

Habermas and Ricœur on Recognition: Toward a New Social Humanism

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Abstract

The concept of recognition identifies a cornerstone of the new dynamic and problematic structures of contemporary social life, including the problems of recognition in a multicultural society, and the struggles for recognition of individuals, associations and identitarian groups. It is also a fundamental term for different theoretical and empirical areas of research, such as psychology, sociology, and politics. This paper will examine the issue of recognition in sociology, assuming a philosophical stance. It starts with a brief overview of the concept's most important uses and its theoretical potential. It argues that philosophy reveals a problematic but potentially constructive balance between the two key-concepts of 'struggle' and 'dialectics'.

Keywords: Hermeneutics, Communicative Action, Psychoanalysis, Dialectics, Intersubjectivity

Introduction

The sociological theme of recognition is relatively recent, it only began to take shape in the 1990s. The concept emerges (1) in relation to the questions of identity of a specific group; (2) with respect to settlement disputes in political anthropology, social anthropology and anthropology of law; (3) in the analysis of the continuity/discontinuity of social systems; and (4) in relation to the theory of social conflicts. The discussion of sociology in wide and general terms should consider that *interaction* assumes a greater significance in a wide spectrum of fields of study. These range from social exchange to social interaction, and from symbolic interaction to the question of personality (*i.e.*, interaction processes: interaction and the social system; conditions of integration; roles, pluralism and personality; organisms and environment; generalized medias of integration). Essentially, Talcott Parsons' *General theory of social action* (1949) distinguishes the use of recognition from the sociology traditionally used in anthropological and ethnological research, namely via research investigating intersubjectivity and interrelation related to behaviours, as well as the social behaviours and rituals revealing *reciprocity*. Mauss's work (1925) provides the first and most important study in this area, and remains a foundational reference for the study of the dynamics of recognition (in philosophy as well as in the narrower field of social theory).

As one of his most important contributions, Mauss brings the issue of reciprocity into the field of economic anthropology, where experts such as Marshall Sahlins (1972) would later develop a new paradigm of analysis and understanding of the social phenomenon of interrelationships as reciprocity. Sahlins transforms reciprocity by measuring the change in social distance, and therefore the degree of integration and, to an extent, the quality of inter-relationships in a given, specific social reality. He identifies three forms of reciprocity: *balanced*, *generalized*, *negative*. The first expresses an intermediate degree of solidarity, within which one is expected to return the gift; this kind of reciprocity concerns relationships outside of the family circle; those between relatives; and that between families in the community itself. The second expresses the highest degree of solidarity, as the value of the goods traded is scarcely considered. This form it has no precise contents, does not set time limits, and does not even require that the item returned has the same economic value as the item originally relationships within family members are included in this category. These two types of reciprocity are united by the fact that such relationships are morally governed. The last form of reciprocity indicates a complete lack of reciprocity, *i.e.* the maximum social distance. For example, robbery and theft were recognised and accepted in archaic societies during wars, and were believed to provide honour. Currently, some notions are related to both the classical concept of interaction and the more contemporary concept of recognition.

Amongst these, the concepts of solidarity and reciprocal altruism are particularly notable. Closely related to this modern usage is the Meadian concept of *symbolic interaction*, which almost assumes the function of a thematic connection (between interaction and reciprocity) and disciplinary factor (between philosophy and sociology). Social interaction assumes especially strong sociological significance in the study of group dynamics. However, determining the forms of interaction is a prerequisite to fully understanding the processes of interaction. Georg H. Mead's (1934) Social Behaviourism or rather his Symbolic Interactionism, (and more precisely the work of H. Blumer [1969]), postulates that the Mind and the Self are social products. It also argues that language constitutes the place of their emergence: language is the *medium* through which experience and (social) reality can be formulated symbolically, and subsequently built and shared. A central element of symbolic interaction is an individual's ability to assume the other within oneself, and to regulate his own conduct using this perspective. Obviously other influential factors exist, such as *emotions*. But scholars have established that Meadian symbolic interactionism is also a fundamental reference for the cultural approach to emotions. The fact that we are capable of understanding the other is not only the result of an interrelational *experience*, but is also the result of our emotional interrelational dynamism. It is not a coincidence that Mead (and after him Hochschild [1979, 1983] and others) discusses symbolic interactionism rather than linguistic or rational interactionism (Kemper, 2000).

