

Assessing the Effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units in Combating Corruption: The Case of Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS, Ethiopia

Dr. Minhaj Alam (PhD)

Associate Professor
School of Governance and Development Studies
Hawassa University
Hawassa, Ethiopia

Daniel Handino Onsamo

Lecturer, Department of Civics and Ethical Studies
Wachemo University
Hadiya, Ethiopia

Abstract

Corruption is an important aspect of bad governance and is often defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. As measuring corruption whether it is increasing or decreasing is sometimes difficult, it is better to measure the institutional system of anti-corruption agencies in accordance to their effectiveness in combating corruption. Accordingly, the purpose of this research was to assess the effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units (ELUs) in combating corruption at lower level of decentralization of Regional Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission with especial reference to Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS, Ethiopia. Hence, it examined the extent to which the targets of Ethics Liaison Units were being met in the study area by identifying their main establishment objectives as well as by exploring challenges which hinder and their prospects which promote the achievement of ELUs in the study area. This research is basically a qualitative laden research with explanatory nature of data but to make it more representative and sound, researchers applied descriptive survey design which was based on a mixed approach and hence both qualitative and quantitative approaches were employed. The source of information was both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered and analyzed from 110 civil servants, 74 whistleblowers (general public), 5 ELUs officers, 5 political leaders and 16 (2 FGDs, each comprised of 8 members from civil society representatives) while secondary data was gathered from published and unpublished materials such as annual performance reports, Proclamations, Regulations, guidelines, magazines and journals. The findings of the research revealed that the outreach of the awareness program by Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission was steadily increasing from year to year in the study area. But with regard to take both disciplinary and criminal sanctions against the corrupters by concerned bodies were found very weak. Too much dependency, lack of sufficient resources both human and materials, absence of practical political leaders' commitment, lack of trust and confidence of people were observed as major challenges which hinder the realization of objectives of ELUs in the study area while higher salaries paid to ethics officers compared to other government employees, pre-job training and commitments and collaborations of a few committed employees were found as prospects. Based on the findings, the major recommendation is to strengthen the sanction mechanism in addition to give more independent charge to ELUs to investigate and to sanction the corrupters in the study area. Besides, as per the population size of Hadiya Zone, expansion of awareness program of ethics and anti-corruption education will make the campaign more effective alongside the rearrangement of institutional structure of Ethics Liaison Units.

Key words: Corruption, Effectiveness, Combating Corruption, Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, Ethics Liaison Units, Hadiya Zone

1.1 Introduction

Corruption is one of the burning issues and impediments to good governance and sustainable development across the globe (Alam, 2014). However, it is more common in developing countries than developed ones.

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries where the prevalence of corruption has been uncontrolled (Selamu, 2010). Accordingly, Ethiopian Government established an independent Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission on May 24, 2001 with the aim of fighting against corruption (FEACC, Proclamation 235/2001).

The SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission is one of Regional Anti-corruption Authorities which was established in 2002 (SNNPRS EACC Proclamation No, 48/1994). Beginning from its establishment the Commission made an effort to fight against corruption (EACCs' Profile of Ethiopia, 2012). However, this institution under its efforts to be more participatory and thereby to bring it more nearer to society and its people devised a remedy under decentralization to establish Ethics Liaison Units to prevent corruption in all public offices and government enterprises by the Regulation No 84/2003 as the backbone of Ethics Infrastructures of Regional EACC. Hadiya zone as a part of lower level of decentralization of Regional EACC has observed the prevalence of corruption of different forms such as making appointments to position on the basis of acquaintance, corruption in recruitment of employee, improper utilization of public assets and budgets, misappropriation and embezzlement etc. Considering the situation in this Zone, more than 80 ELUs were established in different sectors like administrative office, tax and revenue office, finance and developmental office, justice office, police office, agricultural office, education office etc. to tackle the corruption from within. Therefore, under this background, this research was conducted to assess the effectiveness of ELUs in combating corruption in the study area.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Ethics Liaison Units are the major agencies or networks of the Commission at lower levels in both public offices and enterprises under the leadership of ethics officers who are in-charge of maintaining the code of ethics and to prevent corruption. Having these responsibilities, however, these Ethics Liaison Units to some extent empowered by Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of SNNPRS in order to run their responsibilities but their extent to which the targets of Ethics Liaison Units are being met or not is not researched at Zonal level. Furthermore, those researches which have been conducted in Ethiopia to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption authorities mostly tend to focus on national and regional level.

Therefore, probably this research is the first of its kind and represents a modest attempt to fill such gap in the research area by analyzing the extent to which the units were discharging their responsibilities by identifying the existing factors of prospects and challenges. In general, it focused on why were the ELUs formed and what were their overall evaluation of the progress made in implementing their objectives to fight against corruption. Further, it identified the challenges which affect the realization of ELUs and opportunities which promote the realization of the ELUs in the study area. Based on these, this research attempted to address the following objectives and research questions.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective: -

The main objective of this research was to assess the effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units (ELUs) in combating corruption with special reference to Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS, and Ethiopia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives: - The specific objectives of this research are:

1. To find out the objective behind establishing the ELUs in the study area.
2. To examine the extent to which targets of ELUs are being met in the study area.
3. To explore factors which hinder or facilitate the realization of the objectives of ELUs in the study area.

1.4 Research questions

Based on the general and specific objectives, this research has the following research questions:

1. What was the objective behind ELUs' establishment to achieve in the study area?
2. To what extent Ethics Liaison Units achieved their target objective in the study area?
3. What are the factors that hinder or facilitate the realization of the objectives of ELUs in the study area?

