

State Referent Objects of Security in Sudan-Chad Transnational Borderland

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Abstract

Sudan and Chad, despite having different referent objects of security in the transnational borderlands of eastern Chad and Sudan's Darfur, brought about similar insecurity outcomes in the borderlands. Sudan's referent object of security was the Arabo-Islamic identity, although in 2007-2016, it transitioned to regime security. Chad, on the other, pursued the Chadian ruling regime security. Although both countries supported each other's rebels, the other measures pursued by each were different. Sudan mobilised ground soldiers to carry out reprisals on African indigenous communities; she established and armed Arab Janjaweed militia group; and carried out aerial raids targeting civilians in the borderlands. Chad, on the other hand, concentrated government troops in specific places to protect the Chadian government; mobilised government friendly ethnic groups to carry out reprisals on civilians; and sometimes armed "enemy" ethnic groups to provoke cataclysmic fights amongst the enemy ethnic groups. Additionally, Chad subcontracted the security of citizens to rebel groups fighting the Sudanese government; and carried out aerial raids on rebel positions inside Sudan. The security measures of the two countries were oriented to different referent objects, but the measures did serve to mutually reinforce insecurity. The study concludes that the focus on a state's referent object of security can bring up hidden contrasts and comparisons that can influence the adoption of better state security policy and practice in transnational borderlands.

Key words: Securitization Theory, Transnational borderland Security & Identity Politics

1.1 Introduction: Securitization Theory and Empirical Studies

Referent object of security refers to "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buran, Weaver and Wilde, 1998: 36). Securitizing actor, on the other hand, is the agent that declares something as a referent object of security (Balzaq, 2011). The borderland- constituted by eastern Chad and Sudan's Darfur, which is the subject of this study, has more or less the same ecological and human mix, as well as, intersecting insecurity episodes (International Business Publications [IDP], 2011:73). Security, which is a central concept in this study, in common parlance, means "the feeling of being safe from harm or danger" (Anum 2010: 11; Terriff, et al., 1991: 1). In realist view, the state is the main concern of security; although, due to the proliferation of insecurities in the post-cold war times, the concept has been deployed to include many other objects of security (Anum 2010:11). To manage this development, the concept "referent object of security" has come to be used to circumscribe the discourse and research in security studies (Annum 2010:11).

Eastern Chad and Sudan's Darfur region constitute a borderland that is transnational in nature (IDP 2011:73; Ploch 2010) and it is possible to study both Sudan and Chad's referent object of security therein. I use the postulations from the securitization theory to explain this phenomenon. This theory, affiliated to the Constructivism Theory of international Relations, takes insecurity to mean anything that threatens the referent object of security (Buran, et al., 1998: 24). The concept "securitization" is understood as the act that escalates politics of an object to a level above the normal rules of the game in society; the object of security is enacted as something special to justify special measures to safeguard it (Buran, et al., 1998: 23). The foregoing scholars opine that the practice of public policy might place an issue in a continuum ranging from non-politicised, through politicised to being securitized.² States such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Burma will politicise religion; while others such as the former USSR and Iran will securitize culture (Buran, et al., 1998: 24).

This theory views security as having referent objects in five sectors; namely, the military sector, the political sector, the economic sector, the societal sector and the environmental sector (Buran, et al., 1998: 23).³

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²The aforementioned authors view states as operating in different parts of the continuum on different issues.

³For explanation of insecurity in these domains please see Buran, et al., 1998: 22-23.


It is clear that securitization theory has yielded a very broad view of security. The danger with this exercise of securitization is that it tends to cause an endless spiral towards what is security. Some realist scholars might view this tendency as creating a fog over issues of military and state security threats that realists view as the core existential threats to society. But notwithstanding that criticism, this theory is more close to the concrete experience of modern society with its diffuse threats. In the next part, I examine Balzacq's work (2011) on securitization theory that is relevant for data collection in this study.

Balzacq (2011: 8) came up with three assumptions for securitization theory that makes the theory amenable to empirical studies. The three assumptions are: - the centrality of audience, the co-dependency of agency and context, and the "depositif and the structuring force of practices." In the first assumption, the author posits that securitization can be realized only if there is an audience backing the act of doing securitization. The author further informs that the securitizing audience is one which: a) has a direct causal connection with the issue; and b) has the ability to help the securitizing actor to tackle the envisaged threat (Balzacq, 2011: 8-9). The second assumption holds that securitization is achieved when there is co-dependency between agents and context; this implies that the object that is the referent object of reality should be related to the existential reality of the audience (Balzacq, 2011: 10). The third assumption is that securitization is implicated in the security practices that are put in place by the securitizing actor (Balzacq, 2011: 15). The rationale for the foregoing is that security tools rest upon some folk knowledge of what the threat is and what measures should be put in place to counter the threat (Balzacq, 2011: 16). The author opines that regulatory and capacity instruments are used to neutralize threats. Regulatory tools refer to government policies and the legal regimes that are enacted to deal with threats; while capacity tools are capacities such as military tactics and other coercive tools that help in the achievement of security goals (Balzacq (2011: 17).

1.2 Transnational borderland and the States Referent Objects of Security

Figure 1 gives the geographical location of the transnational borderland that astride the Sudan- Chad border; I also explain the referent object of security for each state. I argue that in the period of study, Sudan espoused an Arabo-Islamic identity; while Chad did enact a regime centric object of security.⁴ Sudan is designed, in spite its multi-religious and multi-racial nature, as an Arabo-Islamic state; an act that is seen to be perpetually threatened by the African peripheries (Deng (1995: 9-10; Lokosang 2010: 15-16).⁵ Darfur is one of the peripheries of Sudan and therefore, one of the regions viewed as endangering the emerging Arabo-Islamic state of the country.