Mead's social theory shares both aspects of functionalism and structuralism, due to Weber's theory of social action. The constitution of social actors (*Self*) is at the core of Mead's, and demonstrates how the size of the mind and thought (*Mind*), as well as social organisation (*Society*) are formed. *Self*, *Mind* and *Society* are parts of how a single whole functions. While external behaviour originates in interior attitudes, some internal elements come from outside, as an internal attitude is an integral part of an external act. While there are absolutely no *subjective* meanings that are radically internal, the same meanings and individual acts can be understood and explained throughout the relational context of a collective consisting of a set of social relations. Individual conduct must be explained using the behaviour of organized social groups, for society as a whole is anterior to the individual, who is only a part of its larger whole. The way of thinking is itself interrelational, as it 'mimics' the exchange of social dialogue, while thought arises when an individual develops an internalized conversation with himself. The internalized gesture is significant as a symbol. It holds the same meaning for all individuals in a given society or in a certain social group, and it is within this common meaning that these people develop conscious thought and relationships with themselves. Therefore, thought would not be possible without social relations or language. Social interaction always provides a basis for common meaning, as a gesture is only clearly meaningful in the reaction it causes in the other. However, the fact that I can consciously objectify this meaning, and abstract it from the immediate reaction of other, allows me to universalise this meaning. I can also therefore autonomously develop a specific re-elaboration based upon the general framework of reference that Mead calls the *generalized other*. Mead's perspective applies sociological research to both philosophy and psychology, and has some important implications. In addition to the evolution of sociological research and subsequent critical developments, the Meadian approach leads us to address the phenomenon of interaction using the peculiar perspective of social psychology.

This explains its significance for Axel Honneth and Paul Ricœur's research, as well as in phenomenological studies (Honneth, 1992; Ricœur 2004). In this regard, conflict is another key concept in social psychology, and is fundamental for studying the dialectics of social interaction. If Hegel gives philosophy the highest speculative and critical importance, then Karl Marx elevates sociology to the dignified role of a true *paradigm*. The latter believed that social behaviour is formed from conflict, and more precisely from the attempt to dominate others and to avoid being dominated. Studies on Marx have generally focused especially on the struggle between social classes, but Georg Simmel's investigation is more systematic. For Mead, both the attitude of the community (*i.e.*, as the 'other generalized') in relation to personal individuality, and the control it exerts on the behaviour of its members become determining factors in the type of relationship a person has with his Self. Assuming the same attitudes that others exhibit toward him, the individual participates in a common universe of discourse. In addition to being a prerequisite for developing the reflection of the mind, this is also the basis for the feeling of the Self; the structure that establishes both a character's personality and his self-consciousness. The attention that sociological research gives to Mead's work on emotions strengthens the possibility of a more rigorous approach to phenomenological sociology. To explain the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, Husserl applies the concept of *Einfühlung*, or empathy. However, Husserl's original transcendental intersubjectivity precedes this concept, as it explains the formation of areas of common meaning and action (language, society, history).

The process of recognizing the other is analysed on the basis of Husserl's phenomenological description of intentionality based on the preliminary element of the experience or constitution of material nature (space, time, causality); the psyche; and of the body. The other experiences myself as another for him, as I experience him as another for me. From an analogical association, which is constituted throughout an immediate emotional identification (empathy), the other is never merely a body, but also an inner being with a psychic life similar to mine. The series of intentional relations are reciprocal and allow Husserl to realise the concept of intersubjectivity. The Austrian philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schütz has made an important development to the phenomenological approach to sociology. The comprehensive phenomenological sociology, which exists in a strong but productive critical dialectic with Weber, focuses on the formation of the significants experienced, and the relationship between action and meaning, thus deepening the various methodological problems that arise for the interpretation of action. Nonetheless, society is interpreted as a dynamic interrelation, although its operations are not intelligible through the analysis of its structure, but rather via its processes. These include the social world, which is actually the complex result of the encounter of different spheres of experience, as well as the overlapping of different defined areas of significance (Schütz, 1967).

When generally considering the development of sociological research surrounding the issue(s) of recognition, we can argue that, over the decades, it has transitioned from being polarized on the issue of the philosophical and sociological theme of intersubjectivity, into the sociological-ethical and sociological-political theme of reciprocity. Recognition in sociology emerges in the 'dialectical' theoretical-practical realm of intersubjectivity and reciprocity. It is necessary, interesting, and important to expand the general theory of action and the sociology of intersubjectivity found in the work of Jürgen Habermas. If dialectic and recognition appear to be strategic terms from a psychological perspective, in sociology the concepts of social action and intersubjectivity are key terms for philosophical research on recognition, which seeks to incorporate this sociological perspective.

The Intersubjectivity in Habermas' Social Theory

The core of Jürgen Habermas' vast research is occupied by the question of the public sphere as a space for mutual relationships and communicative rationality. He derives similar political commitment from the same (essential) conceptual triad of *public sphere*, *discourse* and *reason*. His espoused profile of the philosophy of man implies and sustains all speculative developments surrounding this triad. It refers to a strict interpretation, literal, and nourished by evolutionary biologism, of the Aristotelian idea of man as a 'political animal', living in the *public space*. A comparison with biology and the behaviour of newly-born mammals reveals that no other species in the world emerges as imperfect and helpless as humans. We are radically dependent on each other, and are thus constitutively intersubjective; we become persons in public space because we continually learn from each other (Habermas, 2005). This specific dimension of human intersubjectivity is echoed throughout Habermas' entire corpus. The construction and organisation of public spaces, whose structural framework is of a *social* nature, reveals the constructive or decadent; the harmonies or rifts; of a communitarianism that is either emancipatory or repressive. In comparison with the specific context of our social reality, Habermas initially observes a general dynamism of coercive and repressive natures, within which the work of the social critic and the 'militancy' of a free and emancipatory communication were considered necessary and urgent for ensuring authentic human coexistence in a positive state. Subsequently, he has changed the angle of his diagnosis by considering the importance of the progressively complex modern society.