1.5 Significance of the Research

Assessing or evaluating the practice of any policy or plan carefully enables us to identify its strength and weaknesses and then provides some inputs for correction in the cycling of policy making. Currently, as fighting corruption is the key issue in Ethiopia in general and at all levels of decentralization in particular. Therefore, this research is of the prime importance in line with policy and agenda of the government to combat corruption of any kinds at all levels of decentralization.

So, the findings of this research may help the policy-makers to overcome the obstacles at grassroots levels in combating corruption. It provides the first hand information with evidence about the increasing volume of whistleblowers as well as the functionality of participatory approach to combat the corruption at the grassroots levels. The findings brought forth the existing challenges faced by the ELUs at the zonal level to enhance the institutional efficiency. The findings of this research may be generalized to other ELUs of the region to make them inclusive agenda of the citizen. Finally, it may encourage other researchers who have an interest in the related problems can use this research as reference material for further studies.

2. Review of Related Literature

2.1. An Overview of Corruption and Anti- corruption initiatives in Ethiopia

Corruption exists in every society. As discussed in previous section, corruption is a term with several meanings and a universally accepted definition of the term does not yet exist. Hence, having a good background and understanding of history, culture, and socio-economic setting of a country is of paramount importance to understand the context of the term (Alam, 2014). Corruption in Ethiopia, as in many nations in the world, is rooted in the country's policies, bureaucratic traditions, political developments and social history (Korajian, 2003 as cited in Shimelis, 2005: p.63). It is with this in mind that this section highlights the issue of corruption and anti-corruption in Ethiopia.

2.2. Corruption during the early days of imperial rule

For centuries, Ethiopia was under traditional rule in which small governing elites controlled over the nation's resources. One cause for failure of different Ethiopian monarchies to build any kind of administrative framework through which they could exercise their absolute power is the absence of centralized political leadership (Paulos, 2000 as cited in Shimelis, 2005: p.63). In the absence of centralized political system, it is unlikely to mobilize resources for balanced development of the country. As Berihun (2000) stated, during those times, in various parts of the country, tax was collected from the people but utilized in the interest of regional lords. This hindered fair and equitable distribution of wealth causing abject poverty (Korajian, 2003). It is not only corruption that is deep-rooted in Ethiopian culture. There are certain indicators for the existence of anti-corruption measures as well. In this regard, Emperor Theodor's deserves to be mentioned. According to Berihun (2000), Theodor's was keen or devoted to change the situation, though time was not in his favor. Mahitemesillasie pointed out that Emperor Theodor's was the first ruler who understood the nature of the evil and established an organ of control known as office of the "Tear Watcher" or "office of complaints" (Belachew, 2001 as cited in Shimelis, 2005). According to Belachew, *"Theodros was so concerned that disguised in tattered clothes used to go outhunting for officials noted for abusing their public office. Unfortunately, the system of control, which he tried to institutionalize did not last long, it died with him."*

The history of modern public administration in Ethiopia goes back to 1907 when Menilik created the first cabinet, which consisted of 12 ministries. "The Emperor Menilik, keenly interested in the new world suddenly impinging upon his country and determined to modernize his administration upon European lines, began creation of ministries" (Paulos, 2000). According to Mahitemesillasie (1969), Menilik's intention in modernizing public administration was to protect and motivate the peasants, business people and workers; to secure justice to the people; to provide education to children; to enhance international relations of the country; to protect the people from dangers and govern according to the law; and to introduce European modernization. However, the ministers were not salaried; and their appointment was based on their loyalty and the followers they could mobilize during wartime (Asmelash cited in Paulos, 2000).

As a result, with growing public power, corruption began to flourish, which explains Lord Acton's well-known saying, "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely". During their stay for 10 years in public office, the ministers could not manage either themselves or the people. As a result, they had been denied the chance of staying in their offices longer. On Megabit 12, 1910 (EC), the people of Ethiopia crowded on the streets and marched to the palace and requested Empress Zewditu and Teferi Mekonen to dismiss the ministers from their offices for they abused the public trust. Then, the Empress was forced to take corrective measure and, hence, removed the ministers from their posts and a year after formed a body of notable elders to serve her as counselors (Mahitemesillasie, 1969). Another event of early days of imperial Ethiopia relates to the anti-corruption measures associated with tax collection. Tax collection is, in fact, susceptible to corruption in every society.

Particularly, the problem is very severe in traditional societies with agrarian economies. As a means of deterrence, the government of the day had kept on introducing new regulations that functioned until 1928 E.C.

2.3. Corruption during the Reign of Emperor Haileselassie

Modern public administration in Ethiopia is instituted during Emperor Haileselassie era. According to Berihun (2000), it is during this era that tax collected from different parts of the country began to be centrally administered and monthly payment for administrators and civil servants began to be disbursed in the form of salary. As a result, the strong power and the autonomy of the provincial governors came to an end. As a way of laying down the foundation of the modern bureaucracy, especially in the 1960s, the importance of efficient administrative system was highly recognized. The civil service appeared to be accepted as the major instrument available to government for promoting economic and social development (Paulos, 2000). However, because of political interference in administrative affairs it became very problematic to adhere to civil service rules and regulations. Subsequently, what used to be in the past decades, as a sign of respect, had become a means of living. The covert practice soon became an open exercise from the ‘gatekeeper to the top officials’ involved in the practice openly and glaringly. It became so difficult even to carry out routine business without coming across or involved in the very act.