Figure 1: Darfur and east Chad conflict zones map



Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6213202.stm>

The regulatory practices which the government of Sudan put in place to safeguard Arabo-Islamic identity include the following: Sharia law, the regulation of the school system, and the predatory state system (Adam, 2008: 163).⁶ In the 1960s and 1970s, the government banned the use of "indigenous languages in primary schools" (Adam, 2008: 163).

⁴As will be seen in this paper, the Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of identity of the Sudanese state seemed to fracture from 2013.

⁵ In Sudan, all the presidents have been Muslims from the north. In the same vein, since the independence of Sudan in 1956, the constitution has been Sharia at the core and the capital city, Khartoum, is located in the Muslim north

⁶ This policy started with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium that colonized Sudan.

Additionally, in high schools in the 1980s, the core of education was “Arabic languages and Islamic studies” (Adam, 2008:163). In the late 1970s, MuhamarGadadafi, the Libyan leader came up with an ideology that the Sahel belt exclusively belonged to Arabs (Adam, 2008: 160). Also Sudan was afflicted with succession of military coups: Numeriwas deposed by al Mahdi in 1986(CIJ 2006:1);while Al Mahdi was dethroned by Al Bashir in 1989 (CIJ 2006:1) -and all these leaders supported Gaddafi’s vision of Sahel as an exclusive homeland of Arabs.The politicization of the Arabo-Islamic identity spurred conflict between indigenous Africans⁷ and Arabs in Darfur; this led to a serious humanitarian crisis that resulted to the indictment of President Al Bashir by the Hague based international criminal Court(Cryer and Kalpouzoz 2010: 207).Table 1 indicates violence outcome in Dar Masalit, one of the affected areas in West Darfur.

Table 1: Details of Violence and Insecurity in Dar Masalit in West Darfur (April 2003-April 2004)

Region and category of atrocities	Alleged Perpetrators	Victims and numbers affected
Civilian killings	Government troops and Janjaweed	788 from Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa villages.
	Government air force	Aerial bombardment killed 32 civilians.
Sexual violence and rape	Janjaweed	Rape cases reported in nearly a half of the villages that were burned
Destruction of food stocks and other essential items		Done in entire stretches of land to drive away populations Janjaweed dug out buried grain Cattle and camels looted
Occupation and resettlement of villages by Janjaweed		By March 2004, Janjaweed families started occupying the land of the displaced Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.
Destruction of Mosques and killing of imams	Government forces and Janjaweed	Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa belong to Tijaniya sect of Sufi Islam that extends from Senegal to Sudan Government forces and Janjaweed burned at least 65 mosques; indigenous Korans were desecrated and at least 6 imams were killed.
Preventing displaced Masalit and Fur from returning	Janjaweed	Janjaweed were camping in burned villages to prevent the return of the displaced people

Source: HRW 2004: 7-38

As can be seen in Table 1, the resulting insecurity in Darfur, from April 2003 to April 2004, is attributed to three forces: the Sudanese army, the Janjaweed and the Chadian rebels. What is curious about the data is the “destruction of mosques, the killing of the imams and the desecration of the Quran” (HRW 2007: 27-28). One might think that because the protagonists are all Muslims the destruction would not occur. So what accounts for this? It appears that in the region, the indigenous Darfurists belong to a different Muslim sect than the one practised by the ruling regime in Sudan. The Darfurists belong to the *Tijaniya* Sufi sect, which is an Islamic sect practised by majority indigenous Africans in the Sahel region (HRW 2007:27-28).⁸ The sect teaches that adherents that are unwavering to the sect receive “grace and blessings” (Justice, 2004: 858). The sect is different from other Muslim sects in the “litanies (wird) that members say after prayer and the fact that their recitation (dhikr) generally takes place collectively rather than on an individual level” (Justice, 2004: 858). In the same vein, the sect usually uses the Andalusian-Saharan script, not the classic Arab handwriting of the Nile Valley” in the liturgies (Suleiman, 2011: 64). Additionally, the sect is culturally more egalitarian than other Sufi sects, and incorporates some African customs in their faith (Suleiman, 2004: 64; US Government, 2000:12). Thus, from the foregoing; one can understand that even Islam in Darfur is heterogeneous.

Chad has had a totally different referent object of security compared to Sudan. Chad was colonized by France and the former bequeathed the latter with a secular constitution. Also the Capital City of Chad N’djamena is located far in the Christian South. What is more, the first presidents of Chad, until 1980, were Christians from the south. Although the political leadership was authoritarian, the authoritarianism was freed from religious and even racial overtones.The non-racial overtone of Chadian policy can be seen from its foreign relations policy towards Israel and the Arabs.

⁷Indigenous Africans came up with rebel activity to defend themselves.

⁸The sect is named after Tijani Ahmad (1737-1815), a revered Muslim Saint who was born in Algeria to a Berber family (Justice, 2004: 857-858). That implies that the *Tijaniya* Sect of Sufi Islam is an African indigenous contribution to Islam.