These societies are only held together by the abstract concept of solidarity, mediated between juridical citizens of the state. This community, which today cannot always be strong, only reaches an acceptable degree of stability and cohesion via the formation of public opinion and will. Therefore, the condition of a given democracy is not isolated in its ability to test itself via evaluating the forms and quality of its political public space. Rather, research on the forms and methods of communication assume the meaning and significance of *systematic* sociological research. This occurs because communication is now the ultimate structure of social reality. The basic reference for this notion is Habermas' *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), which is entirely centred on a theory of action. One could also say that, on the one hand, this text focuses on the dialectic between instrumental action and communicative action, and on the other hand between the lifeworld and system. (That is to say, from the point of view of subjects who act in society, and the point of view, or power of action, which is either external or 'objective', and has its roots in the lifeworld. However, this force also progressively develops its structural characteristics, such as the family, the Law, the State, and the economy).

Several critical passages of major theoretical models reveal the rich network of dialogical and dialectical confrontations, including the following: Weber (with particular attention to his theory of rationality); Lukács and Adorno (because of their alternative perspective on critical Marxism); Durkheim and Mead (regarding their outline of the change from the paradigmatic perspective of a philosophy of the subject to an communicative intersubjective understanding); and Parsons (for clarifying the relationship system and lifeworld). One could also add Winch and Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle and Piaget and Popper to this list.

The research originates from the concept of rationality, which is clarified in relation to its different usages. It is connected to the central notion of communicative action, (which is elevated to the highest level of scientific and heuristic importance, due to the linguistic turn). This notion is first clarified in contrast to instrumental action (expressive of a different rationality), and then in connection with it. This is done via the dialectic operating between the *system*: namely, the economic organisation, the political-administrative apparatus of the State and Power, and the lifeworlds which are the sets of values shared by a given society in a manner not immediately reflected. This final theoretical development constitutes the final and more current theme in this topic. The modern system responds, for the first time, by interfering in the life of the world, to a degree far exceed the direct needs of material reproduction. For Habermas, this problem is both speculative and political, and is radically and directly connected to the human condition, which is essentially intersubjective. As a constitutively intersubjective condition, critical sociology's approach is decisive for a framework including both scientific research and diagnostic analysis, and working from the perspective of political action.

On the other hand, in such circumstances the examination of reality and the structuring and functioning of inter-relationships (especially communication) depend upon the efficiency, explicatory power, and significance of a critical sociological approach. Linguistic communication incorporates a *telos* of mutual understanding. At this point and (linguistic) level, (1) a theory of rationality is closely connected to (2) a theory of communicative action, to (3) a dialectic of social rationalisation and (4) to a concept of society that reunifies systems theory and the theory of action (Habermas, 1981a). In the theory of communicative action, an analysis using the specialized contributions of linguistics, sociology and hermeneutics is developed with initial reference to Popper's theory of the three worlds. This operates 'according to the model of self-criticism' and applies to 'an *epistemic* subject who is capable of learning and has already acquired a certain knowledge in his cognitive-instrumental dealings with reality, or as a *practical* subject ..., or as an *affective* subject ..., and has already demarcated from the external world of facts and norms a special domain of subjectivity marked by privileged access and intuitive presence' (Habermas, 1981b, p. 75). In addition, the lifeworld must be added, as proponents of communication have used it as a contextualizing referent and background.

The lifeworld is essentially connected to the concept of communicative action, while its counterpart, the system, is essentially bound to the concept of instrumental action. This combination is expressed primarily in the State, especially in light of its apparatus and its economic organisation. Therefore, as individuals and members of the community, each person expresses a set of values, and experiences them in a spontaneous and natural way. The crucial focus of Habermas' diagnosis of contemporary society addresses the massive and growing interference of the system in the lifeworlds, (which is not to be understood only in the sense of the public's pervasive interference in the private sphere). The lifeworlds are threatened by an 'internal colonisation' expressed via a new form of social violence at the level of communication and in the conduct of life: 'a progressively rationalized life-world is both uncoupled from and made dependent upon increasingly complex, formally organized domains of action. ... This dependency, resulting from the *Mediatization* of the lifeworld by system imperatives, assumes the sociopathological form of an *internal colonization* when critical disequilibria in material reproduction ... can be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld' (p. 305). Systemic imperatives currently intervene in areas of structured communicative action, namely on the level of cultural production, social interaction, and in socialisation itself. Alternatively, they engage on the level of activities related to individual choices of cultural types, and of types of style, belief, and so on. The Marxist and neo-Marxist critical-sociological model of class struggle fails, because the new *dialectical* phenomenon is expressed through this process of formalized colonisation, which is systematic and represses the lifeworlds.