Misadministration, excessive taxation and corruption, in general, became rampant (Korajian, 2003). Virtually, all heads of government denounce corruption and call for laws and measures to control it. Yet with few exceptions, these laws are flouted or selectively enforced (Gould, 1991). The main anti-corruption legal instrument of the day in Ethiopia was the Penal code of 1957. Enacting law is not enough. The laws have to be implemented and to serve their purpose. As Christopher Clapham stated “the measures legislated were not applied effectively except in glaring cases where it is obvious that failure to apply the law could invite public outcry” (Clapham 1969 cited in Belachew 2001). In fact, the 1957 Penal Code is not deficient by itself. Although one does not find the widely accepted definition of corruption as is currently understood, it contains legal provisions for combating corruption here and there (Belachew 2001). Breach of official duties (Art. 412), abuse of power (Art. 414), appropriation and misappropriation of public property (Art. 422), corrupt practices (Art. 425 and 437), extortion (Art. 226), maladministration (Art.420), traffic in official influence (Art. 424), political corruption (Art. 462-468), and other corrupt practices (Art. 641, 642, and 656), are mentioned in the Penal Code. Notwithstanding these, however, the Code is not free from weaknesses. According to Larbi (1999), the Code is defective as far as dealing with unethical behavior in the public service is concerned. It is considered too detailed to be effectively enforceable. And it is too lenient to offenders portraying great imbalance between offences and prescribed punishment.

2.4. Corruption under the Dergue

The Dergue regime was a centrally controlled government based on communist ideology. This ideology, according to Bamidele Olowu (1996 as cited in Shimelis, 2005), forced the regime to question the basis of the accepted norms and codes of behavior in Ethiopian society and this eroded ethics and morality in the civil service in particular and society in general. During this period, the Ethiopian bureaucracy became very corrupt and parastatal firms such as the Agricultural Marketing Corporations dominated transactions in agricultural products causing total economic failure (Korajian 2003). Still as a means of measures against corruption, the Dergue regime promulgated the Special Penal Code (SPC) from the outset in November 1974. The SPC was necessitated because the administrative and political orientation reflected in the Penal Code of 1957 permitted leniency to perpetrators of some grave offences with light punishment. The purpose of the SPC was, therefore, to facilitate the implementation of changed situations required by the revolution, which included imposition of highest penalties for grave offences caused by greedy officials and sanctioned confiscation of any property or wealth obtained by illegal means (Proclamation No. 8/74).

Furthermore, with the intention of tackling corruption and other unethical behaviors including abuse of power, disregard and mishandling of public property, fraud, favoritism, bribery and other illegal acts, the SPC of 1974 was substituted by the Revised Special Penal Code Proclamation No. 214/81. Chapter II of this code provided for various offences, including: breach of trust and receipt of ill-gotten gain (Art. 13), misuse of public property (Art. 14), refusal to pay public tax or dues (Art.15), offences against the economy such as hoarding of goods and counterfeiting (Art. 18), smuggling (Art. 19), corrupt practices, acceptance of undue advantage and abuse of official influence, and soliciting corrupt practices (Art. 20/21). Chapter III dealt with various forms of abuse of authority and official duties such as failure to supervise subordinates, procurement of undue advantage, extortion, and unlawful arrest and detention. The basic difference between these legislations is, however, not based on the definition of corruption as such. It was rather on administering of punishments.

In the case of the latter, more serious punishments are provided. In fact, it is hardly possible to expect declining of corruption only by taking the measure of punishment. Had this been the fact, there would have been no corruption in China at all, where punishment is most severe. Action Professional Association for the People (2001) argues that the provisions in the Penal Code are not defective as such. The problem lies in absence of competent institutions and lack of evidence against perpetrators. Still, the problem goes beyond this in the sense that political commitment is the basic prerequisite for the anti-corruption crusade. In its attempt to create a new ethical foundation built on socialist ideology, the Dergue tried to institute measures to check corruption by establishing the Working People's Control Committee (WPCC) in 1981 (Proclamation No. 213/81). Later on, the institution was re-established declaring that the establishment of such control system is one of the manifestations of socialist democracy, which enables the broad masses to properly participate among other things in governmental administration, which includes fighting corruption (Proclamation No. 12/87). In practice, through the political structures, political cadres went on intervening and making decisions in the civil service leaving no room for professionals.

As a result, corruption, serious operational problems, inefficiency and other administrative problems reached their peak (Paulos 2000 as cited in Shimelis, 2005). The WPCC, with all powers and responsibilities entrusted to it, and the Special Court which administered 'justice' under the Revised Special Penal Code (1981), could not make a difference. Larbi (2000) expresses the situation as follows: "The special agencies had extensive powers to investigate, prosecute and punish alleged offenders. This earlier attempt, however, largely failed to address the problem of corruption and is believed to have rather worsened the situation." Question may arise as to why the previous attempt of anti-corruption initiative under Dergue regime failed. According to Larbi (1999) and Yehyis (2002 as cited in Shimelis, 2005), the following explanations are provided:

Politicization and abuse of power: - The body that was supposed to tackle corruption, the WPCC, was itself fraught with abuse and corruption. The Committee became a political weapon against perceived opponents or 'enemies' of the revolution, whilst some of the members were themselves corrupt. Typical of communist regimes, the whole system was highly politicized as it was closely linked to the party structure. The Special Court and sections of the judiciary were perceived to be politicized and this seriously undermined their independence.

Lack of coherent and clear policy framework:-The measures were one-sided and parochial, and did not form part of a larger reform of the public services. The populist mobilization measures of the regime did not address the fundamental problems of public administration in the country, which include over-centralized and cumbersome procedures, over-politicization, archaic personnel management practices, poor pay and service conditions, weak mechanisms for enforcing ethical codes, non-involvement of civil society and the public in anti-corruption activities, etc. (ECA 1996).