First, the first President of Chad Tombalbaye, an African Christian southerner cut off relations with Israel in September 1972 “as an act of solidarity with the Palestinians” (IBP 2011:73). The third President of Chad Hissene Habre, who was another African Christian from Muslim dominated northern Chad did not normalize relations with Israel and was more disposed to fostering closer ties with the Arab states (IBP 2011: 73).⁹

But the key concern for the Chadian political leadership, since independence, has been the existential threat of rebels from Darfur and eastern Chad. These rebels deeply affected Chad so that “the political stability index of Chad is less than that of Sub-Saharan Africa” (IBP 2011: 81). In 1982, Hissene Habre, riding on the crest of his rebel movement¹⁰ fought from West Darfur and East Chad to capture power in N’djamena, Chad. Again in 1998, with the support of Chadian Arabs and Khartoum, Idriss Deby deposed Habre in 1990. This fact explains why in Chad there is “a truism that power comes from the east” (HRW 2007: 13). Viewing the Darfur and east Chad ethnic groups as a source of existential threat, Deby pursued two strategies- one domestic policy- the other foreign policy. Under the domestic policy, Deby rewarded his Zaghawa ethnic community and marginalized other communities. On the international front, Deby pursued AU supported détente with Sudan but the efforts did not payoff for each supported rebel activity to destabilise the other (IBP 2011: 81). The formation of Sudanese rebels (JEM and SLA) in Darfur in 2002 intensified friction between the two countries from 2005 to 2009 (IBP 2011:74-81).¹¹ From the foregoing an inference can be made about the Chadian “political personality.” Chadian security policy in the borderlands has been to protect Chadian government. Thus Eastern Chad has experienced Darfuri-like atrocities committed against the indigenous Africans since 2005, one reason being a spill over of the West Darfur conflict to Eastern Chad (HRW 2007). The losses and damage of the violence is indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: Insecurity in eastern Chad in 2006

Region and category of atrocities	Aggressors	Victims and numbers affected
a) Dar Tama	Zaghawa Ethnic Group	44 Tama men
killings of civilians		
Sexual violence and rape		Carried out but no numbers because of stigma
looting of civilian property		Livestock looting. Only dogs and donkeys left
population displacement		6,361 Tama ethnic group (inclusive of some Mararit ethnic group)
b) Dar Sila	Arab ethnic group	220 Dajo and Masalit
killings of civilians		
Population displacement		90,000
c) Dodgore-koukou axis	Arabs/Dajo	67 Africans (Dajos and Teros) + 4 Arabs
killings of civilians		
Population displacement		More than 9000
d) Kerfi area	Arabs and Dajo	More than 350 non Arabs and around 20 Arabs
killings of civilians		
looting of civilian property		Property raided particularly grains, huts burned
Population displacement		Occurred but no figures given
e) Koloy area	Arab militia	About 30 Dajos (non-Arab community)
killings of civilians		
sexual violence and rape		6 Dajo women gang raped
looting of civilian property		Village burned
population displacement		10,000- 12,000

Source: HRW 2007, 21-60

Thus one could conclude that the major difference between the two countries is “political personality”: Sudan espoused Arabo-Islamic ideology; while Chad had a secular liberal constitution (US Government 2000: 12); although,

⁹Indeed in 1988 “Chad recognized the state of Palestine which maintained a mission in N’djamena” (IBP, 2011: 73).

¹⁰The Front national de liberation du Tchad (FROLINAT)- and with the support of the Khartoum

¹¹The relation between the two countries was marked by an on and off diplomatic relations.

Chad's political culture can at best be said to be an immature democracy, where local politics and local issues are more important than overarching national politics (Ploch 2010). Thus in this study, using "political personality" as an independent variable is a complicated venture. Consequently, in each of these states, I have chosen to use referent object of security as a proxy for "political personality."

2.0 Methodology and Objectives of Study

This study adopts the disciplined configurative research objective (George and Bennet, 2005:75), to contrast the two cases: Sudan and Chad in the borderlands. The study will seek to deploy this theory to "serve heuristic purposes" (George and Bennet, 2005: 75) to explore the possibility of typological theories in security management in the transnational borderlands. This study also sought to explore the possibility of an ideal insecurity state model in transnational borderlands.

In this study, the independent variable will be the referent object of security of each country in the borderlands: the Arabo-Islamist nation for Sudan, and the regime/ government of Chad in Chad. The dependent variable for the foregoing independent variable is the security measures enacted in the transnational borderlands. The conditions that are assumed to be shared by both states are: similar composition of African and Arab communities, and low level of stateness in both states. The study utilizes within unit case III research design innovated by Gerring (May 2004: 343). This research design examines temporal variation of a phenomenon in several cases, in one spatial setting, in order to arrive at meaningful contrasts and comparisons (Gerring: 343). Thus the transnational borderlands will be treated as one spatial setting. The reason for this is that the region shares similar attributes: people, ecological conditions, and local political dynamics, so much so that the international boundaries are at best artificial. In this one unit, the two states, each with different referent objects of security, are examined to understand why they have contributed similar insecurity outcomes. Process tracing will be used to determine causality. Secondary sources, such as media material, published journals and books, are the source of data. Although this study is social constructivism in methodology, the author is socialized by concepts from Balzaq (2011) namely: Audience identification with the referent object, and security measures adopted by each state in the borderland. Thus the key questions that will be asked of each case are:-

1. What was the nature of audience identification with the referent object of security at the borderland?
2. What security measures, to safeguard the referent object, were put in place at the borderland by each state?
3. How do the findings in this study posit further development of Securitization Theory?

2.2.1 Referent Object of Security in Sudan 1986-2006

The Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of security in the borderlands was enhanced by Libya's Muhamar Gadhafi, who in the 1970s, developed *al-hizam Al-Arabi* (the Arab-belt)- a vision of a pure Arabic belt in the Sahel region-an area stretching from the Red Sea into the Atlantic Ocean (Adam, 2008: 160). It is Antonio Gramsci (Laclau & Mouffe 2001:66-76) who broke the ceiling from economism as a basis of articulating hegemony to the realm of ideology as a unifying force of communities with diverse subjectivities. Muhamar Gadhafi can be said to have articulated pan-Arab hegemony to knit together the diverse Arab communities in the Sahel region and in Darfur.¹² Gadhafi's aspirations received resonance from the local Arab politics in Darfur. In the early 1980s, the two dominant opposition Sudanese parties: National Islamic Party and the Umma Party that lost power to President Numeiri, in a coup in 1969, planned a comeback to power, and sought to mobilise the Arab communities in Darfur on Pan Arab platform. This move did put a wedge between indigenous Africans and the Arabs. Numeiri was deposed in 1985, and Sadiq al Mahdi of Umma Party was elected into power in 1986 (CIJ 2006:1). Soon afterwards, Adam opines, Arab communities started receiving weapons in the name of protecting themselves from John Garang's SPLM/A in the neighbouring South Sudan (Adam, 2008: 160). Adam concludes that Arabo-Islamic identity became the referent object of identity for Mahdi's regime because of the regime's close identification with the Libyan vision of the Sahel.