Regarding Habermas' *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* Thomas McCarthy provides the following interesting synthesis:

[Habermas] sketched a critical theory of modern society that focused on "the colonization of the lifeworld" by forces arising from the economy and the state. ... The phenomena that Max Weber pointed to in his vision of an "iron cage" and that Marxists have dealt with in terms of "reification" arises from an ever-increasing "monetarization" and "bureaucratization" of lifeworld relations. This relentless attack on the communicative infrastructures of society can be contained, he argued, only by a countervailing expansion of the areas of life coordinated via communication, and in particular by the subordination of economic and administrative subsystems to decisions arrived at in open and critical public debate (McCarthy, 2006², p. 200).

This synthesis compares the entire dialectical continuity of Habermas' perspective with Marx and Weber, and considers the repressive violence of modern systematic colonisation, which he perceives as occurring in our society. However, it does not offer a complete picture of synthesis, nor does it consider the perspectives of either the 'diagnostic' or the positive response strategies that Habermas identifies. Firstly, it is not possible to develop a comprehensive synthesis of the entire colonisation of the lifeworld, nor can a unified strategy be proposed as a counter-action or policy response. The 'systematic' nature of this colonisation must be broadly understood, *i.e.* in light of its diffuse and pervasive character. In fact, it occurs in so many and varied forms. Secondly, Habermas tends to emphasize the negation of a radical resolution, or any antirationalistic resolution. He therefore maintains not only the early perspective of a strong critical rationalism, but also a communicative and interpretative framework. On the one hand, critical work provides the only measure of at least counter-balancing these colonizing forces. These assume the right distance of occurrence (procedural, factual and institutional), which result from the work of Western rationality. On the other hand, one of the most important mature additions to Habermas' theory is the consideration of social movements dedicated to specific causes, such as: environmentalism, Feminism, and so on. Operating within these specific social, moral, and cultural contexts, these citizen-led movements might be able to restore the independence, uniqueness and value of the lifeworld.

Habermas argues that the lifeworld provides an arena for emancipation, and interrelation, and therefore the subsequent realisation of the 'individual' as a *person*. When combined with a *system*, the second aspect of Habermas' theory of 'society', the lifeworld concept becomes strategic. This occurs first in relation to a theory of social evolution that distinguishes between the rationalisation of the lifeworld and the increased complexity of the social systems. That is to say, this leads to a critical theory that must empirically focus upon the node between the forms of social integration and the levels of systematic differentiation (Durkheim). From the conceptual perspective of an action oriented toward mutual understanding, the concept of lifeworld appears to have a limited range in terms of the theory of society (Habermas, 1981b, p. 119). In fact, the dialectical relationship between lifeworld and system provides the best apparatus, which includes the broader social reality and emancipatory processes, both individual and social. The lifeworld is composed of culture, society and personality. However, the faculty and the heuristic power operating in relation to the dynamism of social evolution are assumed by a dialectic existing with the system. Societies establish connective actions and systematically stabilize socially integrated groups according to a formula. This is explained by clarifying that it indicates the proposed heuristic when considering society as an entity, which was differentiated during evolution both as a system and as lifeworld. This systemic evolution is comparable to an increase in the capacity for societal control, while the gap between culture, society and personality indicates the state of development of a symbolically structured lifeworld. Each area of the lifeworld, including culture, society and personality, has unique and specific requirements and interpretive perspectives. These exist in relation to (1) the influence of culture on the act, (2) forms of appropriate behaviour in society, and (3) the types of people and ways of behavior, that is with respect to the formation/expression of socialized personalities. As a result, an individual brings commitment to the reproduction of the lifeworld on a cultural, social and personal level, which strengthens the culture, the social integration and the individual's personality. If these areas were closely interconnected in archaic societies, Weber's notion of the rationalization of the world produces increasing, distancing, differentiation, and complexification. In the hypercomplex and hypertrophic situation that will emerge from our contemporary socialisation, the system dominates, invades, bends, and subdues the lifeworld.

Mead is one of Habermas' main references, and leads him to the explicit theme of individual and social recognition within his theory of communicative action.