Lack of a holistic and interrelated approach:-Linked to the above point, there was overemphasis on investigation and prosecution under the SPC and the Special Court. Preventive measures and public education on the evils of corruption and the need for soliciting public support were seriously underplayed as part of the moves necessary to combat corruption.

Unpopularity of the regime:-Despite the populist approach of the regime in its initial years, it did not manage to sustain public support. Its legitimacy was challenged and the regime might have been more alienated from the public than it had thought.

Size of the institution: The WPCC was established at three levels, namely, national, regional, and institutional. With increase in size, no doubt, costs rise, and most probably, efficiency and commitment reduced, while risk to be engaged in anti-corruption activities increases.

Quality and Commitment of Anti-Corruption Agency Staff: - The success of anti-corruption measures depends on the quality and commitment of staff of watchdog agencies. Staff members of such agencies should be of highest quality in terms of skills, experience, and ethical behavior. In contrast, what was required of the members of the Committee was not merit but political loyalty.

2.5. Corruption under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Rule

The EPRDF-led government came to power in 1991. In the post-1991 Ethiopia, "corruption remained one of the ills that undermined efforts towards societal transformation" (IER, 2001 as cited in Shimelis, 2005: p.69).


Since the time of framing the FDRE-Constitution, the Ethiopian Federal government launched the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in late-1994 with the establishment of a special Task Force staffed by 23 senior government officials and civil servants. The task force came up with 'comprehensive' report after its 15 months study conducted at the federal and 'woreda' levels. The report identified problems of the country's civil service and included recommendations for changes and capacity building in five key areas, namely, i) Expenditure Management and Control, ii) Human Resources Management, iii) Service Delivery, iv) Top Management Systems, and v) Ethics. The Government endorsed the report and officially launched the Ethiopian CSRP in March 1996 with an overall objective of providing fair, transparent, efficient, effective and ethical civil service for the Government and people of Ethiopia (CSRP, 1998 as cited in Shimelis, 2005). The Task Force, clearly portrayed Ethiopia's civil service as marked not only by bloated structure, but also by inefficient and poor performance (CSRP, 2001). Pertaining to Ethics in government, the report of the task force concluded that there are no coherent arrangements for ensuring ethical standards in the civil service; there are neither Legislation governing ethical practices nor codes of conducts for politicians and civil servants, and no central body with the responsibility and capacity for ensuring ethical conduct.

Furthermore, line institutions have extremely weak control systems in important areas of finance and human resource management leaving room for unethical practices. To make the reform on ethics following a holistic approach under the Ethics Sub-Program, six projects were designed and implemented. These were: i) Development of codes of practice and a legislative framework; ii) Establishment of a central body on ethics in government; iii) Strengthening the capacity of police, prosecutors, and judiciary; iv) Strengthening the capacity of mass media; v) Development of education on ethics in government, and vi) corruption survey. Further, each project had been broken down to series of components (CSRP, 1998). Critics say that reform initiatives of a comprehensive nature had to be well diagnosed and refined. According to Paulos (2000), while the Council of Ministers had to discuss and review therefore, it failed to do so. Moreover, the influence of expatriate coordinators in the process of design of the projects was immense. The reform measure lacks necessary conditions which include well-developed bureaucratic structure with competent personnel, proper governance environment, participation of those who are to be affected, favorable attitude, and strong institutional framework. The reform program is, generally, donor-driven and is implemented as condition for economic assistance. Institutionalization and implementation of reform outputs is, still, a great challenge than designing reform.

On the other hand, one of the outputs of the reform program relates to the establishment of FEACC as an independent watchdog agency. FEACC is one of outputs of the Ethics sub-program that had been developed under the project entitled Central Body Establishment Project. Reform outputs of the other sub-programs have been handed over to the respective institutions. Accordingly, Government Expenditure and Management over to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), The Human Resource Management was passed on to the Federal Civil Service Commission while Top Management and Service Delivery remained under the office of CSRP. As mentioned on the above, FDRE- Government established the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (FEACC) as an independent federal government agency to combat Corruption. Post-2002 years in Ethiopia saw wide spread establishment of regional ethics and anti-corruption commissions to fight corruption crimes in their respective jurisdictions. Each regional anti-corruption office has autonomy in managing its own operations and budgets. The SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission is one of regional EACC which was established in 2002 as an autonomous regional government organ to prevent and fight Corruption (SNNPR proclamation No. 48/2002). As decentralized government system, corruption deters socio-economic of a given community, SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission is scaling up its effort to combat corruption in its jurisdiction by establishing Ethics Liaison Units in different Government departments and enterprises (SNNPRS, Proclamation No 84/2011). Merely, bringing the institution near to the society to confront corruption and impropriety may not reduce the prevalence levels of the corruptions until their achievements and challenges should be evaluated from the time to time.

Therefore, this research was conducted to assess the effectiveness of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption with especial references to Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS in Ethiopia.

2.6. Conceptual Framework of the Research: -The following is a brief illustration of the relationship between independent and dependent variables where the research was conducted.

Figure: 2.1 Relationships between Independent and Dependent Variables

Source: Developed by Researchers, 2015

3. Methodology of the Research

This research is basically a qualitative laden research with explanatory nature of data but to make it more representative and sound, researcher's undertaken descriptive design based on a mixed approach and hence both qualitative and quantitative approaches were employed. The main sources of data for this research were primary and secondary. Primary data was gathered by using questionnaire, interview and FGDs while secondary data collected from different documents.

3.1 Target groups (Study population)

Population is the entire group of the people to whom researchers intend the results of a study to apply. In short population is inclusive group defined by researchers, whereas sample is the representative subset of population which contains essential elements of population. Therefore, the target population of this study is Ethics Liaison Unit Officers, political leaders, civil servants, Whistleblowers (general public), Women and Youth Anti-Corruption Forum, secondary high school civics and ethical study clubs and civil society organizations.