Al Mahdi's rule came to an end in 1989 when al Bashir and his National Islamic Front (NIF) took over power in a coup (CIJ 2006:1). Al Bashir tried to outbid Al Mahdi in the Arabo-Islamic project by coming up with the policy of "*Ingaz* (the Islamic movement) to promote the Arab policy. The regime in the 1990s, adopted a "civilization project" that equated Islamism with Arabism and hence being Muslim and non-Arab was not enough to be fully Muslim (Adam, 2008 163-164). In West Darfur, the *Ingaz* involved appointing leaders from the Arab militias, ignoring the pre-existing African Fur Native administrators (Ateem 2007: 17). Seisi Ateem (2007:14) notes further that the post-NIF period (1990-2000) saw the Arab-African conflict shoot from the previous 20 per cent to 54 per cent of the total social conflicts in Darfur.

¹²Arab hegemony here implies that the more than 13 individual Arab identities (see Ateem 2007:14) experienced overlapping subjectivity which united in a symbolic unity; this means the symbolic unity did not take away the existing individual Arab identities.

Thus the Arab communities of Darfur and East Chad appear to have embraced the securitization of Arabo-Islamic identity. But Seisi Ateem (2007:14) notes that whereas 13 Arab tribes attacked the Fur indigenous African communities in Darfur, “the large Arab tribes like the *Rezighat* of Southern Darfur, the *Habania* and the *Ta’aisha* were not party to that conflict.” This implies that the articulated Arab hegemony had frontiers that subverted the articulated hegemony. Such frontiers can help explain the fracture of Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of security which became apparent from 2007- something I have explained in section 2.2.2.¹³

The actor/audience identification with Arabo-Islamic identity was mediated by a plethora of events. First, Gaddafi did not just articulate a vision of a pure Arabic zone in the Sahel; he also recruited the Islamic legion to carry out armed conflict in the region (Elliesie 2010:199). The effect of Gaddafi’s racist ideology is that it reduced the issues to “Arabs versus Africans” (Elliesie 2010: 199).¹⁴ The Arab-African relations worsened from 1986; the year Al Sadiq al- Mahdi ascended to power (Adam 2008: 160). Adam even goes an extra mile to show that there were active “complimentary relationship..of reciprocal provision” between African and Arab communities in Darfur before animosities started in 1986 (Adam, 2008: 159). Flint and Adam blame drought, pressure on resources, and proliferation of illicit guns from Chadian conflict for the intensification of conflict (Flint, 2010: 6; Adam, 2008:160). Coalition for International Justice [CIJ] (2008:1) also mentions drought, particularly in the 1983/84, as accentuating the struggles between farmers and pastoralists. Ateem Seisi (2007:11) opines that the conflict stemmed from Arab pastoralists, haunted by drought, migrating to claim land rights in Darfur. What the foregoing implies is that resource scarcity and availability of guns and pan Arabism ideology did converge to facilitate the Arab adoption of Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of security. Given competition for resources with Africans, and given that Arabs were landless (Flint 2010), the social architecture that was created seemed to have been ripe for mobilisation of Arabo-Islamic identity for conflict. Adam makes similar observation:-

Heavily armed and mobilised by the idea of the Arab belt, Arabs began their banditry targeting the Fur- the largest African indigenous group in west Darfur. As a result, of systematic banditry, the Fur lost thousands of livestock between 1983 and 1987, and saw dozens dead and wounded. Annoyed by the central government’s indifference towards these incidents of banditry in Darfur, in 1987 Darfuris in Khartoum and central Sudan organized a peaceful protest March in Khartoum to warn the government of the problem. To the surprise of those concerned about the banditry in Darfur, Al-Mahdi’s government authorized the police to open fire on the protesters, and if the chief justice had passed the order, there would have been several victims” (Adam, 2008:160).

The Arabs in their attempts to wrestle control of Darfur took a more organized form with the formation of “*Altajamu’uAla’arabi*, translated as “Arab alliance” in 1987 (Adam, 2008:161). In September 1987, the Alliance wrote a letter to the then Prime Minister al Mahdi, citing exaggerated statistics of their population and contribution to the national and regional economy to claim more power positions (Adam, 2008:161). Although Mahdi is not recorded to have acquiesced to their demands, the foregoing grievance became a launching pad of aggressive attacks by the Arabs on indigenous people (Adam, 2008: 161). The woes of the indigenous Darfurists became severe in the 1990s when SPLM/A of southern Sudan started expanding into north Sudan, the development that rattled the Khartoum regime and some Arab groups in Darfur.¹⁵ The periphery was resisting the Arab centre of monopolizing power. In 1990-1992, out of frustration for atrocities against the Fur, Daoud Bolad, a Fur, staged a rebellion in Darfur in solidarity with John Garang’s Sudanese People Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M (Adam, 2008: 164). This brought in more reprisals from government forces that continued targeting the Fur, the Zagawa and Massaleets-other black Darfurists- up to early 2003 (Adam, 2008:164).