When considering Habermas's theory from this Meadian perspective (but also considering some important steps from Schütz's social phenomenology), the notion of intersubjectivity appears to be more significant on the philosophical plane. Habermas applies his theory in order to locate useful elements for developing (philosophical) research on the sociology of recognition. In addition, Thomas McCarthy explains that Habermas applies his theory of communication (developed in Volume 1 of *The Theory of Communicative Action*) not simply to re-read the Meadian conceptual or logical analysis of the genesis of the self and society, but also to develop a social analysis from the individualistic model of social action. 'Habermas argues that ... motivations and repertoires of behavior [sic] are symbolically restructured in the course of identity formation, that individual intentions and interests, desires and feelings are not essentially private but [rather are] tied to language and culture and thus inherently susceptible to interpretation, discussion and change' (McCarthy, 1984, p. xx). Evidently, such a reading reflects an optimistic and rationalist approach, which views societies as (potentially) progressive and emancipatory realities, operating under a dynamism of socialisation, and connected by internalized symbolic and communicative competences that are shared and rationally organized. Thus, recognition essentially becomes an issue of participation, membership and *communicative* dialectic between social actors. The quality of the inter-relationships *in general* do not determine or evaluate the degree of social development and the evolution of its members; rather these depend upon the quality of the communicative relationships. Here McCarthy explains, 'Habermas argues that our ability to communicate has a universal core. ... In speaking we relate to the world about us, to other subjects, to our own intentions, feelings, and desires. In each of these dimensions we are constantly making claims, even if usually only implicitly, concerning the validity of what we are saying, implying, or presupposing – claims, for instance, regarding the truth of what we say in relation to the objective world; or claims concerning the rightness, appropriateness, or legitimacy of our speech acts in relation to the shared values and norms of our social lifeworld; or claims to sincerity or authenticity in regard to the manifest expressions of our intentions and feelings' (p. x).

Therefore, what is fundamental in this passage is not the general concept of communication, but rather the concept of communicative rationality; *i.e.*, the ability and competence of being able to translate personal feelings, desires, intentions, values, and beliefs into rational-communicative concepts and ideas. 'This concept' Habermas explains, 'carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld' (Habermas, 1981b, p. 10). Of course, communicative rationality has limitations, especially regarding the comprehensive study of all phenomena and social processes. On the one hand, it may help to understand the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld of social groups controlled internally. But, on the other hand, it is not possible to entirely explain social reproduction in terms of a single communicative rationality. However, an examination of Mead's philosophical sociology is directly linked to this argument, (which actually forms the beginning of the second volume of *The Theory of Communicative Action*) and therefore provides a more detailed focus on the question of intersubjectivity.

In conclusion, and although not explicitly thematized, Habermas' theory of recognition is founded upon the notion of *intersubjective communication*. This concept is inserted into a theory that can be understood as both philosophical sociology and as critical social theory, and which indicates the dialectic between lifeworld and system. In this dialectic, the possibility of both progress and development/empowerment is not due to the adaptation, rupture or reorganisation of the system, but rather exists in the lifestyle choices of individuals and groups, in terms of the quality of their intersubjective (communicative) relations. The choice of recognition is of pivotal importance, as only individuals and groups can reach such. Their struggles may provide a counterbalance to the invasive pressure, levelling, and hyper-rationalizing of the system. This is the only possibility for progress and emancipation available in this model.

The Intersubjectivity in Ricœur's Philosophy

Sociology and critical theory's approach to recognition exemplifies the continued persistence of the category of intersubjectivity as well as heuristic and factual centrality. If, via Honneth and Ricœur, the psychology of recognition essentially brings the central functionality of the *dialectical* element into the foreground, sociology, via Habermas, brings back the issue of intersubjective communication. The generalized and speculative outcome extractable from the study of the psychology of recognition is that recognition cannot exist without the *dialectic process*.

It will not function without *relational and communicative commitment*, and in short, without intersubjectivity. The recognition process will not be activated as a process of emancipation, as determined by our investigation into the sociology of recognition. However, we can observe that the psychological and sociological are interrelated on two planes; they include many elements of correlation, mutual reference, and connection, which emerge in the theoretical structure of these philosophies with even stronger evidence. This is also due to the specific character of *philosophical discourse*, which moves and is openly interdisciplinary. One must not overlook this aspect, as it in fact requires a new level of philosophical analysis that, by considering psychology and sociology, connects the concept of dialectics to intersubjectivity. There are several ways to accomplish this task, but the essentially Ricœurian perspective of our research, and the possibilities inherent in his philosophy, encourage us to assume the perspective developed in *The Course of Recognition* (throughout Honneth), and to refer to the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut's analysis of *self-psychology*, which Ricœur discussed in his essay *The Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy*. This article focuses upon a specific theoretical development of psychoanalysis, in critical reference to Freud's theory of man. However, Ricœur also examines Kohut's theory in order to develop an expanded theme of intersubjectivity. This extends beyond the change in his perspective on the hermeneutics of psychoanalysis, and results in a dialectical interpretation that will be central to the final development of his philosophical anthropology. At the conclusion of the third chapter we will find that the inquiry into the politics of recognition leads us to focus upon the notion of recognition as *responsibility*. This concept is well known as a crucial part of Ricœur's philosophy of the *capable human being*; a philosophy established on the three constitutive concepts of *dialectics, intersubjectivity* and *responsibility*. There is a possibility that the triad constitutes a comprehensive philosophy of recognition.