3.2 Sample size determination and sampling procedures

One of the most important elements in any research is how samples are drawn from the study population. Therefore, in this research the researchers used multi-stage sampling technique. Accordingly, at the *first stage* of sampling, zone which is Hadiya Zone was chosen by purposive sampling method based on empirical knowledge about the study area and prevalence of corruption for which more than 80 Ethics Liaison Units were established. At *second stage*, Woredas (districts) were selected from a total of 11 Woredas of Hadiya zone randomly. The rationality behind this selection is that the prevalence of level of corruption is the same in almost entire area of the study. At *third stage*, 12 Ethics Liaison Units were selected by using census technique based on the sectors where Ethics Liaison Units are available in selected woreda.

At *fourth stage*, the determination of the sample size was conducted from both civil servant & whistleblower (general public) of study population by organizing the list from the selected Ethics Liaison Units based on whistleblowers records in the document and civil servants record list respectively.

The total Whistleblowers (general public) were (780) who visited the units to report cases of corruption and impropriety whereas the total civil servants were (1020) in 12 Ethics Liaison Units. When researchers summed up both lists, it gives (N=1800). Then, the sample size determination of the study population (n=?). To find the sample size of the study population, it is calculated by using the following sample size formula which is derived by Yamane (Yamane, 1967:886)

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n= Sample size, N= Universe population, and ‘e’ refers to level of precision or sampling error with (0.07). Sampling error(e) can be reduced by increasing the sample size or demonitators or by minimizing the random errors in the data collection process. The size of the sample depends upon the purpose of the research, the nature of the population under inspection or study, the accuracy the researcher’s desire in estimating the population parameter, and the available budget. Therefore, Sample (n) from (N) was calculated in the following manner.

$$n = 1800 / (1 + 1800 (.07)^2) = 180$$

Taking non response rate 10% = 18; Total Sample size = 198

Accordingly, assuming that W1 is Gombora woreda whereas W2 is Ana Lemo woreda, and then sample of each woreda under proportional representation was calculated as follows:

$$S_i = \frac{W_1 \times S_t}{N}$$

Where,

S_i = the sample size of each Woreda respectively;

W₁ = Total Whistleblowers and Civil Servants in each woreda respectively;

S_t = Total sample size of study area,

N = the Total Population of the study area

Therefore,

W₁= Whistleblowers 46 & Civil Servants 51

W₂= Whistleblowers 39; Civil Servants 62

198 is the proportional representation of the universe population of 1800 from two woredas.

Table 3.1: Sample Framework

No	Name of Woreda	Population(N)		Sample (n = 11 %)	
		Whistleblowers/g eneral public/	Civil servant	Whistle-blower /general public/	Civil servant(Cs)
1	Gombora Woreda	420	460	46	51
2	Ana Lemo Woreda	360	560	39	62
Total		780	1020	85	113

Besides, 5 Ethics Liaison Units officers and 5 political leaders were selected purposively for in-depth interview. Two Focus Group Discussions were conducted, each one of them comprised of 8 members. The first focus group discussion was held with the representatives of Women and Youth Anti-corruption Forum (4) and Secondary Schools’ Civics and Ethical Study Clubs (4). The second FGD was held by representatives of civil society organizations which comprised of religious elders (2), elder association (1), business association (2), teachers association (1) and NGOs (2). Based on these sampling procedures the total sample size of this study was (n = 224).


4. Major Findings and Discussion

A total of 198 (100%) questionnaires were distributed but properly filled and returned were 184 (92.9%). And those not properly filled and returned back were 14 (7%). From properly filled and returned respondents 110 (59.8 %) were Civil servants, 74 (40.3 %) were general public.

Out of 10 interview respondents and 16 FGDs participants, 100% respondents participated in both and provided necessary information on the issue under investigation. In general, out of 224, 210 (94%) respondents participated in this research to provide necessary information. This part presents both results and discussions simultaneously based on the themes derived from the objectives of the research. Hence, concerning to fundamental objectives of the foundation of Ethics Liaison Units in the study area, as interview conducted with ELUs officers, their response indicated that the fundamental objectives behind the establishment of ELU in the study area were to prevent corruption before it happens through the promotion of ethical values in the society. Additionally, as the researchers analyzed the document, ELUs establishment regulation No 84/2003, article 3 & 7 and revised ELUs guideline 16/2005 shows that receiving complains of corruption and detections mentioned as other objective of ELUs in the study area. This information reveals that creating awareness, prevention and receiving reports of corruption and presenting them for concerned bodies for investigation (partial) are the major duties of ELUS in the study area. Regarding the Ethics Liaison Units achievements, ELUs efforts analyzed to get their real picture of attainment level of target objectives in the study area as follows.

Concerning to awareness creation training: Ethics liaison units officers' interview response indicated that since their establishments, ELUs gave awareness creation training for civil servants and other citizens on wider areas of concept of ethics and corruption, strategies of fighting against corruption, the code of conducts, criminal law of corruption and how to report complains of corruption and others. To examine up to what extent ELUs were disseminating ethics and anti-corruption education in the study area, the quantitative data was taken from ELUs annual reports.

Figure 4.1 Number of Citizens Obtained Awareness Training



Source: ELUs Annual Reports, 2015

This figure shows that the participants number in awareness creation are steadily increasing from year to year. Hence, this result shows a good progress in expanding of ethics and anti-corruption education in the study area. However, when it is compared approximately with the total population of Hadiya zone which is 1,231,196 according to 2007 census still the outreach of awareness creation is very low in the study area. Regarding to this one of the interviewees replied that “there is a great gap even among political leaders concerning the wise understanding of what they do and try to lead the others on corruption strategies.” Hence, this result reveals that still the outreach of ethics and anti-corruption needs further efforts by ELUs in the study area.

