relations have been anxiety, in enormous part due to its great and inflexible pan-Arab radicalism. This preoccupation with domestic anxieties have fashioned a degree of isolation, which carry on, though in to some extent modified form, in the present atmosphere of laissez-faire in intra-Arab activities.

Iraq and Iran see each other as foremost opponents. They were in encounter over in the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway boundary river and were competitors for influence in the smaller Gulf countries. Baghdad is also troubled by Iranian aid to the Kurdish movement led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Consequently, the arms race between Iraq and Iranian armed forces superiority and were likely to refrain from mounting incidents.

Furthermore, the Iraqi purpose of establishing political power in the smaller states of the Persian Gulf was not prospective to meet with considerable achievement since Iraqi properties and capabilities were incomplete and were outshined by those Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Relations between Iraq and Syria were extremely blemished by the unfriendliness of the two Baathist parties. The both states were supplementary in argument over the transportation fees for Iraqi oil shipped through Syrian pipelines and the division of the Euphrates river water and ways which were being blocked by both countries. Despite the fact that in time these teething troubles were likely to be figure out on terms relatively satisfactory to Syria which has the whip pointer there were little outlook of general understanding between the regimes. Relations with other Arab countries were not exclusively cordial. Even though the Baathist regime has overtly maintained the Fedayeen movement, it has not permitted it to involve in noteworthy activities in Iraq. Whereas Iraq would speak out against any Arab government moving to convert with Israel, it likely would endeavour very little, if any action took place against such states.

The Baathist leaders feel the necessity to maintain, undeniably, to expend, their oil income and did not appear to regard oil as a practical armament to obtain political gain from the West. They motivated to take over the Western owned the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972 only after the later reduced oil production and, henceforth, revenue, but they did not touch its affiliates. Negotiations between IPC and Baghdad were continuing and the Iraqis appear motivated to become peaceful for terms generally as profitable for the companies as their contracts with other Gulf manufacturers. Conversely this would be a tricky business and would need complication of the terms so Baghdad could claim triumph. If this effort unsuccessful, the parties might desire a method prearrangement to embargo the argument at its current stage.

The Soviets have had a long-time wellbeing in Iraq and the Persian Gulf area, conversely the creativity for the 1972 friendship and cooperation agreement appeared to have been taken by the Iraqi Baathist government. The USSR greeted the agreement and see additional psychological advantage from it since Sadat overthrew Soviet advisors from his country Egypt. They recognized, however, that their relations with Baghdad irritate Iran, whose willingness Moscow standards very much. Even though Moscow at that time may have seek more widespread use of Iraqi ports, over flight rights, and possible use of Iraqi airfields for staging, it would probably move very progressively in this course. The Baathist leaders' value USSR military supports were not likely to endanger it through abruptly decreasing the number of advisors, as Sadat did.

The Baathist administration might have understood no especial advantage in considerably developing relations with the U.S. The United States at that time sent American personnel to its interests section in Baghdad, a move which had some specific advantages for Iraq and could be created without display; it did not portend further development toward reinstating diplomatic relations.

## References

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- <sup>4</sup> Directorate of Intelligence.1972. Political and personality handbooks of Iraq, Secret Washington, U.S.
- <sup>5</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72.21December 1972
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid
- <sup>8</sup> Saddam Hussein Al-Takriti was one of the brutal dictator in the Middle and president of Iraq between 1979 and 2003.
- <sup>9</sup> Hassan Al-Bakr was Iraqi president from 1968 to 1979.
- <sup>10</sup> Directorate of Intelligence, Political and personality handbooks of Iraq
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid
- <sup>12</sup> Mullah Mustafa Barzani was a legendary leader of the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist liberation movement between 1943 and 1975.
- <sup>13</sup> The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was founded on 16 August 1946 in the Iranian Kurdistan by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Currently, the KDP is one of the most active and influential Kurdish political party in the Iraqi Kurdistan federal region .
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- <sup>17</sup> Ibid; 79R01012A, Box442, 2, NIE36.2-72.
- <sup>18</sup> Jalal Talabani is the general secretary of the Kurdistan patriotic Union (PUK). He was the president of Iraq between 2005 and 2014.
- <sup>19</sup> David McDowall.2004. *A modern history of the Kurds*, Now York: the U.S, p223; Gareth R. V Stansfield.2003.*Iraqi Kurdistan Political development and emergency*, Routledge Curzon: Now York, p72.
- <sup>20</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72.21December 1972
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid
- <sup>22</sup> Shatt Al-Arab is a strategic river way in the WestAsia where both Iran and Iraq have disputes over its sovereignty since the Ottomon Empire period.
- <sup>23</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72.21December 1972
- <sup>24</sup> Abddul Karim Qassim was an Iraqi military officer and the prime minister of Iraq from 1958 to February 1963.
- <sup>25</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1958-1960. Near East region; Iraq; Iran and Arabia Peninsula, p289.
- <sup>26</sup> The first Baathist government ruled Iraq between 1963 and 1968 under the leadership Abdul Salam Arif and his brother's Abdul Rahman Arif.
- <sup>27</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid
- <sup>29</sup> Anwar Sadat was a president of Egypt between 1970 and 1981.
- <sup>30</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72
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- <sup>32</sup> 79R01012A,Box442,2,NIE36.2-72
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid
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