Let us now examine the Ricœurian essay on Kohut in detail, in order [1] to immediately indicate its connections with Ricœur's hermeneutics of the self, as expressed in his 1990 *Soi-même comme un autre*, and [2] to explain that this philosophical perspective does not lead too far from the communicative perspective of Habermas' critical sociology. In fact, both Ricœur and Habermas stress intersubjectivity as terms or fields of recognition; the first developing a discourse of intersubjective narration; the second of an intersubjective communication as explained previously.

The Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy (Ricœur, 2012, pp. 73-93) is connected to another article that Ricœur published only in Italian in 1988 (in *Metaxù*). It remained long unpublished in its original French version, *Le récit: sa place en psychanalyse* (trans., *Narrative: Its Place in Psychoanalysis* [pp. 201-210]).

The article was intended to contribute to studying the 1984 last work of Kohut, *How does Analysis Cure?* (1984). This philosophical interest does not concern the dispute between the psychoanalytic schools, but rather the place occupied by *consciousness, ego* and *self* (Ricœur, 2012, p. 73). Its first speculative suggestion regards the size of the *self* in psychoanalysis, particularly in relation to the experience of the *other*, by which this work can be categorized via the subject line *Soi-même comme un autre (Oneself as Another)*, which reveals how Ricœur has also clarified the problem of defining the *self* through a survey carried out in the psychology of the unconscious. The presence of psychoanalysis in *Oneself as Another* is thus also illustrated relation to the problem of intersubjectivity. Before delving into this point, we must consider the essay's second interesting element as it allows us to develop this argument in reference to the essay's specific content. This element can be immediately discerned from the paper's general structure and procedure. Resembling *Freud and Philosophy* (1965), the article *The Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy* is divided into two parts. In the first, Ricœur presents an *analytic* of the metapsychology and technique of *self-psychology*; in the second, which is a *dialectical* section, he asks about their possible contribution to philosophical reflection (in particular relation to the question of the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity). This represents Ricœur's first use of a similar transaction regarding a school other than Freudian psychoanalysis.

Ricœur's, the articulation of 'analytic' and 'dialectic' expresses the movement of the *reflection* proceeding from a non-philosophical to a philosophical level. Put more precisely, it transitions to a level where Ricœur 'lets one learn' from the analytical experience, and where the latter enters the sphere of philosophical reflection. This movement was already applied to psychoanalysis in *Freud and Philosophy* and in *The Conflict of Interpretations* (1969). As such, we must inquire why it is repeated in this second passage, and especially in relation to Kohut's psychoanalysis rather than Freud's?

Ricœur think that Kohut's self-psychology can 'instruct' philosophy concerning 'the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity' (*Ibidem*) better than Freud's psychoanalysis can or could have. He had already found in the 1965 essay on Freud that this latter thinker's model was unable to account for the phenomenon and experience of alterity and intersubjectivity (Ricœur, 1965, p. 61).

This passage from Heinz Kohut's psychoanalysis compensates for its lack of Freudianism, in addition to contributing to the philosophy of the theme of intersubjectivity. Two passages of the 1988 article confirm this claim. The first (from the first Italian edition), reads: 'The review *Metaxù* published an article I had written about the *self-analysis* of Heinz Kohut. I am, in fact, very interested in the fact that this author has assigned a primordial place at the relationship with the other'. He then discusses the entire 1986 article, and as evidenced by identical conclusions reached in the work, his primary interest is clearly the three configurations of self-transference that Heinz Kohut describes (mirror transference, the idealizing transference, and twin transference). Specifically, these parallel the three paradigms of intersubjectivity derived from the more radical thoughts of modern and contemporary philosophy (Hegel, Husserl, Lévinas) (Ricœur, 2012, p. 93). However, the second passage reaffirms the criticism of Freud's systematisation, which closes subjectivity and confirms 'there never is the other' (p. 204). Considering Kohut's thought, we should perhaps speak of the abandonment or, even the *overcoming* (in the Hegelian sense of the term) of Freudianism, rather than of its integration or completion. In fact, for Kohut the dimension of intersubjectivity is *constitutive* of subjectivity in itself, and as such the entire metapsychological model leads to a redefinition. In Kohut, the other is *always* thematised as a structural element because it determines the *cohesion* of the subjective self. We require lifelong help from other human beings who trust us, and who position the supportive function of the psychic cohesion against the tendency of fragmentation. In the article *The Self in Psychoanalysis and in Phenomenological Philosophy* Ricœur explains, 'We have already seen that the self always needs the support of a self-object that helps it to maintain its cohesion. In this sense we might even speak of an autonomy through heteronomy' (p. 82). On the one hand stands Freud's solipsistic and *closed* model, in which the principle of cohesion depends on an intrinsic autonomy, and in which fragmentation is mostly related to internal dynamism. On the other hand is Kohut's *opened* model, in which the cohesion of the self gives and maintains intersubjectivity.