Concerning to prevention: ELUs establishment Regulation No 84/2003 and their revised guideline 16/2005, Article 3 the units follow twofold preventive approaches: long-term and short-term.

The interview with ELUs officers reveals that since their establishment ELU prevents many public assets and budgets in short-term prevention approach from wastage. Regarding long-term approach, new work procedures are proposed in different corruption prone areas as shown in figure 4.2 above.

Table 4.2: Number of New Proposed Work Systems and their Follow-up

Year	New proposed work sent by commission	New proposed work system by ELUs	Followed up
2012	---	---	Previous rule and regulations were followed
2013	8	3	7
2014	2	2	3
2015	2	4	4

Source: ELUs Annual Reports, 2015

The table shows that at the beginning year no new work procedures were sent by the Commission nor proposed by ELUs themselves in the study area. However, in the following years there were good progresses in proposing new work system and following their implementations. As informed by one of the key informants that this is a quite good efforts and progress in combating corruption in the study area.

Receiving Complaints of Corruption and their Investigation

Table 4.3:- Reported cases of corruption and completion of investigation

Years	Number of reported cases	Substantiated cases		Disciplinary measurements were taken	Criminal sanctions were taken
		under simple breaches of the codes of ethics	Under serious breaches of codes of ethics		
2012	106	57	7	17	-
2013	290	84	15	37	3
2014	247	76	12	49	2
2015	137	67	11	24	1

Source: ELUs Annual Reports, 2015

This table shows that the incoming cases of corruption increased to some extent within first two consecutive years of its inception. At the same time, table shows the declining trend after 2014 from 247 numbers of reported cases to 137. It also reveals that the decision levels in both 'disciplinary measurement' and 'criminal sanction' were very weak. An interview with ELUs officers concerning this issue reveals that since too much delay of Commission to take criminal sanction on corrupt individuals and no attention of concerned head of a given public office to take disciplinary measurement in identified cases of simple breaches of the code of ethics was minimizing the trust of citizens in performance of ELUs and so the ethics officers seen as simply a titular person. Furthermore, FGDs information reveals that the organization structure itself has a great gap. It made ELUs too much powerless and more dependent on concerned head of the office as well as the commission. Therefore, this result shows that as the sanction is very weak on the corrupter in the study area, the public trust and confidence is decreasing on ELUs from time to time.

Challenges and Opportunities of Ethics Liaison Units in combating corruption in the study area

In this part an attempt is made to discuss the challenges which hinder and prospects which promote the achievement of ELUs in the study area. Concerning the challenges as 149(81%) informants reported that there were no eligibility criteria in assigning ELUs officers in the study area. But a few of them 35(19%) reported that the assignment of ELU officers was based on eligibility criteria. In this vein information from FGDs reveals that rather it was happening in relative approach and mood of relationship in the study area. Almost all 177(96.2%) except 7(3.8%) of the respondents informed that ELUs were not independent in the study area. Majority 162(88%) except 22(12%) of informants informed that there was no public confidence and trust in ELUs in the study area. Moreover, 152(82.6%) of the respondents informed that as there were no practical political will and commitment but 32(17.4%) of the respondents informed that there was political will to combat corruption.


On the other hand, 167(90.8%) of the respondents informed that ELUs did not obtain enough budget and materials while only 17(9.2%) of the respondents informed that ELUs obtained necessary budget and materials. These results clearly indicate that ELUs are facing challenges from different exogenous and endogenous factors in the study area such as institutional dependency, lack of sufficient budget and materials, shortage of competent and skillful human power, lack of authentic political will, lack of trust and confidence of people. During interviews with ELUs officers regarding opportunities of ELUs in the study area reveal that, higher salaries of ethics officers compared to other government employees, pre-job training and presence of clear work manuals, commitments and collaborations of a few individuals are found as prospects.

5. Conclusions and Recommendation

Conclusions: Based on the findings under each three specific objectives of this research, the following conclusions can be drawn. Regarding the main objective behind the establishment of ELUs was to prevent corruption before it happens besides the creation of awareness, prevention and receiving reports of corruption and presenting them before the concerned bodies for further investigation. Regarding their effectiveness in creating the awareness among the citizens, even though the number is low when it is compared with the total population of the study area, ELUs disseminated Ethics and Anti-corruption Education to about 39,799 citizens and protected from much wastage of public budget and assets following long-term and quick preventive approach. Furthermore, ELUs received about 780 reports of corruption and detected them. However, taking disciplinary measurement and criminal sanction on corrupter is very low in the study area. Regarding to the third objective of this research, too much dependency, lack of sufficient resources both human and materials, absence of practical political leaders' commitment, lack of trust and confidence of people were seen as the major challenges which hinder the realization of ELUs in the study area. While higher salaries of ethics officers compared to other government employees, pre-job training and presence of clear work manuals, commitments and collaborations of a few individuals are positively found.