In 2003, two insurgent groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), citing alienation, started fighting the Khartoum government for to gain political autonomy and development (Plau 2006; Heleta, 2008: 5-6). The two rebel groups have different origins though. SLA/M had its origin in the activities of government armed Arab militia of 1987 discussed above. The insurgency started as a “Fur Self Defence Organization” in 1987-1989 (Plaut, 5 May 2006). The Zaghawa later joined the group when the government could not enforce compensation rules for their people that had been killed by the Arab militia (Plaut 2006). According to Marchal, some Zaghawa serving in the Chadian army and who were recruited by Both Hussein Habre and Idris Deby-both Zaghawa- joined the outfit (Fall 2008:430-431). In February 2003, the SLA commenced onslaught on Sudanese security forces (Plaut 2006).

¹³Between 1970 and 1989 Ateem (2007:14) notes that 70 percent of conflicts in Darfur were between Arab tribes.

¹⁴The inference on Arab support, is generated from the observation that there appeared to have been no Arab counterforce to the supporters of Arabo-Islamic ideology in Darfur

¹⁵From the 1980s, the SPLM/A war became more racial than religious for it spread “northward, into the non-Arab areas of Nuba in southern Kordofan, the Ingasana in Southern Blue Nile, and to a lesser degree, the Fur in the western region of Darfur” (Deng, 1995: 13).

The JEM, on the other hand, has a different background. It is curiously related to the efforts of Hassan al Turabi who came to power with al Bashir in 1989 (Plaut 2006). Bashir's coup, in 1989, had been supported by the National Islamic Front of Turabi (Plaut 2006). Due to his intellectual capacity, Turabi became the ideologue of the nascent government and even appeared the very supreme leader of the government (Plaut 2006). Always a calculating religio-politician, Turabi hosted in 1991 "an Arab Popular and Islamic Conference and became its Secretary-General" (Plaut 2006). Using this platform, Turabi sought to assist the African Muslims achieve greater power and resource distribution (Plaut 2006). This seemed to have worked in the short run but in 1999, Turabi, the speaker of Parliament, sought to use Parliament to clip the presidential powers, but that backfired. He was arrested and his supporters, including those from Darfur, removed from positions of power (CIJ 2006:3). The consequence is that the Darfur supporters of Turabi formed the JEM (CIJ 2006: 3). Adam argues that the formation of insurgency groups in Darfur vexed the Arabo-Islamist state." The government took the emergence of such groups as the opportunity to justify indiscriminate destruction of the indigenous populations regardless of sex, gender, age, status and so on resulting in violence that killed over 350,000 civilians" (Adam, 2008:164).¹⁶ When the insecurity situation worsened, the United Nations Security Council, on 31 March 2005, via Resolution 1593, referred the Darfur issue to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Cryer and Kalpouzos 2010: 206).¹⁷

Table 3 indicates the security measures taken by Sudan to protect Arabo-Islamic as its referent object of security. There are basically three capacity tools that were used by Khartoum: administration, the security personnel and the militia. Quach (2004: 7) informs that the Khartoum administration, since independence, established a "post-colonial predatory state" that served the interests of Arab ethnic elites in Khartoum. Additionally, it is Arab Sheikhs who operated from "local government offices in charge of taxation and recruitment of local manpower and resources" (Quach, 2004: 7). Another scholar confirms this scenario: the scholar reports that Al Bashir's administration, since 1994, had given greater power to Arab communities usurping the power from African ethnic groups (Behrends, Reyna and Schlee, 2011:97).

Table 3: Summary of security measures taken by Sudan Government 2006

Arming Chadian rebels

Mobilising ground soldiers to carry out reprisals on African indigenous communities

Establishing and arming Arab Janjaweed militia group

Carrying out aerial raids to Darfur African civilians in refugee camps in Chad

Source: HRW 2007

The second tool is the security forces. In the pursuit of counter-insurgency, the Government of Bashir used three security tools: the national army, allowing the Janjaweed to operate, and using the Chadian rebel groups (Flint 2004). Janjaweed means "evil fighters on horseback" and the use is not new to Darfur in Sudan. The Government of Sudan under Numeiri first used the group or a similar group to brutalize the civilians in southern Sudan in 1969-1985 (Flint 2004: 44).¹⁸ The speeches by Sudanese Foreign Affairs Minister and Omar Bashir seem to suggest that the militia was a tool of government. For instance Flint states that on April 24, 2004, the Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustapha Osman was quoted to have said "the government may have turned a blind eye towards the militia..this is true because those militias are targeting the rebellion" (Flint 2010: 23, 43).

Flint also quotes a speech by President al Bashir in Kulbus on December 31, 2003 in which he said "the government's priority was to defeat SLA rebellion using Janjaweed (Flint 2010: 43).¹⁹

Flint mentions another aspect of the deployment of the Janjaweed: hard-core criminals were recruited by the government to lead the group. The example given is that of Abdul Muhamed, a former army officer who was implicated in killings in Darfur and was accordingly sentenced for ten years in prison in 1999 (Flint 2004:47). However, the government is said to have released him to lead Janjaweed in Geneina in Darfur (Flint 2010: 47). To give the Janjaweed a free reign the police were said to have been instructed not to interfere with the militia as they carried out their orgy of killings (Flint 2010: 49). The militia group had barracks, Sudanese flags on those barracks and lines of hierarchy and brigades like those of the officers in the Sudanese army, as well as, similar uniform as the army except

¹⁶ The government mounted aerial attacks and deployed an Arab "proxy militia" called the Janjaweed to carry out grave reprisals against the indigenous African communities (Heleta, 2008: 6).

¹⁷ On 4 March 2009, the Trial Chamber of the ICC ruled that there were reasonable grounds to believe that al Bashir, was criminally responsible under article 25(3) (a) of the Rome statute as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator, for war crimes and crimes against humanity" (Cryer and Kalpouzos 2010: 207).