Ricœur is sensitive to the differences between these two models. In fact, his interest in Kohut appears to mark an important step in his progressive distancing from Freud (to whom he now claims to feel a 'increasing dissatisfaction'); a distancing marking a new phase of Ricœur's philosophy of psychoanalysis. Since the beginning of the eighties, he has become [1] increasingly attentive to the experience of the clinic, and particularly to the phenomenon of *analytical narration* or, more precisely, to the technical/therapeutic phenomenon of re-constituting the *narrative identity*. In conjunction with this, he is [2] increasingly attentive to the experience of the encounter with the other. This latter theme has held Ricœur's attention since his early studies on Husserl, and has become central for the anthropological construction of *Oneself as Another*. Here, in fact, the subject seems to resemble Kohut's *self* significantly more than Freud's.

This change of perspective has not only affected the interpretation of psychoanalysis, but consequently has also made this interpretation suitable for and compatible with the contents and the 'necessities' of Ricœur's philosophy, which he developed during the eighties. Proof of this lies in the theme of intersubjectivity, which prompts Ricœur to overcome (via Kohut) the 'Freudian' (and solipsist) idea of the *semanticsofdesire*, and to assume the broader and clearly directed conception that 'the human desire has a dialogical structure' (p. 204). This change in perspective has allowed psychoanalysis to *support* and, in some way, *legitimize* the Ricœurian theorisations of intersubjectivity and alterity (although obviously not simply due to the introverted dimension of otherness within in the 'figure' of the moral consciousness). The article *Narrative: Its Place in Psychoanalysis* explains that analysis seeks to illuminate old relationships, especially those with one's father, mother, and anyone related to a child's desires. The analytic experience itself (in each Freudian case) is thus based upon the first reported desire with the other, via language. The other may correspond to this desire, as evidenced by the psychoanalysis revolving around fundamental dramas. The relationship with the father and the mother is one of language, because the child is born into an environment of language, meaning and discourse. In this pre-constituted realm, the father and mother are not only the 'beings' or 'parents' that nourish him, but rather also bring him into the community of language, and therefore into the lifeworld(pp. 204-205).

The issue of narration presents a second piece of evidence, and broadens and, in a sense, overtakes the hermeneutical perspective on the interpretation of symbols. Ricœur recognizes (and in fact, seeks to indicate) that 'Freud himself never thought to theorize' the 'basic fact' that 'each session of analysis ... [includes] some narrative element, as when one recounts a dream' (p. 207). Freud never discussed the possibility of establishing a correlation between the narrative and analysis. Therefore, by extension he would not have theorized the possibility of reading psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic, in the sense that man is a being who understands himself both through interpretation (p. 208) and via the comprehensive method of *narrative interpretation* (which is to interpret himself narratively). This is the main reason behind Ricœur's 'increasing dissatisfaction' with Freudianism. 'I became more and more convinced' he writes in the article of 1988 'that Freudian theory is discordant with its own discovery ... In saying this I am in complete agreement with Jürgen Habermas and others, as well as with a number of English-speaking interpreters of psychoanalysis. They all see a growing gap between its theory – which is ultimately based on a mechanistic model, an economic one, hence an energetic one, which completely misses the key dimension of Freud's discovery – and its practice' (p. 202).

Thus, in the course of the 1980s Ricœur departs significantly from Freudianism. His departure from the theoretical-hermeneutic model has significant implications for philosophical anthropology, particularly regarding the conceptual connection between *dialectic* and *intersubjectivity*. The article *Narrative: Its Place in Psychoanalysis* clearly defines the *narrative* characterisation of Ricœur's dialectic of intersubjectivity. Ricœur follows two independent lines of thought to reflect on the place of 'narrative function' in psychoanalysis. One line comes from narrative theory, and while not having or bringing anything to the depths of psychology, Ricœur first encounters psychoanalysis during the mediation between the two modes of storytelling. These include the historical and the fictional, and contain 'narrative identity'. He also encounters psychoanalysis in relation to the concept of 'narrative identity', and in the hermeneutics of the self, where the process of self-understanding is always constituted narratively (even when storytelling), and resembles the process of the analytic situation.