Recommendation: the following points were forwarded as remedial action to overcome those challenges or hindrances:

- **Responsible leadership:** By not only oral speech but it is recommended that political leaders should be committed practically to support ELUs by allocating sufficient budgets and fulfilling all necessary requirements for assuring their independency.
- **In addition to preventive approach, more attention should be given to punish the corrupters:** Code of conduct is only strong when its sanction mechanisms strengthened. It is recommended that the concerned bodies punish the corrupters irrespective of due consideration to build the confidence among the people and to make use of those funds spent on public awareness program against corruption.
- **Ways of assigning ELUs officers should be revised:** Number of employees in ELUs and way of assigning was seen as one of the major institutional constraints in the study area. So it is recommended that the Commission should revise human resource manual regarding the number of employees required in Ethics Liaison Units and their recruitment criteria should be well defined to improve the efficiency of ELUs in the study area.
- **Essential attention should be given to disseminate ethics and anti-corruption education in the study area:** Since fighting corruption is not one-time campaign, it is recommended to disseminate ethics and anti-corruption education progressively among the members of society to promote zero-tolerance on corruption.
- **Reshaping the organizational structure of ELUs:** It is recommended that the SNNPRS' EACC should reshape the organizational structure of ELUs by giving full power to lower units in the following proposed manner.



Key:

- Top to bottom r/ns
- Accountability
- Co-operation and Collaboration

References

Alam Minhaj et al. (2014), “Preventing Bad Governance in Ethiopia: Major instruments of Anti-Corruption Drive”, Aligarh Muslim University, Department of Political Science, *Indian Journals of Politics*, Vol. 48(1-2):159-183.

Amundsen, Inge. (1999), *Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues*. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human rights (Working Paper 1999:7)

Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (2010), *Unpacking the Concept of Political Will to Confront Corruption*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center.

Arsema Tamyalew. (2010), A Review of the Effectiveness of the Federal Ethics and Anti- Corruption Commission of Ethiopia, <https://www.acauthorities.org>

Arsema Tamyalew. (2011), A Review of the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea (ACRC), World Bank.

- Anwar Shah. (2007), Public Sector Governance and Accountability series: *Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption*. The World Bank, Washington, D.C
- Awoke Amzaye. (2007), *Mosaic Culture and Peoples of SNNPR*. Hawassa: African Printing Co
- Begoivic Boris. (2005), “Corruption concepts, types, causes and consequences”, year III, Nov, 26, 2005
- Belachew Mekuria. (2001), Corruption and Human Rights, Thesis, Law Faculty, AAU. (Unpublished)
- Berihun Kebede. (2000), ‘*Yatse Haileselassie Tarik*’. Artistic Printing Press. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (In Amharic)
- Bevier Mark. (2007), “Encyclopedia of Governance” University of Caltorinia, Berkeley USA Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines(CGVG), (2009). Issued by Indian Ministry of Company Affairs
- Bottelier, Pieter. (1998), Corruption and Development. Remarks for International Symposium on The Prevention and Control of Financial Fraud. East Asia and Pacific Region, The World Bank. (Beijing, October 19, 1998)
- Brinkerhoff, Derick W. (2000), Assessing Political Will for Anticorruption Efforts: An Analytic Framework, *Public Administration and Development* 20(3): 239-253
- Camerer M. (2008), South Africa Institute of international Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper, Analyzing Key Police and Governance issues in Africa and beyond: What makes for Effective Anti-Corruption System?
- Camerer. (2009), ‘Measuring Public Integrity’, *Journal of Democracy*: Vol.17, 2006
- Chene, M. (2012), U4 Expert Answer. Centralized versus Decentralized anti-Corruption Institution www.U4.no.
- _____ (2009), Coordination mechanisms of anti-corruption Institutions <http://www.u4.no/publications/coordinationMechanisms-ofanti-corruption-institutions/>
- Christophe Stückel berger. (2010), *Corruption-Free Churches are Possible: Experiences, Values, Solutions*(www.globethics.net)
- CGG, (2000), Corruption, Local Governance and Decentralization, Sirerra Leoncans
- CIPE, (2008), Combating Corruption, A Private sector approach, New York.
- CSRP, (1998), Ethiopia Civil Service Reform Program, (Unpublished)
- De Graaf, G. (2007), *Causes of Corruption: Towards A Contextual Theory of Corruption*, PAQ SPRING
- De Sousa, Luis. (2009), *Dose Performance Matter to Institutional Survival? The Method and Politics of performance measurement for Anticorruption Agencies*, EUI working paper
- Doig, et al. (2007). “Why do developing country anticorruption commissions fail to deal with corruption? Understanding the three dilemmas of organizational development, performance expectation, and donor and government cycles” *Public Administration and Development*, vol 27(3):251 – 259
- Dr. Inge Amundsen et al. (2009), *Public Sector Ethics*: Catholic University of Angola (UCAN).
- HZELUs, (2012-2015), Annual Performance Reports.
- FDRE, (2001), Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ethics and Anti-Corruption. Commission(FEACC) Proclamation Number 235/2001, Federal Nagarit Gazeta, Berhanena Selam Printing Press, Addis Ababa
- _____ (1995), the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- FEACC and Regional EACCs (2012), Profile of Federal and Regional Ethics and Anti-Corruptions of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.
- FEACC, (2004), principles of ethics and crimes of corruption brusher, A.A Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission – <http://www.feac.gov.et/>.
- _____ (2002), Corruption Prevention and Research Department. Studies on practices and procedures in Privatization Agency to secure the revision of methods of work, which may be conducive to corrupt practices. (Unpublished)
- Family Health International. (2005), *Qualitative Research Method: A data collector’s Field guide*, USA
- F., & Jacobs J. (1996), *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective*, the University of Chicago Press: Chicago
- Gambetta, D. (1993), *The Sicilian Mafia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Giday Degefu. (2000). *Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Ethiopia*. George Printing
- Gould, David J. (1991), Administrative Corruption: Incidence, Cause, and Remedial Strategies. In Ali Farazm and (ed.) *Handbook of Comparative Development and Public Administration*.
- Gray and Kaufmann. (1998), Corruption and Development. In *New Perspectives on Combating Corruption*, A joint publication of Transparency International and the Economic Development Instrument of the WB.,USA
- HZAELU, (2015), revised statistical information of Hadiya Zone ethics liaison units, Hossana