¹⁸ According to Flint, the foregoing "template was imposed" on Darfur in the 2003 onwards (Flint 2004: 44)

¹⁹ The President added "the horsemen would be one of the weapons to be used- alongside the army" (Flint, 2010: 43).

for “a badge depicting an armed horseman” (Flint 2010: 43-45).²⁰The government is also alleged to have worked with Chadian rebels, particularly the RDL of Tama ethnic group that had scores to settle with the Zaghawa (Massey and May 2006).²¹

2.2.2 Transition to Regime as a Referent Object of Identity 2007-2016

As discussed in the previous section, an articulated Arab hegemony was constructed in 1986/87-1989 from Arab tribes that had competing political subjectivities in Darfur (CIJ 2006:1; Adam, 2008: 160). But the hegemony could not hold from 2007 as each tribe, turned weapons given by the government to fight the rebels on rival Arab tribes; the alliance just snapped under the weight of competition for the spoils of resources and chieftaincies left by fleeing indigenous Africans (Flint 2010:4-5). Thus Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of identity entered into crisis mode as seen from increased inter-Arab fights. Thus the progressive weakening of indigenous African hold on land in Darfur also served to weaken Arab solidarity and Arabo-Islamic identity as a referent object of identity.²² One could argue that intra-Arab competition marked a transition from the Arab communities in Darfur valorising Arabo-Islamic identity to them retreating to their local Arab identities as it used to be before 1986/87. Table 4 indicates the intra-Arab conflicts in 2013 that characterised this transition.

Table 4: The Intra-Arab Conflicts in 2013 that led to this Transition

Year	Intra-Arab-conflict	Dead and Displaced
April-October 2013 in Central Darfur	Salamat versus Misseriya	Salamat Dead-300 Displaced-50,000 Misseriya-dead 300 Displaced-not given
January –June 2013 In North Darfur	Beni-Hussein versus Abbala Rizeigat	Beni-Hussein dead 840, injured 420 Rizeigat-fewer
January-August 2013 in East Darfur	Rizeigat versus Ma’ aliya	Rizeigat dead 126, injured 156 No data for Ma’aliya

Source:International Crisis Group (ICG) (2015 2015:7-9

Once this happened, the state became paranoid of its own security and this marked the beginning of Khartoum state elites transiting from Arabo-Islamic identity being a referent object of security to the Khartoum regime being a referent object of identity.²³ Thus the Khartoum regime put in place measures seen in Table 5 which clearly show that the regime sought to protect itself more than citizens- a practice that appeared displaced from the practice in the Chadian state discussed below.

Table 5: Summary of security measures taken by Sudan Government 2013-2016

Not disarming and not taking side in the intra-Arab conflict
Stopped paying some militias, providing food rations and ammunitions
Appointment of regional warlords into national government
Divide and rule” tactics to keep Darfur elites busy

Source:International Crisis Group (ICG) (2015 2015:7-15

2.3 Referent Objects of Identity in Chad.

Audience response towards Deby’s government was characterised by personal and ethnic rivalries that were organized as rebel movements to overthrow Idriss Deby (Massey and May 2006). Some rebel groups were even from Deby’s

²⁰The militia had the same logistics as the military “Thuraya satellite phones, and vehicles” (Flint 2010: 43-45). The Janjaweed is even alleged to have boasted that they were “The Government” (Flint, 2010: 42).

²¹Here was see another frontier case among African communities who aided in the performative act of protected the Arabo-Islamic identity.

²²This fragmentation of Arab Africans on account of the spoils of war is akin to the discourse on the fragmentation of the working class in late colonialism developed into highly diverse sectors that fragmented workers and forestalled solidarity (see (Laclau & Mouffe 2001).

²³Indeed Flint (2010:5) avers that tribal Arab heads blamed the government for doing little to contain inter-Arab fights for the government tolerated the fights to weaken the Arabs from challenging the government.

Zaghawa ethnic group; more worse, some were Deby’s close family members. This also implies that the articulated hegemony of the Zaghawa people to support Deby was itself not a totality- it had frontiers that tried to subvert the articulation and this explains why the opposition for Deby could be located right in the Zaghawa community. Table 6 indicates rebel groups and ethnic affiliates of these groups in eastern Chad that sought to overthrow Deby. World Directories of Minorities and Indigenous people (2007) gives the following chronology of events in Chad in 1982-1994. After Habre took power in 1982, Habre’s government splintered along ethnic lines. In 1989, the splintering provided an opportunity for Deby, a military General under Habre and from the Bideyat Zaghawa, to organize for a counterinsurgency from Darfur against Habre. Second, Deby, in order to execute his plan in West Darfur, met his fellow Zaghawa, and Tama ethnic group, that he mobilised. In 1990, Deby with the support of Libya and tacit approval of France, wrestled N’djamena from Habre who flew to Senegal. Before his escape, Habre had carried out serious reprisals on the Zaghawa in eastern Chad. But, with Deby in power and domination of his Zaghawa ethnic group consolidated in power, another cycle of rebel activity based around ethnic groups proliferated in Eastern Chad. In 1994, Mahamat Nour of Tama ethnic group who supported Deby to grab power in 1990, quit in a whiff to establish, a rebel group²⁴ to contest for power.