In contrast, the second line of reflection on the theory and epistemology of Freudianism leads Ricœur [1] to accept 'in full formula' the thesis of Habermas (*et al.*); that is, of the 'scientific [sic] self-misunderstanding of Freud' and '*hermeneutical* nature of psychoanalysis'. This line of thought, in combination with his 'increasing dissatisfaction regarding Freudianism' pushes Ricœur [2] to *reinterpret* psychoanalysis. He does not begin with theory, but rather the analytic experience itself, *i.e.* the relationship between the analysed and the analyst especially during the transference process (p. 202). This change of perspective convinced Ricœur 'to reintroduce the narrative element into the structure of the analytic experience' (p. 203), via first examining Freud's evidence produced via his practical activity (in contrast to his theory), and secondly by considering the testimony of other French psychoanalysts, such as Piera Aulagnier and the Mannoni (in addition to the German-speaking psychoanalysts Mitscherlich and Lorenzer). One should determine 'the "criteriology" of the analytical fact', which Ricœur seeks to explain in four steps. The last of these allows him to relocate this discussion from the epistemological to the hermeneutic plane of narration. As the first hypothesis making the use of the story possible, the first step allows Ricœur to demonstrate a link to the language of psychoanalysis (via Habermas' line of argumentation). This becomes a central and constitutive *practice of language*: everything happens in or through language, in order to 'resymbolize what had been desymbolized' (p. 204). The second step, relies upon Kohut's self-analysis to allow Ricœur to discuss the 'dialogical structure' of human desire. The third emphasizes that our relationships to reality and to the other cross the imaginary, (for although the imagery may be complicated, it can also become a place of illusion). Finally, the fourth reaches the *narrative dimension*, which allows him to 'add' *time dimension* as an element.

Ricœur conducts this re-interpretation of psychoanalysis by connecting the 'warp' of hermeneutics, the analytical experience of 'plot', the narrative theory of *Temps et récit* (1983-1985), and the narrative conception of hermeneutics of the self (*Oneself as Another*).

Ricœur's work unites the concepts of time and narrative, as well as introducing the theme of narrative identity, and narration as a method of self-understanding. In terms of the latter point... psychoanalysis interprets mediation through the element of self-understanding, and men in psychoanalysis 'are beings who understood themselves by interpreting themselves' via narrative.

To conclude, Ricœur's research is rooted in a social psychology perspective, and extends back to the philosophical-anthropological discourse. We cannot grasp the dissonance and distance using this perspective.

Nevertheless, Habermas uses this and the context in which it is applied, *i.e.* strictly speaking, the sociological scope and the scope of a social critical theory, to develop his ‘philosophy of intersubjectivity’. We cannot hide this discrepancy, and cannot locate its resolution. However, we possess more elements with which to reconstruct a theoretical elaboration of the inter-subjective split between psychology and critical social theory.

A Conclusion

From different perspectives, the transition to a sociology and a psychology of recognition stresses the centrality of *other*, as well as the intersubjective dynamism in the process of emancipation. Ricœur’s psychology of recognition illuminates the complexity of the process of recognition, stretched between the dialectic of opposing forces (constructive and destructive; negative and positive; emancipatory and regressive; socializing and pathologizing; etc.).

When examining the contemporary world from the perspective of the international complexification of social systems (complex and contradictory at a political and cultural international level), or when considering the emergencies related to an increasingly conflictual reality, we can reach a few conclusions. Humans are increasingly dominated by individualistic selfishness and the irrationality of presently overwhelming capitalist liberalism. Following Habermas and Ricœur, this realization should compel us to establish a philosophy of recognition that, first of all, locates the vision of a new communicative humanism, espousing the dialectic of recognition as its central and pivotal node. In order to promote the real progress of individuals and society, it is necessary that [1] a philosophy of emancipation is established. In addition, [2] a philosophy of communitarian participation and the intersubjective recognition must return, in order to nourish social life and the reality of everyday life, or to promote and spread a culture of dialogue and active participation. As such a ‘vital need’, its absence deeply injures and causes people assume inevitable defensive response.

In conclusion, Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology questions the method of re-considering and re-examining the psychological and sociological question of recognition in terms of the civic and ethical responsibility of the person. Put another way, it re-considers and re-addresses it as a matter firstly of moral and civic responsibility, and secondly of (emancipatory) participation for people (for all people, and for each person). This provides the basic general premise of his philosophy of recognition. Of greatest importance is that the recognition of self and other is always tied to mutuality, respect, and gratitude. Ricœur uses Honneth as his fundamental dialectical-critical reference, and particularly relies upon his analysis of the threefold recognition as mutuality: the pre-judicial form of mutual recognition as *love*; the juridical instrument of political and social recognition as *legal rights*; the practical and cultural instrument of social confidence as *social esteem*. Ricœur is aware of the importance and centrality of this analytical grid. *De facto*, the absence of love can cause non-acceptance, exclusion, humiliation; the absence of legal rights causes disrespect, unbalanced relations, illegality, injustice, and so on; the lack of social esteem can cause suspicions, tensions, troubles in social order, misrecognition, and so on. However Ricœur surpasses these levels of analysis, and leads his research on recognition to the level of a moral problematisation.

The challenge for the present and the future will be realising the ideal and ethical values for the lives of individuals and groups (of different backgrounds) within multicultural societies, which are institutionally ordered and freely inhabited. This challenge exists between responsibility and empowerment; between justice and rights/obligations; including compliance with ethical and political integration, and with forces of redistribution.

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