- Jackall, R. (1988), *Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers*, New York, Oxford University Press
- Johnston, Michael. (1999), *A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies*, in the *Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, eds. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.).
- IER, AAU. (2001), *Corruption Survey in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Klitgaard, R. (1988), *Controlling Corruption*: Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Klitgaard, Robert. (1998), "International Cooperation against Corruption." *Finance & Development*, March 1998.
- Korajian, Garbes. (2003), *Good Governance, Transparency and Reform Measures to Enhance Accountability in Ethiopia. A Six-day Course. (Draft Manual)* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Leff, H.N. (1979), "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption" in M.U. Ekpo Ed. *Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a Search for Causes and Consequences*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
- Leys, C. (1970), "What is the Problem about Corruption?" in A.J. Heidenheimer ed. *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
- Lo, T.W. (1993), *Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Matsheza, P and Kunaka, C. (2000), *Anti Corruption Mechanisms and Strategies in Southern Africa*. Harare: Kuku Publishing Services.
- Matlhare Boitshoko. (2006), *an Evaluation of the Role of the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC)*, Botswana
- Melese Alemu. (2012), *Factors associated with Urban Land Corruption in Hossana Town Administration, Hadiya Zone, SNNPRS*, Unpublished M.A Thesis, Ethiopia, Hawassa University
- Meagher, Patrick. (2004), "Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric versus Reality" *University of Maryland, the Journal of Policy Reform*, Vol 8 (69): 103
- Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew. (2009), *Anti-Corruption Measures for the prosecution service: The Singapore perspective*.
- OECD, (2007), *Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions Reviews of Models*, OECD Anti-Corruption Network for East Europe and central Asia. OECD, (2007), *Specialized anti-corruption institutions: review of models* <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/4/39971975.pdf>
- Paulos Chanie. (2000), *Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects*. In *Regional and Local Development Studies, Working Paper. No. 8. (August)*. AAU, Addis Ababa
- Punch, M. (2000), "Police Corruption and Its Prevention. European ", *Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, vol 8: 301-324
- Poulvan Der Molen et al. (2007), *Corruption and Land Administration, international institutions For GSEO*, Netherland
- Rogow, A.A. and H.D. Laswell. (1970), "The Definition of Corruption" in A.J. Heidenheimer ed. *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*. New York:
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Shimelis Ayalew. (2005), *Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Ethiopia: A case study of the Ethiopian Customs Authority, Regional and Local Development Studies, A.A, University, Ethiopia (Unpublished)*
- Sen, Amartya. (1999), *Development as Freedom*. Oxford University Press
- Silken, Peter. (1997), *the Fight against Corruption*. CSRP-CO.(Unpublished).
- SNNPRS, (2014), *The Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State amended Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 142/2014*, *Debub Negarit Gazeta*, Addis Ababa, Branna Printing Enterprise.
- _____ (2011), *South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State Ethics Liaison Unit Establishment Proclamation Number 84/2011*, *Debub Negarit Gazeta*, Addis Ababa, Branna Printing Enterprise.
- _____ (2011), *South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State Disclosure and Registration of Assets, Proclamation No 138/2011*, *Debub Negarit Gazeta*, Addis Ababa, Branna Printing Enterprise.
- _____ (2002), *The Southern Nation, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission establishment Proclamation No. 48/2002*, *Debub Negarit Gazeta*, Addis Ababa, Branna Printing Enterprise.

- _____ (2001), the Revised Constitution of South, Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State.
- Selamu Sulamo. (2010), Preventive Approach to combat corruption and the SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. The Case of Durame Town Administration, Unpublished MA Thesis, Ethiopia, Hawassa University, Transparency International, (2011). National Integrity System Assessment Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.
- Transparency Ethiopia, (2008), *Corruption diagnostic baseline survey report*, Addis Ababa, Branna printing enterprises
- Tesfaye Shamebo. (2003), *Anti-Corruption effort in Ethiopia, FEACC Prevention and Research Department*, Unpublished, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- Theobald, R. (1990), *Corruption Development and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.
- Tilman, R.O. (1970), "Black Market Bureaucracy" in A.J. Heidenheimer ed. *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*. New York
- United Nation Center for Human Settlement, (2002), *Bestpractice-Effective and Efficient service to the Public*, Addis Ababa
- UNODC, (2004), *United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)*, New York
- UNOD (2011), *Impact of corruption on development and how states can better tackle corruption to be under the spotlight at UN Anti- Corruption Conference in Morocco*
- UNDP, (2005), *Institutional arrangements to combat corruption*[http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Corruption Comparative Study-200512. Pdf](http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Corruption Comparative Study-200512.Pdf)
- UN, ODCCP, (2001), *Value Added of Partnership in the Fight against Corruption*. Global Program against Corruption Conference. Vienna. (Unpublished)
- World Bank, (1997), *World Development Report 1997*, New York, Oxford University
- World Bank. (2000), *The Quality of Growth*. Oxford University Press Inc. 1983 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.
- Williamson, O. (1950), "The institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform." In proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics: 1994, edited by Michael Bruno and Borispleskovic, Washington, D.C, World Bank
- Yamane, Taro. (1967), *Statistics: An Introductory Analysis*, 2nd, Ed., New York, Harper and Row
- Yonas Yansiso. (2003), *the Effect of Population Pressure on Land Utility in Sonda Peasants' Association, Sooro Woreda of Hadiya, Zone in SNNPR*. (Unpublished)
- Zenghe He. (2000), *Corruption and Anti-Corruption in reform China*, University of California, Elsevier Science Ltd.