Table 6: Rebel groups of ethnic groups in Eastern Chad

Rebel Group	Year formed	Ethnic affiliation
1.The movement pour la paix, la reconstruction et le development (MPRD)	1992	Southern ethnic group
2.Rassemblement pour la democratie et les libertes (RDL)	1994	Tama
3.Movement pour le Democratique at la Justice au TCHAD (MDJT)	1998	Goran
4.Front uni pour la Changement(FUC)	End of December 2005	Tama and some Zaghawa
5.Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques (RAFD) 6.The Socle Pour Le Changment,L’unite Et La Democratie (SCUD)	February 2006	Zaghawa

Source: Massey and May (2006) andHRW 2007

In 2003, while in Sudan, Nour worked with the Janjaweed to enlist the Tama in his rebel movement (Massey and May 2006). In return, the rebel movement worked hand in glove in attacks against the Zaghawa in Darfur. The rebel group and Janjaweed also followed and attacked refugees in eastern Chad (Massey and May 2006).In the same vein, in December, 2005, in Darfur, Nour gobbled up a rebel coalition called Front uni pour la changement (FUC) (Massey and May 2006). This rebel umbrella consisted of his RDL rebel group and eight other rebel groups (Massey and May 2006). The rebel group, taking advantage of massive deployment of Chadian soldiers in the east, took a quick leap on N’djamena from southern Chad and Central African Republic (Massey and May, July 2006). The rebel group’s take over bit was thwarted by French troops and the upshot is that the rebel movement lost 400 fighters (Massey and May 2006). Soon afterwards, Libya brokered a peace deal between Deby’s government and the Tama faction of FUC.²⁵ As a result, MahamatNour was appointed a Defence Minister and his troops were to be integrated into the army.²⁶

The arrangement, however, did not work because FUC was cautious to disarm and the government forces became impatient and sought to disarm them by force (OneindiaNews 2007). This backfired and FUC started an onslaught against the government positions from the east.²⁷ Nour, on the other hand, fled into the Libyan Embassy in N’djamena (BBC News 2007).In addition to the foregoing, in February 2006, the Rassemblement des forces Deemocratiques (RAFD) was established as an umbrella rebel group for three parties²⁸(HRW 2007:17; Massey and May 2006). The

²⁴ The Rassemblement pour la democratie et les libertes (RDL)

²⁵ World Directories of Minorities and Indigenous people, 2007.

²⁶ World Directories of Minorities and Indigenous people, 2007

²⁷ World Directories of Minorities and Indigenous people, 2007

²⁸The Socle Pour Le Changment,L’unitee Et La Deemocratie(SCUD) led by YahyaDilloDjerou, the leader of Deby’s Bideyat Zaghawa clan (HRW,JAN 2007:17), and other two groups led by “former army commander SebyAquid and RamadaneBokhit

rebel groups were drawn from the Zaghawa ethnic group of Deby; of important to note is that majority of these Zaghawa were defectees from the famed Presidential Guard and close allies of Deby (Massey and May 2006).²⁹

The other dynamic element that further fractured the African groups in eastern Chad and Darfur is the deterioration of relation between Chadian and the Sudanese Government. The two governments backed each other's rebel groups. Rebel groups in both countries were indigenous Africans. Prior to 2004, Deby was an ally of Khartoum because the latter supported him to ascend to power in 1990 (HRW 2007: 16). But as the Chadian rebels and Khartoum backed Janjaweed committed atrocities against the Zaghawa people, informally, some members of the military in Chad- especially the Zaghawa- started supporting the Sudan rebels (HRW2007: 16). It became a tit for tat as the Sudanese government started aiding the RDL and SCUD; and Chad started aiding the Janjaweed Militia in assaulting the African communities HRW 2007: 17-18). The FUC assault of April 2006 that nearly swept Deby off power had the Sudanese backing (HRW 2007: 18). By May 2006, JEM and SLA had been granted bases in eastern Chad to operate from (HRW2007: 19). From the foregoing account, it is clear that Chad's major referent object of security- the Zaghawa dominated regime had no support from African communities- the regime had no support even from some Zaghawa- the core ethnic group that Deby relied on.

“The Government of Chad does not fight the Janjaweed; they fight to stay in power, but not for the people” (HRW, Jan, 2007:56). The foregoing quote aptly captures the practice of security where the referent object was/is the government rather than the masses. The government and military in Chad have been dominated by a tiny Zaghawa ethnic group since 1990 when Deby came to power. The Zaghawa community is just about 3 per cent of the Chadian population (Ploch 2010: 3) and the measures put in place have been aimed at protecting the personal power of Deby.³⁰ These security practices are captured in Table 7.

Table 7: Summary of security measures taken by Chadian Government in 2006

- Concentrating government troops in specific places to protect government
- Mobilising government supporting ethnic groups to carry out reprisals on civilians
- Arming enemy ethnic groups to provoke cataclysmic fights among them
- Subcontracting security of citizens to rebel groups of a rival state.
- Carrying out aerial raids to target rebel groups operating from a rival country

Source: HRW, Jan, 2007: 23

The Chadian Government fearing their troops to be overran by rebel groups, always concentrated troops in specific places. Specifically, since October, 2005, the Chadian National Army started moving soldiers from south-eastern Chad to strengthen “strategic points further to the north, such as Andre and Abeche against rebel attack” (HRW 2007: 21). The consequence of the foregoing is that from early 2006, certain army garrisons in southeast Chad had no troops (HRW 2007: 21).³¹ What is more, some border areas such as Ade and Daquessa were not adequately catered with troop numbers to deal with rebel menace (HRW 2007: 21).

The upshot of this security measure is that a huge security vacuum was created in southeast Chad, and the Janjaweed and Chadian rebels would thus carry out their attacks without an adequate counterforce (HRW 2007: 21). Besides, some groups not related to Janjaweed, the Chadian rebels, and the Khartoum regime, would also carry out cattle raids in the villages (HRW 2007: 22).

Human Rights Watch, quoting military sources, also seem to suggest that the government could have used the strategy of arming friendly ethnic groups against ethnic groups that are perceived as unfriendly (HRW 2007: 23).³² Other sources from the Chadian army captured by the Human Rights Watch is that sometimes the Chadian government armed two ethnic groups to encourage fights between the two groups. For instance in October 2006, the government is alleged to have armed the Salamat Arabs and Kibet non Arabs and inspired them to fight for both communities were perceived to support rebels fight Chadian Government (HRW 2007: 23).³³ Fourth, the Chadian government is also said to have

²⁹ For instance, “Tom Erdimi, Deby’s Head of the Cabinet and Coordinator of the Oil Project and his brother Timan, a director of Cottonchad, Chad’s cotton parastatal joined SCUD after being sent to negotiate with them” (Massey and May 2006). The foregoing two were nephews to Deby.

³⁰ These seem to suggest certain security practices that have ensured that Deby’s regime remains in power

³¹ These garrisons include Madoyna, Koumou, Koloy, Ade, Aourado, Borota, and Goungour

³² For instance, in 2006, Chadian security officials are reported to have exploited historical enmity between the Kamaya Goran and the AmakazaGoran in Faya, in northern Chad, by arming the Kamaya in a bid to destabilize the clan base of UFDD leader MahamatNouri, an AnakazaGoran”

³³ The Human Rights Watch recorded information from an ANT officer on November 29, 2006:-“An ANT officer told Human Rights Watch, “Déby sent soldiers and a government minister to Salamat, they told the Salamat Arabs, ““this land is

“subcontracted” some civilian security to the Darfur rebels (HRW 2007: 57). For instance, in Dar Sila, the Sudanese rebel groups helped to “arm and organize self-defence groups in the area which “led to the militarization of civilian communities” and more escalation of conflict (HRW 2007: 57-58).

2.4 Discussion: Further Development of Securitization theory?

The findings of this article appear to deductively assist in the development of typologies of securitization theory and the ideal model of the insecurity state in a borderland.

a) Typologies of Securitization Theory

The findings appear to contain two sets of propositions concerning how states in security management role might perpetuate insecurity episodes in transnational borderlands. The two theories derived from the two state cases are: the identity oriented state and the regime oriented state. The identity oriented state has its “political personality” preoccupied with social identity that is politicised and securitized. In a transnational borderland, such a state will deploy regulatory, administrative and brute force to protect the group associated with its fancied social identity. The state will have support from the militant and powerful groups belonging to the identity that is the referent object of security. In the process, those individuals or communities that are perceived to threaten the referent object bore the brunt of security measures. In this study, Sudan is an example of such a state.

The second theory concerns the regime/ government oriented state, which is preoccupied with the survival of the government, something that is also politicised and securitized. This kind of government, which is under siege, from both the external and internal enemies, will seek policies in the borderlands that ensure the survival of government. In other words, it will put security measures that maximize the longevity of government. The communities’ security in a transnational region will be a secondary consideration to such a government. In most cases, the government will create a security lacuna for the identity based government to carry on with its agenda of protecting the fancied identity. The government of Chad is an example of a government centric state in this study.

The Ideal Insecurity State

The ideal insecurity state refers to the non-real state that might be used as a heuristic tool to study how a state might generate insecurity for human communities in transnational borderlands. Such a state is idealistic because real cases are likely to be subsets of the ideal case. This study does support the development of an ideal insecurity state. The ideal state is achieved by combining the security measures adopted by both Sudan and Chadian governments into an ideal category of a radial type. A radial ideal model was developed by Collier and Mahon (1993). In figure 1, the measures by each state, are a secondary category to the ideal insecurity state. Sudan is represented by the identity-centric category; while Chad is captured as the government–centric category. The components section in the figure refers to security measures of the ideal insecurity state and the secondary categories. The key below the figure indicates the security measures represented by the capital letters in the component section.

Figure 1: Ideal model of insecurity state at intersecting borderlands

Category	components									
Primary/Ideal category	Insecurity state	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
Secondary categories	Identity-centric	A	B	C	D					
	Government-centric	A	E	F	G	H	I			

Key

- A.** Arming the rebels of a rival state
- B.** Mobilising ground soldiers to carry out reprisals on targeted civilians
- C.** Establishing and arming militia of protected groups
- D.** Carrying out aerial raids to target civilians fleeing to a rival country
- E.** Mobilising government supporting ethnic groups to carry out reprisals on civilians
- F.** Arming enemy ethnic groups to provoke cataclysmic fights among them
- G.** Concentrating government troops in specific places to protect government
- H.** Subcontracting security of citizens to rebel groups of a rival state.
- I.** Carrying out aerial raids to target rebel groups operating from a rival country.

2.5 Conclusion

yours. The Kibet are immigrants.’ They gave arms to the Salamat. Next Déby sent a delegation to the Kibet. They said, “‘The Salamat, they are with the rebels. They will do you wrong. You need to defend yourselves.’ (HRW 2007: 23).

This study has brought to light three issues. First, Sudan and Chad by virtue of different referent objects of security pursued different security measures. In order to protect the Arabo-Islamic identity, the Sudanese government appears to have directed and supported harmful security measures on African indigenous communities. Chad, on the other hand, to protect the Chadian regime from the borderland, instituted the security measures that privileged the security of the government and marginalized the security concerns of her citizens.

Secondly, although, the security measures of the two countries were oriented to different referent objects, the measures of both states did serve to mutually reinforce insecurity in the borderlands. First (see above) both measures militarized the borderlands for it involved the states arming the non-state actors. In the same vein, both states committed sins of omission and commission: Sudan did not provide security to African indigenous communities; and its army actively participated in aerial and ground attacks on civilians. Chad, on the commission side, armed friendly ethnic communities, and incited enemy ethnic communities to fight each other. On the omission side, Chad did leave the inhabitants in its territory exposed to militia and other armed groups.

Thirdly, this study has shown the possibility of constructing an ideal insecurity state that can be used as a heuristic tool to study the contribution of states to insecurity episodes in transnational borderlands. Although the two cases may not be adequate to categorically develop such an ideal insecurity state, future studies might further refine the model as more components are added to it. On the whole, this study has revealed that securitization theory can bring up hidden contrasts and comparisons that can influence the adoption of better state security policy and practice in transnational borderlands.

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